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This thesis examines the relationship between the law on unfair commercial practices and 
consumer contract law. The thesis develops the claim that Directive 2005/29/EC, on unfair 
commercial practices (UCPD) has had a strong impact on the content of consumer contract 
law, despite the declaration concerning the independence between both branches of law 
contained in Article 3(2) UCPD.  
In order to substantiate this claim, the thesis examines the implications for consumer contract 
law of the main components of the regulatory regime laid down by the UCPD, namely, (1) 
the notion of average consumer, (2) the duty to trade fairly, (3) the duty of information and 
(4) the remedies.  
By looking both at the theoretical underpinnings and at the actual operation of this regulatory 
regime, the thesis casts light on the way in which the UCPD has shaped consumer contract 
law. The thesis further shows that this is an ongoing phenomenon whose ramifications may 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
 
The main hypothesis and problem of the thesis  
Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices1 (“UCPD” or “Directive”) is the 
most powerful and complete instrument that the European Union (“EU” or “European 
Union”) has adopted, so far, in the area of consumer protection. Through its complex 
and effective mechanism for protection from all types of unfair commercial practices, 
the Directive provides an extensive and advanced mechanism for consumer 
protection. Its broad scope of application was confirmed by the case law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (“Court” or “ECJ”). The Court accordingly pointed 
out that the Directive’s rules apply to all kinds of commercial practices which in any 
manner may hinder economic interest of consumers.2  
 
The maximum harmonisation character of the Directive further adds to its importance 
and effects. The principal objective of the UCPD is twofold: firstly, to set up a unified 
and coherent European legal framework for fair trading, through the abolishment of 
all obstacles for cross border trade among Member States; secondly, to secure a 
sufficiently high and common level of consumer protection throughout the European 
Union.3  
 
What has remained unclear and ambiguous after the adoption of the Directive is the 
relationship between the law on unfair commercial practices, on the one side, and 
contract law, on the other side. This includes the existing body of European contract 
                                              
1 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the Internal Market and amending Council Directive 
84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive’), OJ L 149/22, 11.06.2005. 
2 Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07 VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV and Galatea BVBA v Sanoma 
Magazines Belgium NV [2009] ECR I-02949; Case C-304/08 Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren 
Wettbewerbs eV v Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [2010] ECR I-00217; Case C-522/08 Telekomunikacja 
Polska [2010] ECR I-2079; Case C-540/08 Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag v Österreich-
Zeitungsverlag GmbH [2010] ECR I-10909. 
3 Article 1 of the UCPD as confirmed by Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07 VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium 
NV and Galatea BVBA v Sanoma Magazines Belgium NV [2009] ECR I-02949, para 51; Case C-428/11 Purely 




law, i.e. the areas of contract law that have been subject to the ongoing process of 
Europeanisation, which is particularly noticeable in the area of consumer contract law, 
but also the national contract laws of the different Member States. The relationship 
between the law on unfair commercial practices and contract law has already attracted 
the attention from legal scholarship,4 from the case law of the ECJ5 and from high 
level officials responsible for consumer policy.6 However, the question has not been 
squarely addressed to date in a systematic and comprehensive manner. This is the gap 
that this thesis seeks to fill in.  
 
Thus, the main purpose of the thesis is to clarify the relationship between the law on 
unfair commercial practices and contract law, which has rightly been described as “a 
legally tricky area”.7 Such a study is not only of a theoretical significance, but it is 
also a topic of high practical importance, since in practice the rules of these two areas 
of law will often apply to the same factual situations, hence the need to reflect on how 
they are correlated and how they affect each other. 
 
The starting point of this thesis is the hypothesis that there is a connection and a 
dynamic interrelationship between the law on unfair commercial practices and 
contract law, despite the provision of the UCPD according to which its provisions are 
“without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, to the rules on the validity, 
                                              
4 H Collins, ‘EC Regulation on Unfair commercial practices’ in H Collins (ed), The Forthcoming EC Directive 
on Unfair Commercial Practices (Kluwer Law International 2004), 37; S Whittaker, ‘The Relationship of the 
Unfair Commercial Practices to European and National Contract Laws’ in S Weatherill and U Bernitz (eds), The 
Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29: New Rules and New Techniques (Hart 
2007), 141; J Stuyck, E Terryn and T Van Dyck, ‘Confidence through fairness? The new Directive on unfair 
business-to-consumer on commercial practices in the Internal Market’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 
107, 142; HW Micklitz, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices and European Private law’ in C Twigg-Flesner (ed) The 
Cambridge Companion to European Union Private Law (Cambridge University Press 2010), 231-232 
5 Case C-453/10 Jana Pereničová and Vladislav Perenič v SOS financ spol. s r. o. [2012] ECR I-0000 
6 A speech by Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission and European Commissioner for 
Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship at the European Consumer Summit 2013 in Brussels ‘Towards a 
more coherent enforcement of EU consumer rules’ (19 Mar 2013) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-237_en.htm 
7 U Bernitz, ‘Scope, Ambitions and Relation to Unfair Competition Law’ in S Weatherill and U Bernitz U (eds), 
The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29: New Rules and New Techniques 




formation or effect of a contract”.8 More precisely, this thesis will attempt to show 
that the law on unfair commercial practices has had a strong impact on consumer 
contract law.  
 
Moreover, I presume that the UCPD is used as a powerful tool aimed at fostering and 
strengthening the process of Europeanisation of contract law. Herein, I understand 
Europeanisation of contract law as a phenomenon that includes: first, the development 
of common contract rules at the European level; secondly, the penetration of EU 
common rules into traditional national contract law concepts; and, finally, the very 
process of harmonization of the Member States’ national laws.9  
 
The main research question  
With the goal of clarifying and understanding the relationship between these two areas 
of law, the main research question addressed in this thesis is the following: 
What is the impact of the law on unfair commercial practices as defined 
by Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices on consumer 
contract law? 
 
In order to provide an answer to this question, it is useful to break it down into several 
sub-questions:  
What are the main points of interlink between the law on unfair 
commercial practices and contract law? 
How do the two areas of law correlate through these main points of 
interlink? 
What lies behind the interaction of these two areas, i.e. has their 
correlation been intentional despite the formal separation? 
What are the effects and consequences of this interaction, in particular 
from the perspective of the Europeanisation of contract law? 
                                              
8 See Article 3(2) of the UCPD  





Is there any particular role of the innovative legal terminology for 
understanding their mutual relationship? 
Is it possible to draw any far-reaching conclusions in relation to 
European private law on the basis of the examined interplay? 
 
Structure of the thesis 
In order to verify my main research hypothesis and to provide an answer to each of 
the research questions listed above, the thesis is divided into six chapters: introductory 
chapter, four main chapters and a concluding chapter, which are all further divided 
into sections. The six chapters include: 
 
1) Introduction 
2) The average consumer 
3) The duty to trade fairly 
4) The duty of information  
5) Remedies  
6) Conclusions  
 
Each of the four main chapters of the thesis is dedicated to the analysis of one of four 
fundamental elements of the Directive. These four concepts are the four cross-points 
where the interlink and correlation between the law of unfair commercial practices 
and contract law is the most intense and relevant, as my research will show. They 
basically cover the entire system of protection of consumers provided by the UCPD. 
This is why, eventually, the examination of these four major interlink points between 
the law on unfair commercial practices and contract law will make it possible to draw 
conclusions and to clarify, at least to some extent, their complex mutual interlink.  
 
The average consumer is, according to the Directive, the main benchmark for the 
assessment of the fairness of a commercial practice, followed by the standard of 




represents a model of expected behaviour for he consumer that deserves to be 
protected by EU Consumer law. Despite the need for adoption of a related standard in 
relation to information and transparency requirements, such a standard did not exist in 
consumer contract law. In this Chapter of the thesis, I demonstrate that there is a 
noticeable tendency to consider that the standard of average consumer of the UCPD is 
also applicable in the context of consumer contract law.  
 
The duty to trade fairly has been established by the Directive as a general obligation 
of all traders while acting at the market, i.e., one that that applies to all their 
commercial practices whenever they may hinder consumers’ economic interests. Such 
a common and general duty, which would always regulate a trader’s behaviour, did 
not exist in consumer contract law. Due to its universal and broad character and the 
tight connection between a commercial practice and a contract, I argue in this Chapter 
that the duty to trade fairly now also applies and regulates all phases of any consumer 
contract.  
 
The duty of information is for the first time established through the provisions on 
misleading omissions of the Directive as a universal pre-contractual duty of traders in 
EU consumer law. Duty of information, as the main regulatory instrument of EU 
consumer law, was previously regulated through a fragmented, partial and incoherent 
European legislation, dispersed in a dozen of directives, characterized by a 
phenomenon of ‘information overload’. In this Chapter of the thesis, I demonstrate 
that the introduction of the universal duty of information by the UCPD, has resolved, 
to a certain extent, these shortcomings of contract law instruments. Moreover, I show 
that the Directive has also provided a European meaning to the notion of invitation to 
purchase, a par excellence contract law concept. 
 
Remedies represents an area for which the UCPD provides very scarce rules, leaving 
the procedural part of the law of unfair commercial practices to be regulated primarily 




of unfair commercial practice, has to rely on traditional contract law rules. What I 
show in this Chapter is the lack of capacity of the existing contract law concept to 
provide an adequate response to the breach of the rules of the Directive has led to their 
modification or adoption of new contract law remedies. In addition to this, I point out 
to the particularly dynamic relationship with the existing remedies developed by 
European contract law that may be used in certain cases as a convenient and easy 
means by an individual consumer for the purpose of remedying the breach of the 
UCPD. Contrary to this, the provisions of the UCPD provide an additional level of 
protection to consumer rights established through contract law instruments. 
 
Setting of the scene: the background of the problem 
Two branches of EU Consumer Law 
The system of EU consumer law consists of two large subcategories: the law on unfair 
commercial practices and consumer contract law.10 For the purposes of this thesis, I 
understand the law on unfair commercial practices exclusively as the set of rules 
defined by the UCPD that regulate exclusively business-to-consumer relations.  
Equally, I understand consumer contract law as comprising “any laws which govern 
the relative rights, duties or liabilities of the parties to a consumer contract, whatever 
the formal classification as a matter of national law”.11 In the thesis, I examine the 
relationship between these two areas of law as understood above, so that anything else 
is beyond its scope. 
 
The UCPD represents the main source of the law on unfair commercial practices; it 
provides a complete and thorough regulation of fair trading in business-to-consumer 
relations.12 Accordingly, there is a rather high level of harmonised rules on unfair 
commercial practices on the European level contained in one consistent piece of 
legislation. The UCPD materially affected national laws on unfair commercial 
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11 S Whittaker (n 4) 148 
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practices, having replaced previously existing diverse national regimes with only one 
set of rules, based on the principle of maximum harmonisation.13 Therefore, the 
remaining, non-harmonised national provisions on unfair commercial practices, in 
particular those of substantive character, fall outside the scope of the thesis.14  
Furthermore, it is true that the law on unfair commercial practices is also embodied in 
other pieces of legislation, but their significance is, in general, minor and therefore 
irrelevant for thesis.15 
 
 
Contrary to highly harmonised law on unfair commercial practices, only a small part 
of contract law has been affected, so far, by the process of Europeanisation, whereas 
its significantly larger part is still contained in the national laws. The area of contract 
law affected by far the most by the process of Europeanisation is the field of consumer 
contract law.16 However, despite an increasing pace of Europeanisation, a significant 
part of consumer contract law is still regulated by the rules defined by national 
contract laws of Member States. Furthermore, unlike in the case of the rules on unfair 
commercial practices, the rules on European consumer contract law are rather 
fragmented and dispersed throughout several directives.17  
                                              
13 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European and Economic Social 
Committee, COM (2013) 139 final, 4 
14 Herein, I primarily think to fields of substantive law not covered by maximum harmonisation, as it is the case 
with financial services and immovable property, see Article 3(9) of the UCPD (n 1); procedural rules of national 
laws will be touched upon, since that is the area which was only partially regulated, so national provisions fill in 
the missing gaps, see Chapter V on Remedies of the thesis  
15 e.g. Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 concerning 
the distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending Council Directive 90/619/EEC and 
Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC; Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006  concerning misleading and comparative advertising (codified version) OJ L 376/21 of 
27.04.2006. OJ L 271/16, 09/10/2002 
16 see S Weatherill, EU Consumer law and Policy (2 nd edn Edward Elgar Publishing 2013), 188 et seq 
17 Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours OJ L 
158/59 of 23.06.1990.; Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts OJ 
L 095/29 of 21.04.1993.; Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 
on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees OJ L 171/12 of 07.07.1999; 
Directive 2008/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for 
consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC OJ L 133/66 of 22.05.2008.; Directive 2008/122/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers in respect of 
certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts OJ L 33/10 of 3.2.2009; 
Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, 






Europeanisation of the law unfair commercial practices 
The commencement of the process of Europeanisation  
Before the adoption of the UCPD in 2005, Member States showed a high level of 
divergences in their approaches to the law on unfair commercial practices.18 The 
existence of such diversities in regulatory regimes was considered as a material 
obstacle for the development of cross border trade within the European Union both for 
consumers and traders.19 Namely, consumers could not know what they should expect 
in case of cross border trade, whereas traders could not be certain what kind of 
behaviour towards consumers and, in particular, what type of marketing tactics were 
acceptable in other Member States.20  
 
This explains the convoluted history of the first attempts by the European 
Commission (“Commission” or “European Commission”) to harmonize the national 
laws on unfair commercial practices. The first attempts by the Commission, which 
were unsuccessful, date back to the seventh decade of the twentieth century.21 They 
are reflected in the book edited by Eugen Ulmer on comparative national laws on 
unfair commercial practices throughout Europe published in 1965.22 
 
In spite of the lack of existence of a unified European legislation, the Court developed 
in the seventies and eighties a body of European law on unfair commercial practices 
through its case law that primarily dealt with the interpretation of EU primary rules on 
                                                                                                                                            
Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council OJ L304/64 of 22.11.2011. 
18 S Grundmann, ‘EC Consumer and EC Competition Law’ in H Collins (ed), The Forthcoming EC Directive on 
Unfair Commercial Practices (Kluwer Law International 2004), 220 
19 Commission, ‘Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection’ COM (2001) 531 final; Commission, 
‘Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Directive on unfair commercial practices ‘ COM (2003) 356 
final 
20 RW De Vrey, Towards a European Unfair Competition Law. A Clash between Legal Families, (Leiden 
2006), 29 
21 E Budaite and C van Dam, ‘Statutory Frameworks and General Rules on Unfair Commercial Practices’ in C 
Twigg-Flesner, D Parry, G Howells and A Nordhausen (eds) The Yearbook of Consumer Law (Ashgate 2008), 
113 




free movement of goods. The main question that the Court had to resolve was the 
assessment of whether the existence of a particular national rule on fair trading is 
justified on the ground that it provides protection to consumers or such a rule actually 
represents an obstacle for cross border trade in the context of the Internal Market, and 
thus should be abolished. In these cases, the ECJ continuously required from Member 
States to provide an advanced level of justification for their national measures which 
prohibited unfair commercial practices.23  Eventually, in its decisions the Court had “a 
rather market oriented approach to consumer protection”, through giving priority to 
the objectives of free movement of goods over the national rules whose goal was 
protection of consumers.24 
 
Consequently, the role of the ECJ for building of the European system of the law on 
unfair commercial practices is very significant. Through its case law, the Court laid 
down the foundations of the European law on unfair commercial practiced and 
developed certain common legal notions and standards throughout the European 
Union, such as the average consumer as expected standard of behaviour of a European 
consumer that was subsequently codified by the text of the UCPD.25 After the 
adoption of the Directive, the importance of the Court has still remained, since the 
ECJ plays a crucially important role regarding the interpretation of the UCPD, 
clarifying thus its scope of application and the meaning of its provisions.26 
 
                                              
23 see, inter alia, Case C-120/78 Rewe Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 
[1979] ECR 00649; Case C-286/81 Criminal proceedings against Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij BV  [1982] 
ECR 04575; Case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM v Confédération du commerce luxembourgeois [1990] ECR I-00667; 
Case C-126/91 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e.V. v Yves Rocher GmbH [1993] ECR I-
02361; Case C-126/91 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e.V. v Yves Rocher GmbH [1993] ECR 
I-02361; Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer 
Verlag [1997] ECR I-03689; Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet International Products 
AB (GIP) [2001] ECR I-01795; Case C-368/95, Familiapress, [1997] ECR I-3689. 
24 G Howells, ‘Introduction’ in G Howells, HW Micklitz and T Wilhelmsson, European Fair Trading Law. The 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (Ashgate 2006), 19 
25 see Chapter II on Average consumer of this Thesis  
26 M. Koutsias and C Willett, ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in the UK’ (2012) 5 Erasmus Law 




Directive on 84/450/EEC on misleading advertising 
Parallel to the development of the European law on unfair commercial practices 
through the jurisprudence of the ECJ, the Commission also started adopting certain 
sector-specific rules on unfair commercial practices,27 followed by the adoption of a 
general legislative framework for advertising through Directive 84/450/EEC on 
misleading advertising (“Directive 84/450/EEC”).28 However, Directive 84/450/EEC 
had limited effects since it represented “above all a compromise” made among all 
relevant stakeholders.29 Namely, due to the lack of political support, it established 
only a very basic and narrow regulatory framework, on the basis of minimum 
harmonisation, limited only to misleading advertising and not to other forms of unfair 
practices.30 However, Directive 84/450/EEC is still important since it introduced for 
the first time the universal idea of fairness on a common European level, through the 
establishment of a legal framework aimed at securing fair advertising practices.31  
 
Directive 84/450/EC was subsequently modified and amended by Directive 97/55/EC 
on comparative advertising32, so that it spread fairness requirements also on 
comparative advertising.33 Eventually, after the adoption of the UCPD, Directive 
84/450/EEC and Directive 97/55/EC were unified into a single piece of legislation, 
namely, Directive 2006/114/EC on misleading and comparative advertising.34 Today, 
Directive 2006/114/EC applies exclusively in business-to-business relations, as a legal 
instrument designed “to protect traders against misleading advertising and its unfair 
                                              
27 see, inter alia, Council Directive of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to cosmetic products OJ L 262/169 of 27.9.1976; Council Directive 79/112/EEC of 18 December 1978 
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of 
foodstuffs for sale to the ultimate consumer OJ L 33/01 of 08.02.1979. 
28 Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising OJ L 250/17 of 
19.09.1984. 
29 F Henning-Bodewig, ‘Secondary Unfair Competition Law’ in RM Hilty and F Henning-Bodewig, Law 
against Unfair Competition: Towards a New Paradigm in Europe? (Springer 2007), 113 
30 S. Weatherill (n 16) 217 
31 Art 1 of Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading advertising  
32 Directive 97/55/EC of European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending Directive 
84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising so as to include comparative advertising OJ L 290/18 of 
23.10.1997. 
33 C-159/09 Lidl SNC v Vierzon Distribution SA [2010] ECR I-11761 
34 Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006  concerning 




consequences and to lay down the conditions under which comparative advertising is 
permitted”.35 However, as a consequence of the wide scope of application of the 
UCPD, which shall apply whenever consumer economic interests are hindered, its 
scope and practical importance is, in reality, very limited.  
 
Furthermore, some of the common European rules on unfair commercial practices 
were also contained in the European directives on consumer contract law. For 
instance, this is the case with Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms, which 
prohibits continuous usage of unfair contract terms.36 Similarly, Directive 97/7/EC on 
distance selling prohibited certain selling tactics in the case of distance contracts, for 
e.g. inertia selling.37 However, all these rules were few, diversified and a general legal 
framework was still missing.  
 
The adoption of Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices 
Eventually, the Commission started intensively working on the new Directive on 
unfair commercial practices at the turn of the twentieth century, together with 
strengthening its powers in the area of consumer protection.38 This is when the 
Commission ordered a detailed study on the feasibility of introducing a general 
principle of fair trading in EU Law39 and an equally detailed, comparative 
examination of the existing laws on unfair commercial practices in Member States.40 
These two projects were subsequently complemented with an additional report on the 
national laws on unfair commercial practices of ten new Member States that followed 
                                              
35 Case C-657/11 Belgian Electronic Sorting Technology NV v Bert Peelaers and Visys NV [2013] ECR I-0000, 
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36 Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/ECC on unfair contract terms  
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38J Stuyck, ‘European Consumer Law after the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer policy in or beyond the Internal 
Market?’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 367 
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their accession into the European Union in 2004.41 All these studies provided the 
essential foundations upon which the Commission subsequently developed the 
provisions that form the UCPD as it stands today.  
 
These studies confirmed the existence of a high degree of diversity among national 
legislations in the area of the law on unfair commercial practices. To begin with, the 
goals of the different legislative regimes differed, since some of them were more 
focused on the protection of competitors, whereas others had a more consumer 
oriented protection in focus. Moreover, some countries did not at all recognize a 
general principle of fair trading in business-to-consumer relations. On the basis of 
their regulatory approach towards the law on unfair commercial practices, as analysed 
in these pre-UCPD studies, Member States could be divided into three groups: 
1) Countries which did not recognize the existence of any kind of 
specific regulation in the area of unfair of commercial practices or a 
general principle of fair trading  (e.g. Ireland, UK) 
2) Countries where a general principle of fair trading was 
derived/developed from the general private law codifications, but where 
no separate law/rules on unfair commercial practices existed (e.g. the 
Netherlands, Italy, France) 
3) Countries with a developed legal frameworks on unfair commercial 
practices, contained in separate pieces of legislation that established the 
principle of fair trading, aimed to protect both consumers and 
traders/competitors (e.g. Germany, Austria, Greece). 
 
Simultaneously to the commissioning of the studies, the Commission published the 
Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection (“Green Paper”) in 2001.42 The 
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Green Paper laid down the grounds for further evolution of a common European law 
on unfair commercial practices. It defined new priorities for the development of EU 
consumer law, particularly through the encouragement of cross border trade as a 
necessary pre-condition for the development of the Internal Market.43 The publication 
of the Green Paper led to intense public discussions on the future on EU consumer 
policy where the main dilemma was related to the method of regulation of commercial 
practices. The question was whether the regulation of unfair commercial practices 
should be done through a ‘specific’ approach (i.e. through the adoption of a series of 
sector-specific directives), or through a rather ‘mixed’ approach (i.e. through the 
adoption of a framework directive).44  
 
Subsequently, in 2002, the Commission issued a Follow-up Communication to the 
Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection (“Follow-up Communication”) in which it 
announced its decision to develop a framework directive on unfair commercial 
practices.45 Moreover, this document was the first in which a clear separation between 
the regulatory instruments on the law on unfair commercial practices and contract law 
was drawn. Accordingly, the Follow-up Communication established two separate 
tracks for the future development of these two laws on the European level.  
 
Eventually, after a Follow-up Communication, the Proposal of the Directive on unfair 
commercial practice (“the Proposal”) was adopted in 2003.46 In the Proposal, the 
Commission opted for a ‘mixed’ approach that combined both a general clause and 
more restrictive clauses on misleading and deceptive practices, as well as some of the 
concrete, most common examples on breaches of the rules in unfair commercial 
practices. Such a general idea of a general clause supported by less abstract clauses 
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45 Commission ‘Follow-up Communication to the Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection’ COM (2002) 289 
final 




and a number of concrete examples was also maintained in the final version of the 
Directive in May 2005.  
 
 
The Regulatory Framework of the UCPD  
The scope of application of the Directive 
The Directive has brought radical changes to EU consumer law, representing “a much 
more aggressive approach towards harmonisation of national laws”, materially 
Europeanising the law on unfair commercial practices throughout the European 
Union.47 In its Communication issued in 2013, the Commission expressed its 
satisfaction with the results achieved by the UCPD and pointed out that there are 
currently no plans for amending the text of the Directive.48 
 
With its maximum harmonisation character and horizontal effect approach, the 
adoption of the Directive marked a radical change to the previously prevailing sector-
specific, piecemeal regulatory approach of EU consumer law, based on the principle 
of minimum harmonization. Despite the initial intention to include the widest possible 
set of commercial practices under the scope of the Directive, and due to the opposition 
of Member States, the Directive has eventually included only those commercial 
practices that affect the economic interest of consumers.49  Consequently, those unfair 
commercial practices that only affect the economic interest of competitors have 
remained outside its scope.50  
 
                                              
47 H Collins, ‘Harmonisation by example: European laws against Unfair Commercial Practices’ (2010) 73 
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However, the Directive provides that, by protecting the consumer’s economic interests 
from the widest possible set of unfair commercial practices, it also protects in an 
indirect manner the legitimate interests of competitors.51 Herein, it shall also be 
underlined that the Directive, through the introduction of its complete regulatory 
regime for securing of fair trading at the market in business-to-consumer relations, has 
also materially and doubtlessly contributed to the protection of fair play among traders 
themselves. Moreover, the scope of application of the directive was interpreted in the 
case law of the Court in a very broad manner, both rationae personae and rationae 
materiae.52 Accordingly, the Directive is applicable in all cases where the economic 
interest of consumers is hindered by the commercial practices of a trader. It is 
absolutely irrelevant whether such a practice also endangers the economic interest of 
competitors or some other kind of interest. Even if the consumers’ economic interest 
is much less hindered than the economic interest of competitors, the rules of the 
UCPD shall apply.53  
 
Besides providing the same definition of trader as the one that had already existed in 
consumer contract law, the question that arose was whether the notion of trader also 
included public-law bodies entrusted with a task of general public importance. In 
particular, the question referred to the court was whether an advertising of a sickness 
insurance fund which was found to be misleading, is included in the scope of 
application of the provisions of the Directive, since it was a publicly owned and a 
non-profit body of a public importance. In its judgment in BKK Mobil Oil, the Court 
confirmed a wide notion of trader that shall also include public law bodies showing in 
such a manner a wide understanding of trader.54  
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However, in its judgement in RLvS the Court slightly narrowed the scope of 
application of the UCPD by emphasising that a trader may be responsible for breach 
of the rules of the Directive only if there is a direct connection between a trader and a 
commercial practice, indirect connection is not sufficient for the application of 
provisions of the UCPD.55  
 
Three-step mechanism for assessment of fairness 
The Directive prohibits all kinds of commercial practices that are unfair.56 With the 
purpose of verifying whether a commercial practice is unfair, the Directive has 
established a complex, three-step mechanism for the assessment of the fairness of 
commercial practices. In order to understand the relationship between the law on 
unfair commercial practices and contract law, it is necessary to explain the operation 
of the mechanism. The mechanism consists of three elements: a general fairness 
clause, three small general clauses aimed at the prohibition of misleading and 
advertising practices, and thirty-one exhaustively listed examples of practices which 
shall always be declared as unfair.  
 
After the adoption of the Directive, what remained ambiguous was how the provided 
mechanism should be applied in practice, in particular whether there is any 
hierarchical order among the rules that the national courts shall follow. The Court 
provided the explanation on the mechanism of the Directive already in its first 
judgement on the UCPD, in VTB-VAB,57 confirming it in its subsequent case law.58 
 
According to the interpretation of the Court, while assessing fairness of any 
commercial practice, a strict three-step procedure shall always be followed in an 
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exactly defined order. The first step to be taken is to verify whether a practice can be 
subsumed under any of the thirty-one practices enlisted in Annex I to the Directive 
which are always unfair, under any circumstances.59 These are the only commercial 
practices, which according to the UCPD, can be declared unfair without requirement 
for a case-by-case assessment.60 The exhaustive list is adopted in order to guarantee 
legal certainty as “an essential element for the sound functioning of the Internal 
Market”.61 In its case law, the ECJ stressed the importance of the requirement of legal 
certainty in the area of consumer protection.62 So far, the existence of a catalogue with 
concrete examples of the most common unfair commercial practices has turned out to 
be a very powerful instrument for the protection of consumers from unfair commercial 
practices.63 
 
The existence of such an exhaustive list also shows a liberal orientation of the 
Directive, which shows that with the exception of the enlisted thirty-one practices, all 
other commercial practices are presumed to be fair. Accordingly, Member States are 
allowed to subject only these thirty-one forms of commercial practices to absolute 
prohibition, since they are considered as the most harmful for the consumer, but all 
other commercial practices can be only prohibited after the fairness assessment has 
been performed.64 This is in line with the maximum harmonisation character of the 
UCPD that does not entitle Member States to add any additional practice to the list 
which may only be modified by the revision of the Directive.65  
 
The second step, which follows if a commercial practice does not represent any of the 
enlisted practices in Annex I, is to check whether a practice is unfair on the basis of 
one of the three small general clauses on misleading actions, misleading omission and 
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aggressive practices, now applying a case-by-case method of assessment of fairness.66 
Eventually, if it turns out that the assessed practice does not represent an unfair 
commercial practice under the initial two steps, the general clause will apply as the 
last step and as a particular safety net directed to sanction any unfair commercial 
practice that managed to skip the prohibition.  
 
The established pyramidal, hierarchical structure of the mechanism, or ‘a top-down’ 
approach as Advocate General in the Opinion in CHS Tour refers to it,67 is strict. 
Accordingly, Member States are always obliged to follow it and they are prohibited 
from making any modifications. In practice, a significant part of the unfair 
commercial practices will be prohibited under some of the thirty-one explicitly listed 
commercial practices in Annex I to the Directive or on the basis of the assessment 
through small general clauses on misleading and aggressive advertising which are 
very broadly defined. Nevertheless, the general clause plays a crucially important role 
in the legal regime provided by the UCPD, by establishing and shaping a general duty 
to trade fairly.68  
 
Maximum harmonisation character of the Directive 
Significance of maximum harmonisation  
A powerful maximum harmonisation character of the Directive increases the effects 
that the law on unfair commercial practice has on contract law.69 This is because 
maximum harmonisation requirement diminishes the strength of national law 
resistance and represents a more influential and vigorous instrument for penetration 
into the laws of Member States. The imposition of maximum harmonisation was 
justified through the necessity to diminish as much as possible all divergences among 
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the national legal systems which may represent obstacles for free movement of goods 
and cross border trade.70 This is also in accordance with the goal of strengthening the 
internal market as one of the two main goals of the Directive.71  
 
An exemption from the general requirement of maximum harmonisation exists in 
relation to financial services and immovable property as a consequence to their 
particularities and sensitivity.72 In these areas Member States, as reaffirmed by the 
ECJ, are free to establish a level of protection that is higher than the one prescribed by 
the Directive, as it is the case with prohibition of combined offers where at least one 
of the offered components is a financial service.73 
 
Reasons for maximum harmonisation  
As a consequence of the maximum harmonisation requirement, Member States are 
imposed not only with the required bottom level of consumer protection, but also with 
its ceiling. This means that Member States are not only limited anymore with a 
proportionality requirement while regulating consumer protection, but with the 
legislation itself, being prohibited from providing a more advanced level of consumer 
protection than the one established by the Directive. A shift from minimum 
harmonisation to maximum harmonisation has been present in EU consumer policy 
during the last decade, and the UCPD represents one of the first examples of such a 
shift as it opened the door for a broader usage of maximum harmonisation in 
consumer contract law.74 The Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006 initially set up the 
grounds for the shift to the maximum harmonisation as part of the new common 
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European strategy of consumer policy and the goal of achieving a high common level 
of consumer protection.75 
 
The adopted maximum harmonisation character also marked the beginning of new era 
of consumer contract law, to be based on maximum harmonisation requirement.76  
Subsequent to the adoption of the UCPD, the Commission passed several pieces of 
European legislation on consumer contract law: Directive 2008/48/EC on consumer 
credit, Directive 2008/122/EC on timeshare and Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer 
rights.77 The shift from minimum to maximum harmonisation was exposed to serious 
criticisms, in particular in the area of consumer contract law.78 Namely, from a 
perspective of desirability, traders seem to be in favour of maximum harmonisation 
since it facilitates cross-border trader, whereas consumer groups are opposing it, 
arguing it diminishes the level of consumer protection.79 This is especially the case in 
Nordic countries where the development of EU consumer based on maximum 
harmonisation results not in improving but in diminishing the level of consumer 
protection, since these countries have to reduce their traditionally advanced 
requirements imposed by national laws.80 The case Ving Sverige, referred to the ECJ 
by a Swedish court, shows well the existence of this tension between the higher, 
Nordic concept of consumer protection and the lower, European approach towards 
consumer protection.81 
 
The proffered justification for the shift towards maximum harmonisation is that 
minimum harmonisation caused significant divergences which represent obstacles for 
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cross border trade, and thus for the development of the Internal Market.82 This is 
because consumers seem to be more hesitant to perform any kind of cross border trade 
since they are afraid for their level of consumer protection, whereas traders are more 
reluctant to perform cross border trade activities due to the need to get familiar and to 
align their practices with the particularities of each legal system. In its Report on the 
application of the Directive, the Commission provides empirical evidence that the 
establishment of a unified European legal framework in the area of unfair commercial 
practices has resulted in the fact that consumers are now more open and ready to 
spend more in cross border transactions.83 The shift from minimum to maximum 
harmonisation also proves that EU consumer policy is not only focused on the 
provision of a high level of consumer protection throughout the European Union, but 
also to the establishment of a unified and consistent system of European consumer 
law.  
 
The notion of commercial practice 
Meaning of commercial practice 
The Directive is aimed at protecting consumers from any unfair commercial practice, 
so it is of utmost importance to understand the meaning of the European notion of a 
commercial practice. The UCPD itself defines a commercial practice very broadly, as 
“any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial communication 
including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the 
promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers”.84 The definition shows that the 
UCPD is primarily focused on protecting consumers from unfair advertising and 
marketing, though its scope of protection clearly goes beyond these two categories.  
 
In its case law, the Court identified some of the forms of commercial practices:  
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• Offering the chance for consumers to win a prize in games, puzzles or 
competitions and in such a manner persuading consumers to buy a certain 
product (for instance newspapers).85 
• Combined offers86, including those kinds of combined offers where one of the 
offered components is a financial service87 
• Selling at a loss, as a means of persuading consumers to make a commercial 
transaction.88 
• Advertising practices such as the sale of goods to consumers on advantageous 
terms or advantageous prices form also commercial practices.89  
• The notion of advertising includes the use of a domain name and that of 
metatags in a website’s metadata, but not the registration of a domain name.90 
 
Relationship between a commercial practice and a contract  
The provisions of the Directive apply to commercial practices which occur not only 
before, but also during and after a commercial transaction in relation to any kind of 
goods or services.91 From a contract law perspective, this provision shows a wide 
scope of application of the Directive. The UCPD awards protection to consumers not 
only in the phase that anticipates the conclusion of a contract, but its rules will also 
apply in the process of contract conclusion itself and once a consumer contract has 
been stipulated.92 In such a manner, the Directive has provided a complete protection 
of the consumer in his contractual relationship with a trader.  
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The Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection, which was published in 
2001 and which established the grounds for development of a common European law 
on unfair commercial practices, gave some examples of what kind of practices should 
be included in the Directive.93 These examples included commercial practices related 
to payment, the subject matter of the contract, price estimates, execution, 
performance, delivery, complaint-handling and post sale services.94 The examination 
of the black list of Annex I shows that all these examples have been included in the 
text of the Directive. All these examples show well how tightly and disparately 
commercial practice and contract are in reality.  
 
The fact that commercial practices are defined in a very broad manner is essential for 
understanding the relationship between the law on unfair commercial practices and 
contract law. Indeed, the meaning and scope of a commercial practice prove the tight 
connection in practice between a commercial practice and a contract in practice, 
granting legal protection offered by the Directive follows all phases of a consumer 
contract, periods of its formation, conclusion, execution and termination. As it will be 
examined and showed later in the thesis, as a consequence of such a tight connection 
in real life, the Directive affects contracts, through the adoption of relevant standards 
of behaviour to consumers,95 but also of traders, applicable in all or some phases of 
the life of a contract, as it is the case with the duty to trade fairly96 or duty of 
information,97 as well as through development of contract law remedies.98 
 
Europeanisation of contract law 
European v national contract law 
Within the European Union, there are two main legislators operating and accordingly 
on the ground of original sources of the law of contract, a distinction is to be made 
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between European contract law and national contract laws.99 In my thesis, I address 
the impact of the UCPD on both the European contract and the national contract law. I 
understand European contract law as set of contract law rules adopted on the 
European level in diverse legislative forms, in particular in the form of directives, as 
well as developed by the case of the ECJ, that accordingly shall apply in all Member 
States of the European Union. The body of European contract law, to a large extent, 
consists of the rules that are exclusively applicable to consumer contracts, as a 
particular type of contracts where one party is a consumer and the other is a trader.100  
 
National contract laws refer to the contract law rules contained, depending on the 
particularities of each legal system, in civil/contract codes/laws of the Member States 
and/or developed by the case law of the national courts that are applicable within the 
borders of a particular legal system. In the twenty-eight Member States of the 
European Union, broadly speaking, there are twenty-nine national contract law 
regimes: one in case of each Member State with the exception of the United Kingdom 
which has two – English and Scottish contract law.101  
 
Fragmentary character of European contract law 
In the fragmented law of contract, as its stands today, a majority of contract law rules 
have been developed on the national level, though an increasing tendency of 
Europeanisation of contract law can be observed.102  The area of contract law affected 
by the process of Europeanisation is still relatively small. It is well described as an 
archipelago of small islands in the wide seas of national laws.103 Even in the most 
affected area of contract law, the consumer contract law, common European rules are 
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limited only to certain sectors or characteristics of a contractual relationship with 
universally applicable rules being very scarce.104 The incoherency among these rules 
is present as the result of different periods and the necessity for constant 
compromising as a precondition for their adoption. General rules on consumer 
contracts, such as those on formation or execution of the contract, primarily originate 
from the national contract law sources. 
 
Primarily through the provisions of the newly developed consumer contract law, as a 
particular set of rules within general contract law, EU law managed to slowly and 
without too many hiccups, penetrate further into national contract laws and to shape 
the non-harmonised areas of contract law. In that aspect, the ECJ has a particularly 
important role to play,105but this had also been done through the process of 
‘spontaneous harmonization’106 or through spill-over effects of the harmonised into 
non-harmonised rules.107 However, this process of Europeanisation of contract law is 
only of partial, inconstant and incoherent character.  
 
Codification of European private (contract) law? 
For the adoption of any kind of general codification of the entire contract or private 
law into one piece of legislation that would be named, or at least resemble to a 
European Civil Code or a European Contract Code, there seems to be a lack of 
political will.108 Such a resistance is also the result of the fact that in some of the 
Member States, contract law represents more than the mere law and simple regulation 
of the most important branch of private law. Contract law is a part of the national 
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identities and pride contained in different codifications, some of which represent 
living legal monuments, which may explain why Member States are very reluctant to 
get rid of them.109 For instance, France and Germany have often/frequently changed 
their governments and even their regimes since the adoption of their codes in 1804 
and 1896, but their codes have survived as the living proof of the continuity of these 
nations. Furthermore, isolated by the British Channel from the rest of Europe, English 
contract law developed through the centuries in accordance with the needs and 
realities of English society, which valued flexibility and opposed any kind of big, 
general codification that might endanger its continuity and perfectionism, though still 
it was materially affected and modified as a consequence of the process of 
Europeanisation.110  
 
Further to this, the impossibility of convergence of the different legal traditions has 
also been pointed out as yet another obstacle for the unification of contract law in 
Europe.111 The same goes for the risk that such a unification could have a counter-
effect and act as irritant in some of the national legal systems.112 Concurrently, the 
existence of adequate constitutional grounds for the adoption of any kind of 
codification of contract law also seems to be missing. Namely, the main legal basis for 
the adoption of a common European contract law instruments is article 114 TFEU, 
whose main objective is the strengthening of the Internal Market, but which, despite 
the attempt to use in widest possible number of cases, has limited power as shown by 
the ECJ in its decision in the Tobacco Advertising case,113 which brought a shadow of 
competence anxiety into European harmonisation policy.114 Consequently, the 
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capacity of article 114 TFEU to represent an acceptable legal ground for a massive 
unification of European contract law is disputable.115  
 
Projects on the Europeanisation on contract law 
The Commission constantly points out to the existence of divergences amongst the 
contract law regimes of the different Member States as a material obstacle for the 
further development of the Internal Market. It has thus used it as the main argument in 
favour of the unification projects of contract law in the European Union.116 Under the 
veil of explanation that unification of contract law throughout the European Union is a 
necessary prerequisite for overcoming these obstacles and for strengthening of the 
Internal Market, the Commission has, as of the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
invested significant efforts directed towards the unification of contract law.  
 
Since the year 2001 and the publication of the Communication on European Contract 
Law,117 the Commission noticeably increased its efforts for the Europeanisation of 
contract law.118 This Communication was followed by a more concrete Action Plan on 
a More Coherent European Contract Law adopted in 2003 and European Contract 
Law and the revision of acquis: the way forward.119  
 
As a consequence of all these efforts and ambitious work, the Commission initiated 
and/or, directly or indirectly, supported several projects on European contract law, 
among which the most important outcomes are the published Principles of European 
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Contract Law (“PECL”)120 and the Draft Common Framework of Reference 
(“DCFR”).121 However, they never managed to become a European Contract Code or 
a European Civil, but have only remained outstanding examples of legal scholarship, 
used as important reference points in the debates on Europeanisation of contract 
law.122 
 
The Optional Instrument and its future 
The latest proposal of this kind made by the Commission was the publication of the 
Proposal of The Optional Instrument on a Common European Sales Law (“The 
Optional Instrument”),123 which is also justified on the basis of necessity to overcome 
currently existing differences in contract law among Member States as barriers for 
cross border trade.124 The Optional Instrument, as it stands now, should represent an 
alternative, a free choice option to national law to be chosen by parties. It would not 
repeal or modify the existing national contract laws, but it would exist parallel to 
them, as an alternative legal regime for which consumers would be able to opt. Such a 
proposal is aimed at being a less intrusive policy option than the one which had also 
initially been presented by the Commission as an alternative solution and which 
envisaged full replacement of national laws.125  
 
However, it was pointed out that traders might profit from such an optional character 
of the proposed Optional Instrument and, as a consequence of consumer’s lack of 
information and knowledge, impose the application of the Optional Instrument on 
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consumers.126  This is one of the reasons why consumer movement seems to be 
strongly against it claiming that it would diminish the existing level of consumer 
protection.127  
 
Surprisingly, the Optional Instrument does not incorporate in its text the rules on 
unfair commercial practices, contrary to the previously adopted approach in the 
DCFR.128 Furthermore, the Optional Instrument seems to be absolutely ignoring the 
existence of the common European rules on unfair commercial practices introduced 
through the UCPD which would result in an ambiguous relationship between the 
UCPD and the Optional Instrument, in case the latter one gets adopted. 
 
The destiny of The Optional Instrument is still unknown, same as the future of entire 
European contract law. While assessing European contract law a while ago, 
McKendrick pointed out that “[t]he future course of the harmonisation of European 
contract law is difficult, if not impossible to predict. The likelihood is that the calls for 
further harmonisation of national contract laws will increase in future years”.129 
Almost a decade later, these words still apply and explain well the current status of 
European Contract Law.   
 
The case of Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights 
In case of harmonisation of consumer contract law, it has been noticeable that 
Member States showed less hostility than in case of general contract law where 
consumer contract law has been significantly more affected by the process of 
Europeanisation than the other parts of contract law. However, the example of 
Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights shows well how Member States are also 
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reluctant to approve adoption of any kind of complex contract law instrument in the 
area of consumer law.130 Namely, Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights shows 
hardly any resemblance to the much more ambitious Commission’s Proposal for the 
adoption of a Directive on consumer rights published in October 2008, proving that 
any substantial reform of consumer contract law is hardly possible.131  
 
Furthermore, initially the new Directive on consumer rights was intended to represent 
a kind of codification of the entire EU consumer law, imagined as an ambitious 
project aimed to include provisions of eight existing directives from consumer 
acquis.132 Eventually, it ended up repealing only two directives, Directive 
85/577/EEC on doorstep selling contracts133 and Directive 97/7/EC on distance selling 
contracts134 and just slightly modifying and amending an additional two, Directive 
99/44/EC on consumer sales135 and Directive 93/13/EC on unfair contract terms.136 
The example of Directive 2011/83/EU shows well a rather limited potentially of 
Europeanisation of contract law, even in case of consumer contract law.  
 
The role of article 3(2) UCPD 
The lack of consensus and reluctance of the Member States towards any massive 
harmonisation of contract law, even in the area of consumer contract law, also 
explains why article 3(2) UCPD was introduced, explicitly stating that the Directive is 
“without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, to the rules on the validity, 
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formation or effect of a contract”. It was suggested that this provision should not be 
read in the sense that it prohibits any influence of the UCPD on contract law, but 
rather as pointing out that the Directive does not establish an obligation to make any 
kind of modifications of contract law.137 In such a manner this provision expresses 
sensitivity to national legal traditions rather than intervening into national contract 
laws.138 However, the impact in practice of this provision is described as being far 
from clear.139 
 
In spite of the fact that it is aimed to regulate exclusively the area of unfair 
commercial practices, Member States were aware of the possible impact of the 
Directive on contract law. Article 3(2) UCPD was inserted as a check point to prohibit 
any direct influence that the UCPD may have on the national contract law resulting in 
the artificial separation of the two set of rules. However, as it will be shown in the 
thesis, this provision only provides a limited safeguard since, by using different 
manners and using bypasses to avoid this check point, Directive 2005/29/EC has 
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CHAPTER II - THE AVERAGE CONSUMER 
 
Introduction: Which consumer is protected by EU law? 
The mechanism of legal protection from unfair commercial practices, as established 
by the UCPD, is not focused on providing protection to just any consumer, but rather 
only to the average consumer.140 The average consumer is a market participant that 
shows an adequate level of carefulness and attentiveness while acting in the market 
representing “the economists’ idealistic paradigm of a rational consumer in an 
efficient marketplace”.141 This notion of the average consumer had been developed by 
the case law of the ECJ and it was eventually codified in the Directive.  
 
The UCPD takes the average consumer as its main objective for protection and 
principal benchmark for assessment of fairness of trader’s commercial practice: a 
commercial practice will be unfair only if it is unfair in relation to an average 
consumer. This is why the standard of average consumer plays a key role in 
application of the provisions of the UCPD. Besides the average consumer as the 
principal standard, the Directive has also introduced a subsidiary standard of 
vulnerable consumer that will be used as a benchmark for assessing of fairness of 
commercial practice when a commercial practice hinders economic interests of 
consumer which are particularly vulnerable.142  
 
Contrary to the prescribed standard in the law on unfair commercial practices, 
European consumer contract law did not have a clearly defined standard of expected 
consumer’s behaviour despite the emerging necessity for its existence. The need for 
such a standard is particularly noticeable in case of two important areas of consumer 
contract law: in case of prescribed transparency requirements of contract terms and in 
case of established information duties.  Namely, while assessing whether trader has 
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duly fulfilled transparency requirements as established by the common European rules 
on unfair contracts terms143 and pre-contractual information requirements,144 the 
standard for consumer expected behaviour is needed in order to verify whether a 
trader has duly fulfilled his obligations.  
 
What I argue in this chapter is that the standard of the average consumer as defined by 
the UCPD tends to fill up the missing related standard in the area of consumer 
contract law. This process is noticeable in relation to pre-contractual information 
requirements. On the one hand, the observed tendency may be described as a positive 
phenomenon which leads to a more consistent and coherent system of EU consumer 
law, praised by the arguments of legal certainty. On the other hand, the adoption of a 
universal standard of the average consumer has resulted in lowering of the general 
level of consumer protection in some of the Member States.  
 
In case of transparency requirements of contract terms, the effects on the average 
consumer seem to be more limited as a consequence of the minimum harmonisation, 
characteristic of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms. This Directive leaves 
more freedom to Member States to define applicable standards. However, in its recent 
judgement, in Kásler, the ECJ has also used, for the first time the standard of average 
consumer as a benchmark for the assessment of transparency requirement of contract 
term.145 Moreover, I argue that for the reasons of legal certainty and consistency, the 
standard of the average consumer as defined by the UCPD should also be adopted in 
the area of unfair contract terms. I show that the adoption of such a standard would 
not be contrary to a present, very pro-consumer jurisprudence of the ECJ in this area. 
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Protected consumer under the UCPD 
Two definitions of consumer 
The Directive contains two definitions of a consumer whose function and purpose 
materially differ. One definition of consumer is aimed at explaining what kind of 
person is supposed to be understood as a subject that is provided protection under the 
legal regime established by the Directive, i.e. the scope of application of the Directive 
rationae personae, whereas the other definition is designed to clarify what is 
substantially meant under the notion of consumer as a benchmark of the UCPD for the 
assessment of commercial practice’s fairness. 
 
Consumer as the subject of protection 
The first definition describes consumer as a natural person who is acting outside his 
trade, business, craft or profession.146 Accordingly, the Directive points out that a 
consumer must always be a natural person, i.e. legal entities are not considered as 
consumers, though Member States may and sometimes do spread legal protection 
dedicated to consumers to certain legal entities, which are considered as economically 
weaker.147 The Commission itself considers spreading ‘consumer alike’ protective 
measures to certain legal entities, in particular to small and medium enterprises in 
their relationship with big enterprises.148  
 
Natural persons, however, are not in all cases considered as consumers. The criterion 
for their recognition as consumers is established on the basis of activity of a person in 
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Sales Law (“The Optional Instrument”)’ COM(2011) 635 final 
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(Recital 8 of the UCPD) 
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each specific case. The Directive provides a definition which actually does not explain 
who is a consumer, but rather who is not to be considered as consumer. Such a 
definition is of help for the interpretation of the materiae personae scope of 
application of the provisions of the Directive, since its legal regime is applicable only 
for business practices which harm or are likely to harm the economic interests of 
consumers.  
 
In respect to this definition, the Directive did not provide anything innovative, but 
rather confirmed a definition that already existed in other pieces of consumer 
legislation149 and that was confirmed by the Court in its case law.150 Since there has 
been a clear consistency between the law on unfair commercial practices and 
consumer contract law concerning this definition and since this definition does not 
help with understanding of the meaning of consumer as a legal standard of expected 
behaviour of consumer, further examination of this definition remains outside of the 
scope of the analysis of this thesis.  
 
Consumer as a standard of expected behaviour 
This Chapter is focused on the second definition of the consumer. This definition is 
aimed to explain what the substantive characteristics of a consumer as a legal standard 
are, establishing thus “an idealised image of how consumer behaves”.151 In that 
aspect, the Directive defines average consumer as “a consumer who is reasonably 
well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, taking into account social, 
cultural and linguistic factors, as interpreted by the European Court of Justice”.152 
This definition represents codification of the notion of average consumer as already 
developed by the ECJ in a legislative text for the reasons of coherency and legal 
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certainty on the European level since it was identified that some of Member States 
were not applying such a test, but were still using their own, national standards.153 
 
This definition is contained in the Recitals of the Directive, though it was initially 
proposed as an integral part of the main text of the UCPD.154 The Commission 
explained that the reason for which the definition was moved to recitals, from the 
main text of the Directive, concerned the prescription of a definition would protect 
further evolution of the standard of the average consumer through the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ.155  However, the principal reason for its removal was the impossibility to 
make a consensus among all relevant stakeholders for the adoption of such a standard. 
 
Nevertheless, despite being moved to the recitals of the Directive, already in one of its 
first judgments on the UCPD, Ving Sverige, the Court underlined the fundamental 
significance of such a definition of the consumer for application of the provisions of 
the UCPD in practice, confirming its status as the principal benchmark for assessment 
of fairness of a commercial practice.156 Namely, the Directive prohibits all 
commercial practices of traders directed towards consumers which are unfair. In order 
to verify whether a commercial practice is unfair, the UCPD has established a 
complex three-step mechanism for assessment of commercial practice’s fairness that 
national court must always follow in a strictly hierarchical order as emphasised by the 
ECJ.157 The notion of average consumer plays a key role chiefly for the second step 
                                              
153 G Abbamonte, ‘The UCPD and its general prohibition’ in S Weatherill and U Bernitz (eds), The Regulation 
of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29: New Rules and New Techniques (Hart 2007), 25 
154 Commission, ‘Proposal of the Directive on Unfair Commercial practices’ COM (2003) 356 article 2(b) 
155 Commission, ‘Communication to the European Parliament concerning the common position of the Council 
on the adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices in the Internal Market and amending Regulation [Consumer Protection 
Cooperation] and directives 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC (the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive)’ COM (2004) 753 final, 3 
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and the three forms of small general clauses, as well as for the third step and the 
general fairness clause of the UCPD.158 
 
The average consumer between the two goals of the UCPD 
European average consumer as a compromised solution 
The standard of average consumer represents, as Weatherill describes it well, “an 
attempt to navigate a course between the rich diversity of actual consumer behaviour 
and the need for an operational benchmark”.159 The question is why the Commission 
opted for such a rather advanced standard of expected behaviour of consumer when it 
had a chance to incorporate a more consumer friendly standard into the UCPD than 
the one developed by the ECJ. This would also have been in line with the shift 
brought by the UCPD from a prevailingly negative, to prevailingly positive 
harmonisation approach in the area of unfair commercial practices.160  
 
The expected standard of behaviour developed through the ECJ case law is higher 
than the standard which had been previously used in some Member States.161 In other 
words, expectations related to the presumed consumer behaviour on the market were 
higher than those initially assumed by national consumer polices. This is not 
surprising since the establishment of average consumer as unified European standard 
of expected consumer’s behaviour was not the product of European consumer policy, 
but rather a result of the tendency to abolish as much as possible all kind of barriers 
for cross border trade among Member States.162  
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Such a standard of average consumer as developed by the ECJ was maintained and 
codified by the Directive, despite the fact that the UCPD is now a common European 
piece of legislation, imagined to be a most powerful instrument for consumer 
protection. This approach can be explained by the fact that achievement of a high 
level of consumer protection is not the exclusive principal goal of the UCPD, but 
besides this objective, the Directive indicates another main purpose of its adoption, of 
nominally equal importance as the need to achieve high level of consumer protection: 
the requirements for improvement of functioning of the internal market.163 As a 
consequence, the standard of the average consumer is the outcome of the conflict of 
these two main goals of the Directives which in their relation to the average consumer 
have opposite purposes: the objective of consumer protection urges for adoption of a 
more consumer-friendly standard, according to which an average consumer is seen, 
more realistically, as it was argued two decades ago by Collins as “a naïve and 
inexperienced consumer”.164 
 
Contrary to this, the interests of internal market advocate for adoption of a standard 
that would establish as least as possible regulatory obstacles for free movement of 
goods where acceptance of any higher standard would also result in more obstacles for 
cross border trade. This is why the average consumer, under such a meaning, was 
eventually approved as the general standard for assessment of commercial practice’s 
fairness.  
 
A comparative example of understanding of average consumer  
Interestingly, a comparative example from Canada, a country of comparable economic 
power and tradition of consumer protection as the European Union, shows a different 
understanding of the standard of the average consumer where this standard is equally 
used for the fairness assessment of commercial practice of trader. In its relatively 
recent judgement, in case Richard v. Time Inc, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified 
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the meaning of the average consumer.165 The facts of this case included a consumer 
who received an advertisement in which it was falsely claimed that consumer has won 
the prize, while the true intention was to make consumer subscribe on a magazine 
under the guise of retrieving this prize.  
 
In its judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada has identified that the assessment of 
fairness of the commercial practice should be performed on the basis of “the average 
consumer, who is credulous and inexperienced and takes no more than ordinary care 
to observe that which is staring him or her in the face upon first entering into contact 
with an entire advertisement”.166 By this judgment, the Supreme Court has overruled 
the decision of the lower Court of Appeal which had defined the benchmark of the 
average consumer as possessing “an average level of intelligence, scepticism and 
curiosity”.167 It can be noticed that the overruled standard of the lower court, the Court 
of Appeal, is much closer to the European understanding of the average consumer. 
However, the Supreme Court opted for a more pro-consumer oriented definition, same 
as the one which applied in case of pre-UCPD national laws in Germany or 
Scandinavian countries.168  
 
 
Three components of the definition of average consumer 
The definition of average consumer is a very complex one, in reality consisting of 
three parts. Firstly: the average consumer is considered as a “reasonably well-
informed, reasonably observant and circumspect” consumer, which explains what is 
the expected behaviour of a consumer. Secondly while assessing the fairness of 
advertising “social, cultural and linguistic factors” should be taken into account, 
which points to the three factors which must be taken into consideration while 
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assessing whether the consumer behaved in expected manner. Third, the concept of 
the average consumer needs to have an autonomous meaning as interpreted by the 
ECJ, i.e. that there has to be a unified European understanding of average consumer.  
 
All three of these parts have been developed by a different set of case law of the 
Court, This jurisprudence had some, though limited, impact on the national 
understandings of the average consumer before the adoption of the Directive.169 In 
order to fully understand the meaning of the average consumer, it is essential to assess 
each of these three components separately.  
 
The average consumer as a reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect consumer  
This part of the definition of average consumer establishes a presumption of how an 
average consumer is expected to behave in reality as a key player at the market. It is 
primarily based on the information paradigm, upon which the entire EU consumer law 
is founded.170 The concept of well-informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect consumer is founded on the hypothesis that consumer lack of information 
leads to an inefficient market, so that is considered to be the main argumentation of 
the economists justifying the need for the legal activism in the consumer markets and 
imposition of duty of information on traders.171 Consequently, EU consumer law 
protects only the consumer who puts some efforts and uses the disclosed information, 
and not those who ignore them. 
 
On the basis of such an idea and approach towards consumer, the Court developed a 
set of consistent case law. The roots of the concept of “a reasonably well-informed 
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and reasonably observant and circumspect consumer” can be traced back to the 
judgments of the Court in Nissan172 and Mars173. Such a model of the consumer was 
eventually confirmed and expressed in currently existing wording in the decision of 
the Court in Gut Springenheide174. 
 
In Nissan, the Court had to decide on a preliminary reference made by French court 
whether an the advertising of imported and already registered cars as new should be 
considered to be misleading. The issue was that cars of the Nissan brand were 
imported from Belgium to France for resale by an importer other than the exclusive 
distributor of Nissan for France. In his advertising the importer was promoting the 
imported cars as both being new, and as cheaper than the same cars which were 
offered by the official French distributor. Despite being brand new, these cars had 
already been registered, though only for import purposes, and they were cheaper 
because they were equipped with fewer accessories than the same model of the cars, 
which was on sale in France by the official distributor. Hence, the question was 
whether a consumer could be misled by such an advertising practice.  
 
In his Opinion, Advocate General in Nissan pointed out that the average consumer is 
prompted to “make a careful comparison of the prices on offer and to enquire of the 
seller sometimes very meticulously, about the accessories with which the vehicle is 
equipped”.175 Continuing in the same vein, the Advocate General identified the 
average consumer as the only consumer who deserves to be protected by EU 
consumer law in accordance with the proverb: “’vigilantibus, non dormientibus iura 
succururunt or the law comes to the assistance of those who are vigilant with their 
rights, and not those who sleep on their rights”.176  
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The Court in its decision materially followed the Opinion of Advocate General and 
adjudicated that the disputed advertising is not to be considered as misleading. In its 
judgment the basic presumption of the Court was that consumers are neither misled by 
the advertisement nor by the fact that cars are cheaper due to containing fewer 
accessories. This is so since a majority of consumers inform themselves about these 
characteristics before buying a car, normally also comparing with other offers on the 
market. Consequently, the law will provide protection to the informed consumers who 
applies a certain level of effort in informing themselves while acting in the market. 
This means that as the objective for protection should only be based upon the fact that 
a consumer applies some effort to inform himself with relevant facts, and not to a lazy 
consumer who does conduct any comparative research about the offers or hardly 
makes any effort in becoming informed.177  
 
In Mars, the Court developed the concept of the reasonably circumspect consumer as 
the benchmark of protection from misleading advertising. The question raised before 
the Court was whether a German national rule that imposed prohibition of the 
indication “+10%” on Mars ice cream bars and other products of the same producers 
represented an obstacle to free movement of goods. In this case, these ice cream bars, 
which first were lawfully produced, advertised and sold in France, were imported to 
Germany. The labels of these ice creams contained the sign “+10%” whose purpose 
was to show that standard product size was increased by ten percents. The disputed 
issue concerned whether such a sign should be permitted since it covered more than 
ten percent of the total surface of product wrapping. As a consequence, consumers 
were subject to being misled by thinking that either the sale price of the goods was the 
same as it was for the same product without the +10% label, or that the size and 
weight of the product was in any way significantly increased.  
 
The Advocate General in his Opinion pointed to the standard of ‘normal care’  
required for justification of the existence of an obstacle to freedom of movement of 
                                              




goods through the rule on advertising prohibition. He stated that it was not proven that 
the consumer who shows normal levels of care could be misled by the sign. In that 
aspect, the Advocate General followed the Commission’s view that “... it must also be 
clear to a careful consumer that a certain amount of exaggeration is inherent in any 
promotion of a product”. 178 In this Opinion, it is noticeable, as the Advocate General 
points out, that consumer protection should be granted only to a careful consumer. 
However, the Court did not follow this approach, but it has rather used the notion of 
reasonably circumspect consumer as a slightly more protective and objective 
formulation. 
 
The Court concluded that a reasonably circumspect consumer is fully aware of the fact 
there is no connection between the size of the marketing sign and the real increase of 
the advertised product.179 By this, the Court rejected the argumentation of the German 
government that “+10%” may cause “a non insignificant number of consumers” to 
believe that the increase of the offered product is bigger than it actually is.180 
Consequently, such an approach shows that the objective of protection is a reasonably 
circumspect consumer who is aware of the basic marketing tactics and does not fully 
trust traders.  
 
Eventually, in Gut Springenheide the Court was obliged to provide answers to the 
direct question regarding the objective of EU consumer policy: whether that is the 
casual consumer or the average consumer.181 This was a conflict between the 
traditional German national concept of a casual consumer with the innovative 
European concept of average consumer as developed by the ECJ case law.  
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In this case, the dispute concerned the legality of the marketing of eggs in Germany 
under slogan ‘six grain – 10 fresh eggs’ supported by the provision of information that 
hens which produce these eggs are fed with particular six types of grain.  The 
marketing slogan was also the name of the trademark. The description of the meaning 
of this name was put inside the product package. However, the issue was that the hen 
feed did not exclusively consist of these grains, and in fact included some other 
ingredients. Therefore, the question arose as to whether consumers are misled by such 
a form advertising of the eggs and by the inserted leaflet.  
 
In his Opinion, the Advocate General indicated that in the case law, the Court always 
referred to an average, reasonably circumspect consumer as the benchmark of its 
consumer policy. In that aspect, Advocate General agreed with the definition given by 
the German Federal Administrative court, which referred the case, where the informed 
average consumer is defined as consumer “who takes in the information about the 
product on sale and hence the overall characterization of the products attentively”.182 
Contrary to the average consumer, there is a casual consumer “who has regard to the 
information about the product on sale and the statements promoting sale only casually 
and uncritically, without checking more closely the message put over by the 
information”.183 In other words, the casual consumer does not use or profit from the 
provided information and that is his problem. The law does not provide protection to a 
person who behaves so negligently, but only to persons who take care and use what 
they are offered, i.e. the information.  
 
In its judgment, the Court followed the Opinion of Advocate General and underlined 
that the national courts, while deciding whether an advertising practice is misleading, 
as a benchmark should take the average consumer who is reasonably well-informed 
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and reasonably observant and circumspect.184 Thus, this judgment represents the first 
decision of the Court in which such a wording for the explanation of the protected 
consumer in advertising was used.  
 
Social, cultural and linguistic factors 
The European Union is a multicultural and multi-linguistic society where the 
existences of differences among its citizens are recognized, protected, and moreover, 
supported and encouraged. One of the forms of these diversities is the diversity among 
consumers coming from different Member States. On the European level, consumers 
do not represent a homogenous group, since they differ among themselves due to 
various factors in relation to national specificities and, consequently, while acting at 
the market, they behave in different manners, so it may be highly disputed whether at 
all we can speak of ‘a European consumer’.185 Empirical research on consumer 
behaviour differentiates depending on the culture to which certain consumer belongs, 
research has shown that, depending to the culture they belong to, consumers are going 
to react and respond in different ways to traders’ commercial practices.186 
 
Through the recognition of social, cultural and linguistic factors in interpretation of 
the meaning of the average consumer, the Directive acknowledges this diversity.187 
The formulation of these three factors enables subsuming of a wide range of different 
circumstances that affect the distinctiveness of a consumer.188 The UCPD in particular 
recognized the differences among diverse consumer cultures in Europe by not 
addressing legal requirements related to taste and decency.189 
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I argue that the case law of the Court shows that they are to be interpreted in a very 
restrictive manner, which significantly diminishes practical importance of these three 
factors. Their application can be justified only exceptionally. This is because these 
factors stand opposite to the goals of the establishment of the unified legal regime of 
fair-trading in the EU since the consequence of their application is that certain practice 
may be allowed in one, and prohibited in another Member States, representing thus 
again an obstacle for cross border trade.  
 
Recognition of the potential usage of social, linguistic and cultural factors in 
interpreting particular commercial practice also represents the result of the case law of 
the Court. Initially, they were raised in the context of factors that were taken into 
consideration while deciding whether a trader’s practice misleads the consumer and 
accordingly whether a national prohibition of such a practice, which represents the 
obstacle to free movement, can be justified. Again, same as in the case of the well-
informed consumer, the ECJ developed these factors through interpretation of EU 
primary law. The Court developed these factors in its decisions in Clinique190 as 
subsequently confirmed and explained in Fratelli Graffione191 and ‘Lifting’.192 
 
In Clinique, the dispute was related to the national ban which prohibited marketing of 
cosmetic products in Germany under the name ‘Clinique’. The justification was based 
on the explanation that such a name is similar to German word for ‘hospital’ and thus, 
that it may mislead consumers about the characteristics of the advertised product. In 
its judgment, the Court pointed out that this prohibition is not permitted because the 
name ‘Clinique’ cannot mislead consumers since it is sold in shops which are 
exclusively dedicated to selling of cosmetic and not medical products. Thus, despite 
the fact that linguistically speaking such a practice could be misleading, the fact that it 
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is sold in particular types of shops provided sufficient clarification for average 
consumer not to be misled.193  
 
The Court, however, did not mention ‘linguistic, social and cultural’ factors but these 
words were only stated in the Opinion of Advocate General. This phrase was 
mentioned in the context that these factors have to be taken into consideration by 
national courts while deciding whether certain advertising is misleading for consumer. 
Namely, depending on these factors, the same advertisement may be allowed in one 
member state and prohibited in the other member state since there it can mislead a 
consumer depending on their particular linguistic, social and cultural characteristics. 
However, what always should be considered in decision making, is the freedom of 
movement of goods on the one hand, with a particular value (health, etc…) that is 
protected by a disputed rule.194 This means that the existence of a particular rule 
which prohibits advertising may be legally justified in one Member State, whereas it 
may be found unlawful in the other Member State on the basis of linguistic, social and 
cultural factors if it protects an interest that is considered to be more important, under 
mandatory condition of proportionality.  
 
In Fratelli Graffione SNC, the dispute was whether prohibition of marketing of toilet 
paper and handkerchiefs under the trademark Cotonelle in Italy represented an 
obstacle to freedom of movement of goods since the trademark of this product could 
mislead consumers to think that the product contained cotton, when in reality it does 
not. Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion agrees with the Advocate General 
Gulmann from the Clinique case that the fact of whether the advertising is misleading 
in one member state may depend on linguistic, social and cultural conditions. In that 
aspect, Advocate General Jacobs showed that the word ‘cotonnelle’ causes “a speaker 
of English, French or Italian to believe that a product is made of cotton but it could 
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hardly have that effect on someone who understands only German or Spanish since 
the words for cotton in those languages are ‘Baumwolle’ and ‘algodon’ 
respectively”.195 This may mean that such advertising practice would be misleading, 
for instance, in case of the average Italian consumer, and not in case of average 
German consumer.   
 
The Court agreed with the observation of the Advocate General on the fact that due to 
linguistic, cultural and social differences, a trademark which is not misleading in one 
Member State can actually be misleading in the other one. However, a measure that 
protects the consumer in that Member State from being misled “must really be 
necessary for that purpose and proportionate to the objective pursued, which must not 
be capable of being achieved by measures which are less restrictive of intra-
Community trade”.196 Such a view of the Court shows that, besides its wide possible 
scope of application, these three factors are interpreted restrictively.  
 
In accordance with such an approach as in Fratelli Graffione SNC, social, cultural and 
linguistic factors were principal factors used by the Court while weighing the 
arguments of consumer protection on the one side, with the freedom of movement of 
goods on the other side in its decision in Lifting case the.197 In this case, the Court was 
faced with the question whether the name of a cosmetic product manufactured by 
Lancaster which contains the word ‘lifting’ is misleading for consumers. This is 
because consumers might be misled due to the word ‘lifting’ that the advertised cream 
contains in its name, it has the same effects as a surgical lifting of the wrinkles. The 
issue was whether the term ‘lifting’ is particularly misleading for German consumers 
due to linguistic reasons, and that as a result, the prohibition of this form of 
advertising would be justified in Germany.  
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In his Opinion, the Advocate General pointed that this linguistic factor cannot be 
applied in this case since ‘lifting’ is an English word so it would rather mislead 
consumers of different Member States rather than a German consumer.198 The Court 
followed the Opinion of the Advocate General and did not agree with the German 
justification for the prohibition of the advertising of products containing the word 
‘lifting’ since it could not be considered as misleading for the average consumer.199 
Consequently, the Court did not accept German justification for existence of such a 
national measure based on language particularities. 
 
The limited scope of application of the factors 
Taking into consideration these three factors of the Directive while defining the notion 
of the consumer takes into account the European concept ‘united in diversity’ and 
respect of the multi-linguistic and multicultural nature of the European Union that also 
affects European private law.200 Moreover, these values have been explicitly 
recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.201 This is 
why Wilhelmsson has advocated for a more practical usage of these factors.202 
 
The Court showed that these three factors are to be interpreted in a very restrictive 
manner. The application of these rules might result in the fact that advertising of a 
certain product becomes prohibited in one of the states, whereas in the other ones, it is 
lawful. Hence, traders would not be able to advertise a particular product freely in the 
same manner. This is why this provision has to be interpreted restrictively, that these 
factors should be taken into consideration only when their impact has serious effects. 
Particular consideration should be paid to the maximum harmonization character of 
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the Directive which diminishes even further the their possible scope of application in 
practice.  
 
Remarkable is that the Court developed and mentioned these three factors in cases in 
which it did not find them applicable. Similarly, in a majority of the cases when these 
factors were raised in favour of justification of banning a particular practice, the Court 
rejected them. For instance, in Italy it is a cultural phenomenon that vinegar is made 
exclusively of grapes and never of apple, or that pasta can be made exclusively of 
durum wheat, but the Court did not accept this justification for a measure which 
prohibited the marketing and selling of vinegars based on apple203 or pasta made of 
other types of wheat.204 Similar cases exist with margarine in Belgium where 
consumer culture understood that margarine is always packed in cubes in order to 
distinguish it from butter which was packed in different manner. However, this could 
not justify the existence of national Belgium measure aimed to protect expectations of 
a Belgium consumer.205 
 
The case law shows that actually the Court allows the application of the three factors 
only in cases when the health or personal integrity of consumer, with a higher value 
than only economic interests, are endangered and when such a risk is clearly proven. 
This was the approach of the Court in the interpretation of primary law by accepting 
the justification of national measures on the basis of the protection of health and 
safety. For instance, the import of muesli bars with added vitamins that were lawfully 
marketed and sold in Germany on the basis on the uncertainty of the effects of these 
vitamins.206  
 
Similarly on the ground of public health, France was allowed to prohibit marketing 
and sale of Red Bull, a drink that is lawfully marketed and sold in most other Member 
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States.207 The Court found both of these measures to be justified. However, since 
protection of these interests is beyond the scope of the Directive, the case law shows 
that it is hard to imagine that social, cultural and linguistic factors may apply in cases 
when economic interests of consumers are endangered.  
 
A restrictive approach towards the application of these three factors narrows down the 
possibility of the influence of the national concepts on the understanding of the 
average consumer by the national courts. This is in accordance with the aim of the 
Directive to achieve a high level of harmonisation of fair trade laws in the Member 
States. In that sense, it is on the national courts to provide justification for the 
application of these factors. As a consequence, some of the national legal systems will 
not be able to maintain their pre-UCPD standards on the ground of social, cultural and 
linguistic characteristics of consumers. The idea seems to be that there should not be a 
Swedish or an English consumer, but that rather a concept European consumer needs 
to be established.  
 
The autonomous interpretation of the average consumer 
The third component of the definition of the average consumer is an understanding of 
its meaning ‘as interpreted by the European Court of Justice’. This is in line with the 
requirement that the notion of EU law, including European private law, may have only 
the European meaning, fully liberated from any influences of the national legal 
systems.208 Such an approach represents a mandatory prerequisite for the aimed 
unification and it is primarily derived from Hoekstra.209 In this case the Court 
underlined the principle of the autonomous interpretation of EU law by the ECJ and 
that only the Court is competent to provide an interpretation of the provision from EU 
law which have their own autonomous European meaning.   
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Since the Hoekstra case, case law has shown high levels of consistency regarding the 
application of the principle of autonomous interpretation of EU law. The further 
clarification was well explained in a more recent judgment of the Court in Hadady 
where the ECJ underlined that “it follows from the need for uniform application of 
Community law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of 
Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States 
for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an 
autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Community, having regard to 
the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the legislation in 
question”.210  
 
In case of the rules on unfair commercial practices, the autonomous interpretation of 
the terms from the UCPD was confirmed by the Court in Ving Sverige. The entire 
legal framework for fair-trading needs to have its own European meaning.  In this case 
the Court was asked whether a particular advertising of Swedish travel agency could 
be considered as an invitation to purchase in accordance with article 7(4) of the 
UCPD. The notion of the invitation to purchase from the Directive also exists in the 
national laws of member states and accordingly the advertisement which was the 
object of dispute can be considered as invitation to purchase in some of the national 
jurisdictions, whereas in some others it cannot. However, the Court pointed out that 
the terms from the Directive should be interpreted independently from the national 
legal traditions and gave the autonomous interpretation of this term on the basis of the 
text of the UCPD.211  
 
Some other case law of the Court can be also considered as useful for understanding 
the notion of the average consumer. For instance, in Lloyd, the Court that the attention 
of consumer is not a constant, but rather a variable category that depends on the 
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category of goods and services.212 As a consequence, national courts have to assess 
consumer behaviour in the context of particular product that is the object of a 
commercial practice. This autonomous interpretation is of particular importance in the 
case of the UCPD since this Directive requires maximum harmonization, as it was 
pointed out by Advocate General Mengozzi so that all Member States could have a 
unified approach to the regulation of fair trading.213  
 
The case law of the Court provides numerous examples on what is in reality to be 
understood as the average consumer. However, the problem is that the ECJ cannot 
provide clarification on how in each of the thousands of possible factual situations, the 
average consumer might be imagined to behave. This opens the door for different 
understandings of the average consumer, in particular cases decided by the national 
courts. This is why it may easily happen that in different countries in case with the 




The interpretation of the average consumer under the UCPD 
In its case law on the interpretation of provisions of the UCPD, the ECJ also touched 
upon the question of the meaning of average consumer. These decisions are important 
since they facilitate the understanding of the meaning of the average consumer to the 
national courts in cases when they are supposed to assess fairness of a commercial 
practice. Accordingly, the Court confirmed the role of average consumer as a central 
figure of the Directive who is always to be taken as a benchmark in relation to which 
fairness of a commercial practice is to be assessed.214 Moreover, certain clarifications 
of the meaning of the average consumer were provided, particularly by the Advocate 
Generals.  
                                              
212 Case C-342/97 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV [1999] ECR I-03819, para 26 
213 Advocate General Trstenjak in Case C-540/08 Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag v Österreich-
Zeitungsverlag GmbH [2010] ECR I-10909, para 24 





In Mediaprint, the Advocate General in her Opinion pointed out that the average 
consumers is a compromise, a balance, between the requirements for consumer 
protection, on the one hand, and encouragement for freedom of movement of goods, 
on the other hand, based on the fundamental principle of proportionality.215 Therefore, 
while interpreting the concept of the average consumer, national courts should always 
be aware of the principle of proportionality while deciding on the average consumer. 
 
Moreover, in contemporary society and free market economy, consumers needs to be 
fully aware of the fact that usual advertising tactics do not include only marketing of 
product prices and quality, but also of certain supplementary benefits.  Accordingly, 
the Advocate General pointed out that “it is therefore logical to leave it to such a 
reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect consumer within 
the regulatory framework defined by Community law to decide whether to purchase a 
product on the basis of the advertised advantages or because of its quality or even its 
low price”.216 Consequently, the Advocate General points out that the average 
consumer cannot be misled by a sale with bonuses, i.e. by the sale of newspapers that 
offers participation in a competition. The validity of such an argument was confirmed 
by the Court when deciding that such a commercial practice is not to be considered as 
unfair.217 
 
In her Opinion in Plus218, the Advocate General agreed with the arguments raised by 
Spanish government that average consumer will not expect to spend 100 EUR in order 
to play a game of chance. Consequently, the fact that consumers are offered the 
possibility to participate in a lottery if they spend a certain amount of money cannot 
be considered as an unfair commercial practice. In this case, unlike in Mediaprint, the 
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Court did not assess this argument of the Advocate General since it just considered the 
maximum harmonization character of Directive which precluded explicit prohibition 
of any other commercial practice than the thirty-one exhaustively enlisted in Annex I 
of the Directive.219 
 
In Lidl, the Court assessed permissibility of a comparative advertising from a 
perspective of an average consumer. One of the findings of the Court was that 
comparative advertising of food products with different characteristics exclusively on 
the basis of price differences could be misleading for the average consumer if this 
distinction among characteristics is not apparent from the advertisement.220 
Furthermore, the Court pointed out to the national courts that the average consumer 
should be taken from the category of all end consumers who purchase their basic 
consumables in a chain of stores221 from which the average consumer should be taken 
as the benchmark for the assessment whether a comparative advertisement is to be 
considered as misleading.  
 
In Ving Sverige, a case referred from a Swedish Commercial Court, the ECJ was 
dealing, inter alia, with the question whether an advertising for a package travel of a 
Swedish tourist agency which contained only the initial price and partial material 
information can be subsumed under a form of unfair commercial practice. According 
to the views of Consumer Ombudsman, the main Swedish institution in charge of 
enforcement of consumer law, such an advertising practice of trader is to be 
considered as misleading since it omits to present certain material information and 
thus misleads an average consumer. Such a view of Consumer Ombudsman was fully 
in line with the traditionally advanced Swedish approach towards consumer 
protection.  
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The ECJ disagreed with the approach of Swedish Consumer Ombudsman and pointed 
out that the disputed advertising practice is legal, i.e. that an average consumer cannot 
be misled by such a practice and thus it must not be prohibited.222 Namely, according 
to the Court, for an advertisement directed towards an average consumer it is 
sufficient to provide only some of the material information in the advertisement itself 
whereas for the additional missing information it is enough to provide the consumer 
with a phone number of an address of a web page on which he can find the missing 
information and get informed. In other words, in case of an advertising practice as the 
one of Ving Sverige, an average consumer will not be fully pleased with the 
information provided, but he is expected to look for more information provided to him 
via other mediums. 
 
In its judgement, the Court underlined the fundamental significance of a common 
European model of average the consumer, as a well-informed and reasonably 
observant and circumspect consumer, for the interpretations of the provisions of the 
Directive.223 As a consequence, only such a consumer can be used as a model 
throughout all Member States, precluding all previously existing national models of 
consumers even if, as it was the case of Sweden, national models of consumer 
guaranteed a higher level of consumer protection.  
 
In Perenicova,224 the average consumer was taken as a benchmark while deciding 
whether false information on annual percentage rate in consumer credit agreement 
was misleading information in the context of the provisions on misleading action of 
the UCPD.225 Regarding behaviour in real life of an average consumer in his relation 
towards consumer credit, the Advocate General explained what is expected, i.e. that 
“an average consumer will normally obtain offers from a number of potential lenders 
and decide to take out a loan on the basis of a comparison of those offers, including 
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the costs likely to be incurred”.226 As a consequence, offering favourable credit 
conditions will, by rule, be the fundamental reason why a consumer would opt for a 
particular creditor. The Court concluded that the average consumer would be misled 
by the false provision of the interest rate, as it were the case. Hence, such a practice by 
traders is unfair and prohibited.  
 
In Purely Creative, the Court pointed out that information regarding the cruise that 
was offered, as a prize, to consumers has to include information regarding the 
itinerary of the cruise, points of departure and arrival as well as forms of housing and 
meal plans which are offered. In a concrete case, these pieces of information were 
provided only partially and in small print. The Court pointed out that clarity and 
comprehensibility of disclosed information has to be assessed in such manner that 
they “enable the average consumer of the group concerned to take an informed 
decision”.227 
 
The distinction between the average consumer and vulnerable consumer 
Besides the definition of the average consumer as a general standard for assessment of 
fairness of a commercial practice, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive provides 
two additional, supplementary benchmarks. The first one is the average consumer 
within a particular group of consumers,228 the second one is the vulnerable 
consumer.229  
 
Average consumer of a particular group  
The standard of the average consumer of a particular group of consumers applies 
when a commercial practice is specifically aimed at a particular group of 
consumers.230 Such a standard applies in case, for instance, of advertising of male 
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shave equipment which is directed exclusively to male population above certain age 
as a target group and behaviour of an average consumer of that group will be 
considered as a benchmark. In these kinds of cases, the national courts are obliged 
record the reaction to the commercial practice of an average member of such a group 
while assessing the impact of such a practice.231 
 
It has to be underlined that the meaning of the average consumer within a particular 
group of consumers is the same as the meaning of the general average consumer. Only 
the context for the assessment of fairness will be changed. This is because the purpose 
of this supplementary benchmark is to provide a more realistic assessment of fairness 
of a commercial practice when it is directed to a particular group of consumers which 
are not particularly vulnerable, but which has certain particularities that have to be 
taken into account. Such a consumer is also considered as being reasonably well-
informed and reasonably circumspect and observant. The point is to exclude from the 
assessment consumers who in this group is irrelevant since they are not affected by a 
particular practice, and thus must not be considered in the results. 
 
The notion of vulnerable consumer  
The standard of the vulnerable consumer applies in case of particular vulnerability of 
a consumer to a commercial practice as a consequence of particular characteristics of 
that consumer such as mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity.232 Such a 
definition of the vulnerable consumer was criticized as being too narrow and arbitrary, 
thus neglecting to include some other legitimate causes of consumer’s vulnerability 
including education, race and ethnicity.233 For instance, the ECJ itself has identified a 
low level of education as one of the causes of vulnerability to consumers, so it is 
surprising that these grounds were not taken into consideration.234 
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In case of a commercial practice which is targeted towards such a group of consumers, 
fairness is to be assessed on the basis of the average member of the group to which 
such a vulnerable consumer belongs. For example, if the potentially misled consumers 
are children at early stages of the adolescence, an average child of that age group 
would be considered as the average consumer for purpose of fairness assessment.  
 
Due to their vulnerability, the initial presumption is that vulnerable consumers are 
especially affected by an unfair commercial practice. This is why particular care needs 
to be paid to their protection unfair behaviour of traders. In accordance with this 
approach, a commercial practice may be considered as fair on the basis of two 
previous forms of the average consumer, but unfair if assessed on the basis of a 
vulnerable consumer.  
 
The concept of vulnerable consumer is the outcome of the European Union’s policy to 
pay special attention to those which are particularly weak.235 Moreover, this standard 
was established as a category aimed to remedy relatively high requirements for 
consumer protection established by the average consumer that was criticised as being 
particularly harmful for vulnerable group of consumers. This is because in case of 
some Member States, such as Germany or Scandinavian countries, the adoption of the 
average consumer as a central benchmark led to the diminishment of the level of 
consumer protection since their pre-UCPD central benchmark was much more similar 
to the vulnerable than to the average consumer.236 Hence, the vulnerable consumer 
attempt is to represent a corrector applicable in case of particularly weak consumers.  
 
The concept of vulnerable consumer is in line with the case law of the ECJ that 
developed the general standard of average consumer. Namely, the vulnerable 
consumer is not vulnerable because they behave carelessly and does not use the 
disclosed information, rather due to some of its characteristics which he cannot 
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influence, such as their age or state of mind, which inhibits them from receiving and 
profiting from disclosed information. For instance, it cannot be expected that the 
imposition of the duty of information applied in the same manner to all consumers 
will be of the same benefit to a thirty-year old person in comparison to a ninety-year 
old consumer.  
 
Examples of vulnerable consumers 
As an exclusive concrete example of vulnerable consumers, the UCPD identifies 
children.237 With such an approach, the Directive became the second instrument of 
European consumer law to provide a particular care about children. The first 
instrument where children, as well as other vulnerable categories of consumers, were 
granted additional levels of protection from advertising was Directive 89/552/EEC on 
television without frontiers238 which was repealed by Directive 2010/13/EC on 
audiovisual media services239. The vulnerability of children to advertising practices 
was confirmed in De Agostini.240  
 
In EU Consumer Law, the first document where children, i.e. minors, were attributed 
particular levels of protection was Directive 97/7/EC on distance selling where traders 
imposed obligation to take into consideration, while fulfilling their pre-contractual 
information duties from the directive, the principles established by the national laws 
of Member States protecting those who are unable to give their consent, where minors 
are mentioned as an example.241 The Commission in its Guidelines on the UCPD also 
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identifies teenagers as a group of vulnerable consumers for the same reason as 
children: “their lack of attention or reflection due to their immaturity”.242   
 
Vulnerable consumer in action 
The conditions posed by the Directive for the application of vulnerable consumer 
standard seem to be too strict which questions its effectiveness. Namely, a particular 
practice has, first, to be likely to materially distort economic behaviour only [emphasis 
added MD] of identifiable the group of vulnerable consumers, and, second, it has the 
distortion has to be performed in a manner which the trader could have reasonably be 
expected to foresee.243 The requirements of exclusiveness limits particularly the 
application of this standard. It means that a practice which endangers both the 
economic behaviour of the regular average consumers and vulnerable consumers will 
not be able to be assessed on the basis of a vulnerable consumer. This would be the 
case in spite of the fact that it materially distorts economic behaviour of vulnerable 
consumer so that it makes a commercial transaction he would have not otherwise 
made, if the regular average consumer is not affected by a particular practice.  
 
Moreover, in practice it is very difficult to prove that certain commercial practices are 
directed towards vulnerable consumers since they reach all types of consumers, and 
not only the vulnerable who are their main targets.244   Consequently, such an 
approach may significantly narrow down potential application of the standard of 
vulnerable consumer. The requirement ‘reasonably expected to foresee’ gives an 
objective perspective to the interpretation of the vulnerable consumer.245 
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The Court has not yet provided the interpretation of the characteristics of vulnerable 
consumers, particularly how widely they are supposed to be understood. However, all 
the terms, and particularly credulity, can be very widely interpreted to include all 
imaginable vulnerable consumers. Undoubtedly, vulnerability caused by lack of 
education or financial status can be easily subsumed under the cause of vulnerability 
due to credulity. In general, for their credulity vulnerable consumers are those “who 
may more readily believe certain claims”.246 
 
One crucially important task for the competent authority in charge of assessing 
fairness of commercial practice is to discover on the basis of which of the three types 
of consumers yardsticks it will perform its task. The potential problem for the national 
court is the question of deciding how to decide whether a commercial practice is 
directed towards a group of vulnerable consumers or to general public, who actually 
represents vulnerable consumers and what level of influence a practice should have on 
a group, i.e. what it is just partially dedicated to vulnerable consumers.  
 
Vulnerable consumer in services of general economic interest 
The definition of the vulnerable consumer derived from the UCPD is not to be 
confused with the notion of vulnerable consumer for the purpose of services of 
general economic interest (“the SGEI”). The European Commission defined the SGEI 
as services “which the public authorities class as being of general interest and subject 
to specific public service obligations”.247 The access to the SGEI is a fundamental 
right of all consumers.248 
 
These two notions have, to a certain extent, different meanings and purposes. Under 
the SGEI, vulnerability is particularly addressed to the economic aspects of 
consumers, their financial situation, due to which they need special rights related to 
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the admission to the services of general economic interests and protection from 
disconnection. This is the case, for instance, with limitations on the rights of providers 
of heating to cut the heating system during winter from a consumer who receives a 
very low monthly income.  
 
Contrary to this, according to the UCPD, vulnerability is caused predominantly by 
non-economic factors. Vulnerable consumers under the SGEI definition are 
characterized as consumers who are particularly vulnerable due to their hard economic 
situation or some other characteristic and thus enjoy an additional level of 
protection.249 For instance, vulnerable consumers are those consumers with extremely 
low personal income or consumers who live in remote areas of a country. Of course, 
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Protected consumer under consumer contract law 
 
Lack of clear standard of protected consumer 
European consumer contract law is focused on the explanation of who shall be 
understood to be a ‘consumer’ in the context of clarification of the scope of 
application rationae personae of consumer law, i.e. which subjects are protected by 
the consumer law regime.250 Such a definition of consumer fully corresponds to one of 
two definitions of consumers of the UCPD, where consumer is defined as “any natural 
person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are 
outside his trade, business, craft or profession”.251 
 
Accordingly, the case law of the ECJ examined this definition of consumer in the 
context of the scope of application of consumer law, providing eventually a rather 
narrow interpretation.252 A question of particular importance was the application of 
consumer law in case of so-called ‘mixed purpose’ contracts where consumer was 
acting both within and outside his trade, business, craft or profession.253 Directive 
2011/83/EU on consumer rights is aimed to provide final clarification of this 
ambiguousness, pointing out that in case of these types of contracts, it has to be 
verified which activity “is predominant in the overall context of the contract”.254 
 
However, unlike the UCPD, European legislation in the area of consumer contract 
does not provide a definition of a common European standard of expected behaviour 
of consumer, but such a definition of consumer is missing. Surprisingly few pieces of 
legal scholarship have addressed this issue, and even those are limited to the 
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observation that such a unified European standard is missing despite the need for its 
existence.255 The necessity for existence of a common European definition of 
consumer has certainly increased together with the shift of European consumer policy 
from minimum to maximum harmonisation which requires a more unified consumer 
policy among Member States.  
 
The need for a standard of consumer 
Information and transparency requirements  
The standard of consumer in consumer contract law is to be used as a model of 
behaviour on the basis of which the national court would have to verify whether a 
trader has duly fulfilled his obligations. In particular, the standard of consumer is of 
utmost importance for two areas of consumer contract law: unfair contract terms and 
pre-contractual information requirements.  
 
First, for the assessment of fulfilment of the requirements of transparency and fairness 
of contract terms, primarily in the context of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract 
terms and whether a contract and its terms have been drafted in plain, intelligible 
language, this standard is used as a benchmark for assessment of whether these 
criteria of contract term have been fulfilled or not.256 Second, for the verification of 
fulfilment of trader’s obligation to disclose to consumer all relevant information in 
plain, intelligible language imposed by all European directives in the area of consumer 
contract law, the standard is again used as a yardstick to verify whether these pre-
contractual duties have been correctly fulfilled.257 
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Why has the meaning of consumer as a standard been missing? 
Bearing in mind the importance and the role that transparency requirements and duty 
of information have in the system of EU consumer law,258 the fact that the meaning of 
the consumer as a standard was not provided is surprising. The fact that such a 
standard has been missing resulted in a heterogeneous understanding of applicable 
standard among national legal systems of Member States. Such a phenomenon was 
explicitly noted in the EU Consumer Law Compendium, a Study ordered for the 
European Commission on the Consumer Acquis and its implementation in Member 
States, focused on eight European directives.259The authors of the Study underlined 
the significance of this phenomenon, but did not go further into details, only pointing 
out that the detailed exposition of this fact is beyond the scope of the performed 
study.260  
 
Equally, the drafters of the Draft Common Frame of Reference, as an academic 
project that also covered all areas of consumer contract law, noted that Directive 
93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms does not either provide the answer to the question 
of what kind of consumer should be the reference model for the assessment of 
transparency, or whether that is the average consumer.261 However, again, in the 
proposed provision on transparency requirement of a contract term, the DGFR did not 
provide a standard in comparison to which it has to be assessed.262  
 
Concurrently the actual Commission’s Proposal on a Common European Sales Law, 
the so-called Optional Instrument or the CESL, has also failed to provide a standard of 
expected behaviour of the consumer in the context of transparency and information 
requirements despite the fact that the Optional Instrument has particularly further 
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developed these duties.263 The Optional Instrument also does not provide particular 
protection for vulnerable consumers, who are simply ignored in the text of the 
Proposal, equalizing this category of consumers with a general category. As a result, 
the UCPD would certainly provide a higher level of consumer protection to vulnerable 
consumers than the proposed Optional Instrument. 
 
The lack of provision of unified European standards does not seem to be a negligent, 
but rather an intentional omission. The reason why the benchmark was not defined is 
due to the fear of some Member States that the model of the average consumer as 
developed by the Court’s interpretation of the EU primary law would be introduced as 
the most probable option.264 In that sense, the inability to provide a unified standard 
may mean that EU law implicitly recognized the divergences among the national legal 
systems. This approach was definitely legitimate and legal, being in line with 
minimum harmonization approach enabling thus national legal system to maintain 
their national standards if they are in accordance with the minimum criterion. 
   
The relevance of the shift towards maximum harmonisation  
The meaning of consumer as a standard in consumer contract law is relevant both for 
traders and for consumers. It provides traders with a guideline as to what manner they 
are obliged to behave in and how to fulfill the duties they are legally imposed with, 
while consumers are made aware of the level of provided protection they are entitled 
to.265 The necessity for having a unified meaning of the consumer in EU consumer 
contract law has become particularly important after the shift from minimum 
harmonisation to maximum harmonisation approach in consumer contract law.  
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Previously, a general rule was that European legislation would provide a minimum 
level of protection, whereas national legal systems were allowed to adopt any 
additional rules on consumer protection, if they respect the imposed minimum 
standard.266 This meant that the national legal systems were free to adopt the standard 
of consumers applicable for assessment of transparency and information requirements 
in accordance with their own consumer policies having respected the minimum 
criteria established by EU law. 
 
However, during the last decade several of the major EU directives on consumer 
contract law were repealed or modified by the new directives requiring maximum 
harmonisation.267 It is no longer legal for Member States to have diverse standard for 
defining the consumer from the unified European standard. Consequently, the shift 
from minimum towards maximum harmonisation also results in a significant increase 
of the need for the adoption of one, unified European meaning of consumer as a 
benchmark. 
 
Today, the majority of pre-contractual information requirements imposed by EU 
Consumer Law are contained in directives requiring maximum harmonisation. Their 
examination may show that there is a tendency of adopting a standard equal to the one 
of the average consumer as defined by the UCPD. In case of Directive 93/13/EEC on 
unfair contract terms, despite the intention to modify it in accordance with a 
maximum harmonisation principle, such an attempt has failed.268 However, the 
reasons of legal certainty still urge for adoption of a standard related to the one of the 
UCPD.269  
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This is in particular the case after the judgment of the Court in Perenicova in which 
proved a tight connection between the unfair commercial practices and unfair contract 
terms, pointing out that the usage of unfair contract terms would typically represent an 
unfair commercial practice.270 Accordingly, the usage of the unfair contract term will 
typically represent a form of unfair commercial practice. The adoption of such a 
standard would also be in line with a current very pro-consumer jurisprudence of the 
ECJ and with the entire EU consumer law and policy since they deal with different 
aspects of fairness of contract terms, so one does not exclude the other. 
 
EU primary law and the notion of consumer 
Consumer Protection under EU primary law 
A detailed analysis of EU primary law related to consumer protection is beyond the 
scope of this paper.271 Instead I will examine EU primary law in order to verify 
whether its examination contributes to understanding of the meaning of consumer in 
EU consumer contract law. EU primary law does not, namely, provide a direct answer 
to this question, but understanding of EU consumer law and policy based on the 
analyzed constitutional foundations can be of help for getting a clearer picture of what 
is the objective of protection of consumer contract law.  
 
The previous section of this Chapter showed that the concept of the average consumer 
was primarily developed by the interpretation of the Court of EU primary law, in 
particular of article 34 TFEU (ex article 28 TEC). The questions raised before the 
Court concerned whether national measures on commercial practices of Member 
States whose objective was consumer protection, but which were found to establish 
obstacle to free movement of goods, could be justified in accordance with the 
principles set up by the Court in its judgment in Cassis de Dijon.272 The Court’s 
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prevailing approach was that disputed national measures represent obstacles to free 
movement of goods since they are not in line with the principle of proportionality and 
thus they should be abolished, defining a very high level of expected behaviour by the 
consumer.273 As a standard of the assessment for justification of the national 
measures, the Court took the average consumer as a benchmark in the form in which it 
was later codified in the UCPD. 
 
Two-fold approach of the ECJ 
Contrary to the noticeable restrictive approach towards the national rules on consumer 
protection, the Court in the interpretation of EU secondary legislation on consumer 
contracts had a rather consistent pro-consumer approach. On this basis of these two 
distinctive approaches, Unberath and Johnston pointed out the inconsistency of the 
objective of protection of the Court depending on whether the decision is based on 
primary or secondary law.274 
 
The explanation for such a diversification of the approach can be found in the analysis 
of the objectives of the Court’s interpretation. Namely, the aim of interpretation of the 
primary law was in the context of free movement of goods where national rules on 
consumer protection rules represented obstacles. Consequently, the Court goal, at least 
nominally, was to find a benchmark which would enable the functioning of the 
Internal Market, but again which would respect particularities of national legal 
systems. The recognition of usually lower standards of the definition of consumer 
could have been easily used as the justification for preservation of the national 
measures and this is why the Court came up with the average consumer which 
combined the reasonably well-informed, the reasonably circumspect and the observant 
component, with the social, linguistic and cultural factor which have to be taken into 
consideration.275  
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Contrary to such an approach in the interpretation of EU primary law, in the context 
of consumer protection, the Court’s had a more pro-consumer approach while 
deciding on the basis of EU secondary law on consumer protection. Namely, in the 
last three decades, a dozen European directives were passed that have regulated 
certain types of consumer contracts, such as off-premises, distance or timeshare 
contracts, or particular aspects of the content of consumer contract itself as it is the 
case with the rules on unfair contract terms making thus shift from negative into 
positive harmonisation. This is because the tension between the incentive to 
strengthen the internal market on one hand, and the requirements for strengthening of 
consumer protection on the other hand are less present if a particular area of law has 
already been unified.  
 
Until recently, the prevailing method of regulation has been based on minimum 
harmonization which has allowed Member States to maintain or adopt measures 
which provide a higher level of consumer protection. Accordingly, the countries 
which adopted stricter measures justified them through the minimum harmonization 
character of the directives as was the case in Buet.276 It is questionable whether such a 
measure by a French national would have been justified by the Court if it had not had 
its roots in EU secondary legislation. 
 
Previous to the UCPD, the average consumer was the outcome of negative 
harmonisation and the conflict between the internal market and national rules on 
consumer protection. Currently, such a standard was maintained in the secondary 
legislation as a compromise to the conflict between requirements of the internal 
market and European consumer policy.  This is why in the area of unfair commercial 
practices, there is no more differentiation between the approach on the basis of 
primary and secondary law. Such an approach seems to be also now prevailing in the 
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area of secondary law on consumer contract law. This is certainly the case at least in 
the standard of the protected consumer, there is the same tension as in case of the 
UCPD between the interest of consumer protection and the interest of the internal 
market, noticeable through the examination of the constitutional basis of secondary 
legislation.  
 
The constitutional basis of consumer protection 
Consumer protection is guaranteed and highlighted by the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights which represents an integral part of the Treaty.277 Besides this, the TFEU itself 
contains two articles which are exclusively dedicated to consumer protection: Article 
12 TFEU278 and Article 169 TFEU.279 It is noticeable that the objective of both of 
these articles is to ensure common European policy of provision of high level of 
consumer protection. The interpretation of Article 169 shows that there are two legal 
bases for the adoption of the consumer protection measures on the European level.  
 
First, there is article 114 TFEU whose purpose is the establishment and functioning of 
the Internal Market and removing all of the possible obstacles. Second, article 169 
TFEU itself provides basis for the adoption of the measures for consumer protection. 
In practice, the absolutely prevailing legal basis for the adoption of consumer 
protection measures is article 114 TFEU (ex article 95 TEC).280  From a consumer 
protection perspective, the problem with article 114 TFEU is that the interests of 
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consumer protection are sometimes conflicting with the interests of the strengthening 
of the Internal Market.281   
 
However, article 169 TFEU has been rarely used as the legal basis for a consumer 
protection directive and its effects in practice are minor. Directive 98/6/EC on price 
indication represents one of few directives on consumer protection adopted on basis of 
article 169 TFEU (ex Article 153 TEC). It seems to be rather supplementing the 
consumer protection policies of Member States. Furthermore, maximum 
harmonization character on the basis of this provision is explicitly prohibited,282so in 
currently prevailing maximum harmonization approach, it is questionable whether in 
the future this provision will have any role to play.  
 
It looks clear that article 114 TFEU will remain the dominant ground and probably the 
only basis for development of consumer policy. This means that the entire EU 
Consumer Law, and not only the law on unfair commercial practices, has always to be 
interpreted in a manner that it is mandatory to take into consideration the interest of 
the internal market as defined by article 114 TFEU together with the interest of 
achieving high level of consumer protection.  
 
In the context of constitutional basis of EU Consumer Law, Willett suggests that as a 
benchmark for assessment of fairness in commercial practice and for verification of 
transparency of contract terms should materially differ under the explanation that 
these two areas have different objectives and regulate different areas. On the one 
hand, the objective of the rules on unfair contract terms is the provision of high level 
of consumer protection, whereas, on the other hand, the goal of the UCPD is to satisfy 
both the aim of achievement of high level of consumer protection and the aim of the 
strengthening of the internal market.283  
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This argument can hardly be accepted. Namely, Directive 93/13/EEC, as well as the 
majority of the European directives in the area of consumer protection, is based on the 
same legal basis as the UCPD, article 114 TFEU. Accordingly, this article also 
imports requirement of strengthening of the internal market into the core of the 
directives, as their principal policy objective, besides achievement of high levels of 
consumer protection, and consequently in the standards to be derived from these 
directives. This characteristic of article 114 TFEU is confirmed by the ECJ.284  
 
Consumer Policy Strategies 
The Commission’s Consumer Policy Strategies are adopted for the period of several 
years and they identify the directions of the future development of EU consumer law 
and policy. The analysis of these strategies can also show the approach of the 
Commission towards the meaning of consumer. The examination of the Strategies 
adopted for the period of the last ten years proves the general tendency of the 
Commission to open a new chapter in the area of consumer protection and to modify 
in certain directions the founding European consumer policy established by 
Preliminary Programme of the European Community for consumer protection and 
information policy, adopted in April 1975 by the European Council.285 In general, a 
tendency of development of a ‘less friendly consumer’ approach can be noticed where 
EU Consumer Law is increasingly losing its “social protective outlook”.286 
 
In the context of understanding the meaning of consumer in consumer contract law, 
certain parts of the strategies are relevant. One of the main objectives of the Strategy 
2002 - 2006 was the establishment of a high level of consumer protection.287 Such an 
approach was followed by Strategy 2007–2013. One of the ideas on the basis of which 
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this Strategy was developed is that consumers have become more empowered in 
comparison to the earlier periods when they were more ignorant about their rights and 
system of consumer protection. Consequently, the greater empowerment of consumers 
has also led to greater responsibilities for them to manage their own affairs.288 
 
Furthermore, the Strategy 2007 – 2013 underlined the tight connection and interaction 
between internal market and consumer policy.289 One of the main goals was to 
empower consumers. Empowered consumers are defined as those who need real 
choices, accurate information, market transparency and the confidence that comes 
from effective protection and solid rights.290 
 
The Consumer Programme 2014-2020 underlines the importance and the role of an 
empowered consumer as the centre of the Single Market.291 This is why 
empowerment of the consumer is identified as one of the General objectives of the 
Programme.292 The Programme also underlines the specific needs of vulnerable 
consumer “in order to take into account their specific needs and strengthen their 
capabilities”293 In such a manner, the Programme underlines the significance of 
particular protection of the vulnerable consumer, a concept that is not yet applied in 
case of unfair contract terms in the lack of a universally prescribed standard. 
 
The analysis of the texts of previous, current and future Strategies show the shift of 
consumer policy in the European Union. The main objective of protection is the 
empowered consumer who is an educated consumer, who profits from disclosed 
information and who is aware of his rights. Applied on consumer contract law, this 
leads to the conclusion that the empowered consumer will also be the objective of 
protection. This concept seems to be very similar to the average consumer, as a 
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consumer who is an active participant of the market and who cares and fights for his 
own interest.  
 
EU primary law and understanding of consumer  
All in all, it can be concluded that today in case of both parts of the once bifurcated 
EU consumer law, the fair-trading law, and consumer contract law, there exists 
secondary legislation which has introduced unified European rules in these two areas. 
Consequently, since secondary legislation exists in both cases, there is no need for 
existence of different standards, one to be applied in case of primary law and the other 
in case of secondary legislation.  
 
Moreover, both of the regulatory instruments were, though with few exceptions, 
adopted on the grounds of the same constitutional basis, article 114 TFEU, 
understanding that interest for high level of consumer protection was combined with 
sometimes confronting interest of the development of internal market. Therefore, in 
case of both regulations there is a need for a standard of the consumer that would 
include both these interests. Similarly, the European strategies on consumer protection 
as lighthouses of common European consumer policy, take the informed consumer 
who is an active market player, looks for information and compares offers as the 
objective for the future development of European consumer policy.  
 
The final conclusions to be drawn here is that today there is no reason why, as it was 
the case previous to the adoption of the UCPD, EU primary law would require the 
adoption of different standards of consumer in contract law and in unfair commercial 
practices. Quite the contrary, the constitutional basis under which directives of 
consumer contract law were adopted urge for the adoption of the meaning of 





EU secondary law and the standard of consumer  
Transparency and benchmark consumer 
Common European consumer policy is based on a paradigm of the informed 
consumer as an idealised rational actor at the market. The disclosure of information is 
of essential importance for the consumer since his rational decision making process 
depends on it. The mandatory information requirements as defined by EU law do not 
require only simple provision of information to the consumer, but also the manner in 
which the information will be provided to the consumer, so that they can process and 
profit from it.  
 
Besides sector specific consumer contract directives which all require provision of 
information in a transparent manner, Directive 93/13/EEC imposes a high level of 
transparency requirement regarding contract terms. The transparency requirement 
stands next to the information requirements as provided by other EU directives since 
the purpose of both is to ensure that the consumer makes a well-informed decision.294  
 
The transparency requirement is also guaranteed by Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair 
commercial practices whose rules provide an additional layer of protection to 
consumers from non-transparent contract terms.295 Accordingly, provisions of 
information in unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manners represents what 
is called a misleading omission.296 The tight connection between Directive 93/13/EEC 
and the UCPD was confirmed by the Court in Perenicova, where the Court pointed 
out that the usage of unfair contract terms represents a form of unfair commercial 
practice.297 
 
                                              
294 See further on transparency and information requirements in EU consumer law in: G Howells, A Jansen and 
R Schulze (eds), Information Rights and Obligations: A Challenge for Party Autonomy and Transactional 
Fairness (Ashgate 2004) 
295 S Orlando, ‘The Use of Unfair Contractual Terms as an Unfair Commercial Practice’ (2011) 7 European 
Review of Contract Law 25, 33-34 
296 Art 7(2) of the UCPD 




Directive 93/13/EEC on contract terms imposes strict requirements of full 
transparency of contract terms on traders.  In all cases when the consumer is provided 
with the terms of the contract in writing, these terms have to be drafted in plain, 
intelligible language.298 The assessment of fairness of the main subject matter of the 
contract and the stipulated price and remuneration are left out of the scope of the 
application of the directive with the exception of transparency obligation. Therefore, 
the so called ‘core terms’ of a contract will be considered as unfair if they are not 
provided in plain intelligible language.299 Consequently, the transparency represents 
the minimum level of regulation that the European Union provides for core terms.300 
This is why in practice these rules play an important role.  
 
The requirement of ‘plain, intelligible language’ is a standard that should be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis. Its purpose is, as it was identified in  the Commission v. Spain 
by Advocate General Geelhoed that the terms contained in general conditions have to 
be “completely plain and intelligible to the consumer. Their meaning must not depend 
on which of a number of possible divergent interpretations is placed on them”.301 
Besides this form of protection, Directive adds another layer of protection stating that 
in case of any doubts about the meaning of the term, the one that is most favourable 
for consumer will prevail.302 
 
ECJ case law on unfair contract terms  
On the basis of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms, the Court has 
developed a fruitful judicial practice which is often described as manifesting a very 
pro-consumer oriented approach. However, none of the case law has provided 
clarification of what kind of consumer is understood as a benchmark for the 
assessment of fulfillment of transparency requirement, though the average consumer 
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as defined by the ECJ and codified in the UCPD was identified as the most probable 
solution to be adopted.303 In spite of a lack of such a clear standard, I will now 
examine the existing case law in this area in order to verify whether any general 
conclusion useful for the subject examined here can be drawn. In particular, the 
purpose is to discern whether such a case law advocates against average consumer as 
defined by the UCPD to be also applied to consumer contract law.   
 
The judicial practice consists of two groups of cases: those resulting from the 
infringements surrounding lack of proper transposition of the directive by Member 
States and those decisions surrounding the basis of preliminary references made by 
national courts with the purpose of receiving interpretation of some provision of the 
directive. The first group of cases would include the judgments of the Court in relation 
to the infringement procedures that the Commission initiated on the basis that 
Directive 93/13/EEC had not been properly implemented, whereas the second group 
would include the decisions made as the answers to the preliminary references made 
by the national courts. A certain level of inconsistency in approach may be noticed in 
these two sets of cases.  
 
In the first group of cases, the issue was whether a particular manner in which these 
countries transposed the provisions is suitable and whether it fulfills the objective 
posed by the directive. In all of these cases, the Court underlined that the individuals 
have to be made fully aware of their rights and this is the reason why proper 
implementation matters.304 In its judgment in Commission v. Spain the Court pointed 
out that legislative action is not necessarily demanded to transpose provision of a 
European directive but that it is extremely important for the national law to be 
“sufficiently precise and clear and that individuals are made fully aware of their rights 
and, where appropriate, may rely on them before the national courts”.305 
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Consequently, the conclusions to be drawn from these decisions show that if the 
directive is properly implemented, consumers will be made fully aware of their rights 
and will be able to profit from them. 
 
Contrary to such a view of the Court in the case law on infringement of Directive 
93/13/ECC, in its case law on the interpretation of the provisions of this directive, the 
Court approached the consumer as being absolutely ignorant about their rights despite 
of proper transposition of the directive. A series of cases were pending before the 
Court in which it was assessed what kind of obligation Directive 93/13/EEC 
establishes to the national courts regarding the assessment of unfair contract terms. In 
Oceano, the first case of this kind, the Court defined consumer as a weaker party in a 
contractual relationship with trader “as regards both his bargaining power and his 
level of knowledge”.306  
 
As a consequence of his economic weakness, consumer has no sufficient financial 
resources to initiate a litigation. The problem with the lack of financial capacities is 
solvable through the access to free legal aid, but what remains unsolvable is the fact 
that the consumer is not aware of their rights. This is why the ECJ confirmed the 
existence of the right of the national court to assess the fairness of contract term on its 
own motion. In Cofidis, the Court reaffirmed the right of the national courts to 
ascertain the illegality of an unfair term even in cases when the consumer does not 
raise the issue of fairness themselves, within the time limit defined by the national 
law. In other words, EU Law requires positive actions of the national courts as a 
necessariy perquisite for effective protection of the consumer since the consumer is 
unaware of their rights or faces difficulties with enforcing them.307 
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In a subsequent case law, the Court transformed this right into a duty of the national 
courts to assess the fairness of a contract term “compensating in this way for the 
imbalance which exists between the consumer and the seller or supplier”.308 The 
Court essentially based its rulings on the ground that Community-law consumer 
protection rules constitute rules of public policy in the context of national legal 
system.309 As a consequence, the national courts are obliged to assess the fairness of a 
contractual term, unless consumers oppose to such a motion.310 Moreover, in its 
decision in Invitel, the Court identified that the decision of the national court on 
unfairness of a contract term has erga omnes effects on all consumer contracts that 
contains it irrespectively of the fact whether a consumer party to it has initiated a legal 
action or not.311 
 
Again, in its decision in RWE, a case which dealt with a question of fairness of a 
standard contract term that allowed the trader to modify the gas prices without stating 
the reasons for that was found to be unfair, the Court highlighted consumer’s need to 
be protected from stipulation of unfair terms in consumer terms. Accordingly, the 
Court pointed out that a standard contract term in consumer contract must always 
meet “the requirements of good faith, balance and transparency”.312 However, a 
provision which allows trader to modify its prices in case of which the consumer was 
not informed about the grounds for these modifications before the conclusion of a 
contract will represent a form of unfair contract term, despite the existence of 
possibility for the consumer to terminate the contract in case of price alteration.313  
 
In these cases the Court displays a very pro-consumer approach as a means to provide 
protection to the consumer as the weaker party. However, all of the case law dealt 
with procedural implications of the directive and questioning procedural autonomy of 
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the Member States. The purpose was to align the procedures established by national 
laws in accordance with the requirements set up by the principles of equality and 
efficiency. In other words, this pro-consumer approach of the ECJ in its case law was 
not the result of the interpretation of the directive regarding what is understood as its 
breach, but rather of the procedural consequences of the breach of the directive. In 
that aspect, the interest of the Internal market fully coincide with the interests of the 
protection of the consumer since the goal of both is to sanction unfair behaviour on 
the market.  
 
On the other hand, the question of the consumer as a benchmark is substantial in 
nature and has nothing to do with procedural autonomy of Member states, the latter 
being the main issue in these cases. It was possible to see that in the case of the 
definition of its meaning, the interest of consumer protection and internal market are 
conflictive. Defining consumer as a passive, uninterested player at the market would 
in accordance with the interest of consumer protection, but against the requirement of 
the internal market.  
 
On the other hand, defining the consumer as an extremely intelligent and active player 
would also be contrary to the interests of consumer protection, but would encourage 
the actions of the trader.  Consequently, it can be concluded that the pro-consumer 
oriented approach of the ECJ in relation to unfair contract terms cannot be regarded as 
contrary to the acceptance of the average consumer as a benchmark for the assessment 
of the Directive 93/13/EEC in the context of fulfillment of transparency requirements. 
Moreover, the introduction of the average consumer in consumer contract law 
contributes to a “balancing of the interest of the two parties” which the Court has 
emphasized as one of the objectives of consumer law.314 
 
                                              




The significance of the ECJ decision in Kásler 
In its recent judgement in Kásler, the ECJ explicitly used the standard of average 
consumer, as a reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect 
consumer, requiring from the national court to use it as a benchmark for the 
verification whether a contract term has been drafted in plain, intelligible manner.315 
This was the first case that the Court applied the benchmark of average consumer as 
defined by the UCPD to be used a standard applicable also in case of the unfair 
contract terms. Accordingly, it may be concluded that the average consumer has also 
become the applicable standard in case of unfair contract terms. 
 
The concept of Consumer and Information Requirements  
The duty of information represents the most important instrument for consumer 
protection provided by EU consumer law.316 The imposition of duty of information as 
a regulatory tool for protection of consumer that is the weaker party in contractual 
relationship, has been noticeable since the very beginning of the development of the 
European consumer policy.317 Today, the number of required information duties has 
multiplied so much that the phenomenon is pejoratively called the  ‘information 
jungle’.318 In accordance with such a policy, all of the European directives contain a 
developed set of information duties particular for a type of contractual relationship 
they regulate. The duty of information represents one of the tightest connection points 
between the UCPD and contract law since breach of information duty will represent a 
form of misleading omission. Their relationship and consequences thus arising are 
analyzed in a separate chapter of this thesis. 
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However, in this area what remained unclear is also the meaning of the standard for 
verifying whether a trader had fulfilled his information duties. As in the case of 
transparency requirement imposed by Directive 93/13/EEC, neither the secondary law 
nor the Court have explained on the basis of what standard the fulfilment of the 
trader’s obligation needs to be assessed. What is possible to conclude on the basis of 
the case law on consumer contract directives is that there is a recognized separation 
between the regular consumer and a more vulnerable consumer who deserves 
additional care by the system of consumer protection. Accordingly, I want to assess 
the case law of the Court in relation to information duties in order to see how the 
average consumer fits into the concepts developed by the judicial practice, as it was 
done in instance of case law on the ground of provisions on transparency of Directive 
93/13/EEC.  
 
The Court came closest to explaining the standard of protected the consumer in the  
Cofinoga, case dealing with the interpretation of the old Directive 87/102/EEC on 
consumer credit. In this case referred by a French court, which dealt with the 
obligation of provision of information requirements in a consumer credit contract, the 
Court underlined that in case of renewal of consumer credit agreement, a trader is not 
obliged to present to the consumer all required pieces of information established by 
Directive 87/102/EEC.319  
 
The judgment of the Court directly opposed and precluded French approach where 
renewal of a consumer credit contract was treated in the same manner as the 
conclusion of a new agreement and, thus, the trader was obliged to provide all 
relevant information to the consumer.320 As a consequence, the consumer now must 
be observant and circumspect as well as aware that in case of the renewal of a 
consumer credit contract, they will not be provided with the information on the basis 
of which they will decide whether or not he will renew the contract. The consumer has 
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to, himself, seek for all relevant information. Opposite to this, an uninformed, lazy 
consumer will not be protected.  
 
In spite of the fact that the old Directive 87/102/EEC was based on minimum 
harmonization, the Court explained that the French approach was contrary to the 
objectives of the directive, in particular to the goal of the strengthening the internal 
market, confirming in that manner its previous decision in Berliner. In its judgment in 
Berliner, the Court underlined that consumer credit Directive should always be 
interpreted in accordance with both of its objectives.321  
 
The legal basis for adoption of the directive on consumer credit has been Article 95 
TEC (now Article 114 TFEU) which was the same as in the case of the UCPD, aiming 
both at the strengthening of the internal market and at achievement of high level of 
consumer protection.322By analogy, this means that most other consumer protection 
directives also should be approached in the same standard, including the standard of 
protected consumer which has also to incorporate the requirements of the internal 
market. This is exactly in line with the manner in which the concept of the average 
consumer is defined by the UCPD. 
 
The general notion of average the consumer is mentioned in several cases of the Court 
related to contract law, but their meaning is ambiguous. For instance, Advocate 
General in his Opinion in Criminal Proceedings against Patrice Di Pint, one of the 
first cases dealing the with interpretation of Directive 85/577/EEC on doorstep selling, 
has pointed out that “the directive is obviously intended to protect the average 
consumer”.323 However, it has remained unclear what was the meaning of the average 
consumer to which Advocate General referred to in his Opinion.  
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Similarly, the notion of average consumer is mentioned in the Opinion of Advocate 
General in Ilsinger, the case dealing with the question of applicable jurisdiction over a 
consumer contract. In this case, Advocate General pointed out that in “determining 
whether a prize notification addressed to a consumer constitutes an offer, it is not 
possible…to provide a general answer. It will be necessary to determine in each 
specific case how an average consumer understood the vendor’s prize notification, 
and whether it is possible to consider from the consumer’s standpoint that the vendor 
has by its prize notification made him an offer. The national court must actually carry 
out that assessment of the facts. In proceedings for a preliminary ruling, which are 
based on a clear separation of functions between the national courts and the Court, any 
assessment of the facts in the case is a matter for the national court”. 324 Again, the 
clarification of what was meant under average consumer was not provided. 
 
Vulnerable consumer in contract law  
The case law on consumer contract law seems to have recognized the category of 
vulnerable consumers as a category of consumers who due to their vulnerability 
deserve more care and attention than the general category of consumers before this 
was recognized by secondary legislation. In Buet, as one of the first cases where the 
Court assessed the provisions of Directive 85/577/EEC on contracts concluded away 
from business premises, the  particular vulnerability of consumers with lower level of 
education in case of promotion of education materials was pointed out. Such a view 
was explained through the potential negative effects that uninformed purchases might 
have on buyers. 
 
In Buet, the Court pointed to consumers with the lower level educations as particularly 
vulnerable to the sale of the inadequate language learning materials, as it was the case, 
where the purchase of this kind of materials would not only cause financial loss to 
consumer but would have long-term negative effects for consumers regarding their 
                                              





employment prospectus.325 Hence, the Court considered the French measure of total 
prohibition of selling of this kind of education equipment as being in accordance with 
article 30 TEU. Such a decision was adopted despite the existence of the right of 
contract termination by the consumer as provided by Directive 85/577/EEC which 
consumers could use to remedy its decision. However, vulnerable the consumer in 
Buet represents an exception in case of which right of rescission could be considered 
as not providing sufficient tool for protection.326 
 
In Openbaar Minsiterie, an assessment on the justification of the Belgian law 
concerning the authorization for sale of periodicals as obstacles to free movement, the 
concept of the vulnerable consumer is mentioned in the Opinion of Advocate General 
Leger. In his Opinion, Advocate General identified that periodicals, and the 
subscription to such periodicals, would include all categories of consumers. Therefore, 
since these periodicals do not exclusively target vulnerable consumers, so the 
subsidiary standard of vulnerable consumer cannot be applied.327  
 
The used concept of vulnerable consumer is very similar to vulnerable consumer as 
defined by Directive 2005/29/EC.328 Through adoption of this implicit regime for 
vulnerable consumers in case of information requirements, the conclusion can be 
made that with the exceptional cases of vulnerable consumer, the standard on the basis 
of which it will be assessed whether the information has been duly disclosed will be 
the standard of average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably 
circumspect and observant consumer.  
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The analysis of post-UCPD secondary law on consumer protection 
Directive 2008/48/EC on consumer credit  
Eventually, all of the recently adopted directives in the area of consumer contract law 
can show that the average consumer is to be taken as the applicable standard. Namely, 
all of post-UCPD consumer contract law directives refer to the UCPD in certain 
manner, particularly in the context of required pre-contractual information duties. 
Accordingly, the new Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements points out that 
consumer has to be protected from unfair commercial practices of creditors, 
particularly those dealing with the information duties of the creditor in line with 
[emphasized by M.D.] the UCPD.329 If consumer is provided with protection ‘in line’ 
with the UCPD, by analogy it also means that the fulfillment of information duties 
needs to be assessed on the basis of the same standard of the average consumer as the 
principal benchmark and the vulnerable consumer as a residual benchmark applied in 
cases when consumer is particularly vulnerable.  
 
Directive 2008/122/EC on timeshare contract 
Similar wording was also taken in the new Directive 2008/122/EC on timeshare 
contracts. Directive 2088/122/EC refers to the UCPD by stating that one of the 
objectives of the new directive is to further develop the legal framework of protection 
of consumers in timeshare, particularly by further developing the information 
requirements of traders and manner in which these information duties will be 
provided.330 Again, if Directive 2008/122/EC refers to the UCPD as the model for the 
improvement of the set of information duties, it also means that it refers to the 
standard of the average consumer as the one to be applied.  
 
Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights 
Eventually, the standard of the average consumer seems to be fully recognized by the 
new Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights (‘the CRD” or “the Directive 
2011/83/EU”).  The directive does not mention anywhere an average consumer or 
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generally applicable standard for assessment of developed information duties under 
any other name.  However, despite the fact that a generally applicable standard is not 
explicitly defined, the CRD provides the definition of a subsidiary standard, formally 
and substantially identical to the subsidiary standard of vulnerable consumer defined 
by the UCPD. According to the directive, the standard of ‘vulnerable consumer’ is to 
be applied in case of consumers who are particularly vulnerable due to “their mental, 
physical or psychological infirmity, age or credulity in a way which the trader could 
reasonably be expected to foresee”.331 Such a provision did not exist in the Proposal 
of the Directive on consumer rights of 8 October 2008, and it was identified as a 
particularly weak point of the Proposal.332 
 
It is noticeable that Directive 2011/83/EU adopts absolutely the same wording as the 
one from the definition of vulnerable consumer in the UCPD.  The objective for the 
existence of this category of consumers, as the CRD points it, is that the concept of 
the vulnerable consumer is applicable in case pre-contractual information 
requirements provided by the Directive as defined by articles 5 and 6 of the Directive 
2011/83/EU.333 This means that, as the exception to the general rule (which is not 
defined), a vulnerable consumer will represent a benchmark for the assessment 
whether trader has fulfilled his information duties in cases when he is vulnerable due 
to some of the enlisted causes.  
 
In the area of the consumer contract law the idea of vulnerability of certain types of 
consumers who deserve an additional level of protection is not a radical innovation. It 
was recognized by the ECJ in Buet, but also by Directive 97/7/EC which requires that 
a provision of pre-contractual information while concluding a distance contract must 
be provided in accordance with, inter alia, “the principles governing the protection of 
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those who are unable, pursuant to the legislation of the Member States, to give their 
consent, such as minors”.334  
 
Through recognition of the vulnerable consumer as a subsidiary reference point for 
assessment of fulfillment of information requirements in contract law that is worded 
in the same manner as the vulnerable consumer in the UCPD, the Directive also 
implicitly accepted the average consumer of the UCPD as the general benchmark. 
Hypothetically speaking, it is questionable what would be the consequence in practice 
if a lower standard of consumer than the average consumer of the UCPD were 
accepted in consumer contract law. In such a case, the trader would be liable for the 
unfair commercial practice of a misleading omission since they did not provide 
information to the consumer who was neither reasonably well-informed, nor 
reasonably well circumspect and observant. This is because the UCPD explicitly 
mentions that all information requirements from consumer contract directives are 
considered as material, and thus their breach is a form of misleading omission. The 
other option is that, irrespectively of one provision or the other, the courts always 
assess whether the information is provided, first on the basis of the average consumer 
for the need of the UCPD and second on the basis of some other reference mark for in 
the context of consumer contract law. As a consequence, this would result in legal 
incoherence and uncertainty.  
 
Therefore, it is not surprising to notice that some of the English speaking Member 
States in their national legislation used the term ‘average consumer’ in the context of 
consumer contract law as a standard. For instance, the Irish National Consumer 
Agency as a statutory body established by the Irish government in charge of enforcing 
consumer rights, uses in its guide to the unfair contract terms the word ‘average’ in 
defining the consumer as a benchmark for assessment of transparency requirement: 
“[t]he question will most likely be decided from the perspective of the typical or 
average consumer.  The fact that a term used would be intelligible to a lawyer does 
                                              




not suffice if it is not intelligible to an average consumer and could therefore be 
reviewable under the regulations”.335 Similarly, the UK Financial Services Authority, 
as regulatory body in the United Kingdom in charge of financial services, in its 
Guidelines on unfair contract terms in consumer contracts uses the average consumer 
as a standard for verification whether contract term has been provided on intelligible 
and plain language.336 
 
Conclusion of the Chapter  
This chapter examined the average consumer which is the principal objective of 
protection provided by the Directive. It was initially developed through the case law 
of the ECJ and codified for the first time in EU Consumer Law through the provisions 
the UCPD. The notion of average consumer is of utmost importance for assessment of 
fairness of a commercial practice since it designates what is the expected behaviour 
and reaction of a consumer to a commercial practice. Therefore, it is to be used as the 
benchmark for fairness assessment. A standard of vulnerable consumer is to be used 
as a subsidiary benchmark which has to be used when a commercial practice is 
targeted to a particularly vulnerable group of consumers.  
 
Contrary to the benchmark of average consumer, a prescribed European standard of 
expected behaviour of consumer was missing in consumer contract law. This standard 
is of very high practical importance since it has to be used for verification of correct 
fulfillment of all transparency and information requirements imposed by diverse 
directives on consumer contract law. Eventually, a tendency of adoption of a unified 
standard of consumer equal to the one average consumer of the UCPD is particularly 
noticeable in the newly adopted legislation on consumer contract law in relation to the 
imposed pre-contractual duty of information and transparency requirements of 
contract terms. 
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CHAPTER III – DUTY TO TRADE FAIRLY 
 
Introduction: General Duty to Trade Fairly in EU Consumer Law 
The UCPD has introduced, for the first time, what I call, a general, pan-European duty 
to trade fairly in business-to-consumer relations. The universal duty to trade fairly is 
secured by the system of protection based on a three-step mechanism for assessment 
of fairness of a commercial practice that provides a complete protection of the 
consumer from any kind of trader’s unfair behaviour. In this three-step hierarchy of 
the applicable provisions of the Directive, the last, third step defined by a general 
fairness clause is of particular importance. Namely, the UCPD has established a 
general fairness clause providing thus the most abstract rule for assessment of fairness 
of a commercial practice.337  
 
The importance of the general clause comes from the fact that it, firstly, establishes 
the most abstract rule of fairness, applicable in widest possible situations, contributing 
materially in such a manner to the widest possible general character of a universal 
duty to trade fairly, and, second, through its cumulative double criteria, it explains 
best a substantive meaning of the duty to trade fairly and how traders shall behave at 
the market in their relationship with consumers. 
 
Contrary to the example of the law on unfair commercial practices, in European 
consumer contract law there is no universal duty which would correlate to the duty to 
trade fairly introduced by the UCPD and which would thus be applied to all types and 
all phases (formation, conclusion and execution) of a consumer contract. Good faith 
mentioned by Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms has only limited effects, 
in particular being applicable only on non-individually negotiated contract terms.338 
The lack of such a general principle is primarily the result of strong opposition of 
Member States to the introduction of any kind of duty similar to the principle of good 
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faith in contract law on the European level.  This is a consequence of the diversity of 
approaches of national legal systems towards, first, recognition of existence of such a 
duty, and, second, the content and requirements of that duty.  
 
What I argue in this Chapter of the thesis is that the duty to trade fairly as defined by 
the UCPD has also become a universal duty applicable in consumer contract law. As a 
consequence of a broad definition of the notion of commercial practice and its tightest 
connection with contract, the duty to trade fairly applies not only before, but also 
during and after a commercial transaction.339 Consequently, this means that the duty 
to trade fairly regulates behaviour of trader towards consumers in all phases of their 
contractual relationship, establishing thus also a general fairness requirement in 
consumer contract law. In other words, the duty to trade fairly has become a general 
obligation that also applies to consumer contract law, but only as a duty of the trader 
due to the unequal relationship between consumer and trader. 
 
 
Duty to trade fairly under Directive 2005/29/EC  
The definition of general clause   
According to the Directive, any commercial practice that is unfair shall be 
prohibited.340 In order to verify whether a practice is unfair, the Directive envisages a 
three-step mechanism for assessment of fairness of a commercial practice that national 
authorities shall follow.341 The first step is to verify whether a practice can be 
subsumed under any of thirty-one exhaustively enlisted concrete examples of 
commercial practices which are always unfair.342 The second step is to assess a 
practice through one of three more abstract “small general clauses” which prohibit 
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misleading and aggressive practices.343 Eventually, the last, third step is a general 
fairness clause which provides the most abstract and general mechanism for 
assessment of commercial practice’s fairness that managed to skip the previous two 
steps.344  
 
According to the third step, a commercial practice is unfair when two conditions are 
cumulatively fulfilled. The first condition is that a commercial practice is contrary to 
the requirements of professional diligence. The second condition requires that such a 
commercial practice materially distorts or is likely to materially distort economic 
behaviour of an average consumer. In such a manner, the Directive defines a general 
fairness requirement of trader in a negative manner, as a duty not to trade unfairly. 
Traders are not directly obliged to trade in a fair manner, but they are prohibited from 
acting unfairly. Although the initial intention was to formulate the general clause in a 
positive manner, primarily as a result of the UK’s strong opposition, the final version 
of the duty is formulated in a negative form.345   
 
The explanation for the shift in approach is found, as Collins explains it well, in “the 
traditional British liberal perspective on the state that what is not prohibited is 
therefore permitted, thereby avoiding the appearance of the imposition on business of 
a vague positive duty to behave in ways dictated by the government”.346 Moreover, 
negative formulation is considered as being encouraging for trader’s commercial 
freedom, as it was argued by Advocate General Trstenjak. It is in accordance with the 
principle in dubio pro libertate which shall be always applicable in case of the UCPD 
application.347  
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The UCPD provides that a commercial practice will be unfair if it is contrary to the 
requirement of professional diligence, as an expected and required standard of fair 
behaviour of traders. Moreover, for a practice to be declared unfair, the particular 
commercial practice of a trader must affect or must be likely to affect economic 
behaviour of consumer, as a necessary requirements of consequences that a behaviour 
of trader needs to have on consumer in order to be prohibited. I will examine both of 
these conditions later in details in this Chapter of the thesis since, besides providing 
condition for application of this provision, they explain best what shall be the 
substantive meaning of the duty to trade fairly.  
 
The purpose of the general clause and its functions 
A general fairness clause provided by the Directive has four main functions which 
proves well its character of a general duty to trade fairly. These functions include the 
roles of the general clause as a safety net, its adaptability to the changes of trader’s 
behaviour, but also to the changes of a consumer’s behaviour and a general fairness 
clause also show a clear policy determination of EU consumer law.  
 
Safety net 
The general fairness clause is to be used as a safety net aimed at prohibition of any 
commercial practice that is unfair, but which manages to skip prohibition on the 
grounds of the first two steps for assessment of fairness. Although it is true that in 
practice most of the unfair commercial practices can either be subsumed under one of 
thirty-one exhaustively listed practices of Annex I or be declared as unfair through 
assessment based on one of small general clauses, some commercial practices which 
are unfair that may avoid them.348 
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Accordingly, with its general and flexible formulation general fairness clause secures 
a full horizontal application of the duty to trade fairly, securing thus the most 
complete protection of consumers from any unfair commercial practice of traders. In 
such a manner, the duty to trade fairly fills in the gaps which remained unregulated by 
other, sector specific EU rules.349 
 
Adaptability to changes of trader’s behaviour  
In the case of other areas of EU consumer law, as a consequence of its generally 
present piecemeal approach, it was possible to notice diverse methods and techniques 
that traders used in the past in order to avoid the application of the provisions of a 
particular directive. For instance, this was the case with old Directive 94/47/EC on 
timeshare when traders started using a new product called ‘holiday clubs’ whose 
scope fall out of the legal regime established by the directive in order to avoid 
application of its provisions. Similarly, in case Directive 85/577/EEC on doorstep 
selling, a new irregular method of approaching the consumer was surmised as the 
‘response’ of traders to the passing of the directive which successfully succeeded in 
avoiding the application of the provisions of the directive related to illegal aggressive 
practices.350  
 
In that aspect, the purpose of a general clause is to remedy all possible avoidance of 
the application of consumer law by covering in abstracto all imaginable cases of 
unfair behaviour of traders and to provide a complete protection. In such a manner, 
the general clause overcomes constant risk typical for sector specific legislation of not 
being capable to adapt quickly to market developments. Moreover, this also shows 
that the Directive is future-proof351 since it is capable to cover all innovative practices 
traders may develop in the future that may be against economic interest of the 
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consumer, but which are not sanctioned by the provisions of the UCPD or some other 
piece of consumer legislation.  
 
Society and trade are now developing in such a more quickly than ever before and the 
trade techniques adapt much faster to these changes than the applicable legislative 
framework. The general clause of duty to trade fairly has that flexibility to be capable 
of covering all imaginable, but also currently unimaginable situations that can 
potentially happen in the future, a flexibility that none of the other pieces of European 
legislation on consumer law possesses. In other words, this shows the Directive’s 
ability to adapt automatically to the evolution of the market, as it is described. 352 
 
Adaptability to changes of consumer’s behaviour  
Importantly, not only trader’s behaviour and commercial techniques change during the 
time, but this happens with consumer behaviour which is also a relative and 
fluctuating category.353 Consequently, consumers become less susceptible to being 
hurt by one set of practices, and more by other types of practices. Finding and 
verifying how consumers really behave and react to a commercial practice in reality 
shall be a crucially important criteria for application of the general fairness clause.354 
In that respect, the general clause with its flexibility represents a great instrument with 
high potentiality in order to accommodate the duty to trade fairly to the reality at any 
moment and to adapt the mechanism of protection in accordance with real consumer’s 
behaviour.  
 
Consequently, national courts shall profit from such an adaptability of character of the 
general clause that can follow change of consumer behaviour in practice since a 
commercial practice is unfair only if affects or is likely to affect the consumer’s 
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economic behaviour.355 This means that a commercial practice which is contrary to 
the requirements of professional diligence is not automatically deemed unfair under 
general fairness clause, but it is mandatory required that it has certain affects on 
consumer’s behaviour. 
 
Policy determination  
The general clause is not only a provision of a binding legal nature, but also a 
provision which shows a clear policy determination and explains the philosophical 
basis of the Directive.356 As a policy measure of EU Consumer Law, its objective is to 
underline that only fair trade, at least in case of business-to-consumer relations is 
allowed and encouraged, whereas the unfair behaviour is unacceptable and thus shall 
be strictly prohibited and sanctioned. 
 
Such an approach is in accordance with EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights which 
recognizes the freedom to conduct business in accordance with European law and 
national practices.357The general duty to trade fairly represents the other side of the 
guaranteed freedom: in order to be free to conduct business, the trader is obliged to 
trade fairly. Furthermore, the general clause represents the emanation of the 
requirement posed by EU Charter that all European policies have to ensure high level 
of consumer protection.358 Accordingly, it has introduced a common European duty to 
trade fairly which applies to a widest possible forms of trader’s behaviour in his 
relation towards a consumer.  
 
Two limbs of the general clause  
The general clause of the Directive is defined in the following manner: 
A commercial practice shall be unfair if: 
(a) it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence, and 
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(b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic 
behaviour with regard to the product of the average consumer whom it 
reaches or to whom it is addressed, or of the average member of the 
group when a commercial practice is directed to a particular group of 
consumers.359 
Cumulative fulfillment of the two limbs is required for a practice to be considered as 
unfair.360 Accordingly, if one of the two conditions is missing, a practice cannot be 
declared unfair. The first condition is related to the breach of the required standard of 
behaviour of a trader. It will be fulfilled if a trader has not behaved in a required 
manner as defined by the UCPD. The second condition is related to the consequences 
of such unfair behaviour of the trader towards the consumer and it is accordingly 
fulfilled if a commercial practice has effects on the decision making process of 
consumer.  
 
The general clause is always applied bearing in mind reaction and behaviour of an 
average consumer, as a reasonably well-informed and reasonably circumspect and 
observant consumer, who is taken as the principal benchmark under the Directive.361 
The wording used in the general clause reveals the complexity and ambiguousness of 
its provisions, in particular due to the combination of innovative and traditional legal 
vocabulary used in a new context whose meaning and mutual correlation does not 
seem to be sufficiently clear.  
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The requirements of professional diligence 
The meaning of professional diligence 
Professional diligence defines required a standard of behaviour by the trader while 
acting on the market. The standard requires an advanced level of care in comparison 
to an ordinary person or a non-professional.362 This is accordance with the case law of 
the ECJ in the area of consumer contract law where the Court confirmed a 
requirement of particularly attentive care from traders in their interaction with 
consumers. This is because the consumer is always a weaker party ‘as regards both his 
bargaining power and his level of knowledge’ in comparison to a trader.363  
 
Since professional diligence is an innovative legal notion in EU consumer law, the 
Directive also provides its definition. It is defined as a “standard of special skill and 
care which a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, 
commensurate with honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith 
in the trader's field of activity”.364 The definition shows that professional diligence 
shall be understood in a broader manner than the concept of subjective good faith 
since professional diligence also requires from trader to possess relevant competence 
and expertise in addition to the requirement of honesty.365  
 
Accordingly, it is pointed out that professional diligence requires for traders “to 
undertake further activities beyond those that they are normally required to carry out 
in fulfilling a duty of good faith”.366 Moreover, in line with its scope of application, 
the Directive narrows down the definition to the required standard of behaviour 
towards consumers, whereas regulation of trader’s behaviour towards competitors is 
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provided by other pieces of legislation and thus it is irrelevant for definition of 
professional diligence in the context of the UCPD.367  
 
Initially, the Commission planned to define ‘professional diligence’ as “a measure of 
special skill and care exercised by a trader commensurate with the requirements of 
normal market practice towards consumers in his field of activity in the internal 
market”.368 Such a proposal was criticized by the European Parliament as being 
difficult to understand, as well as for allowing traders to base their defense on the fact 
that a practice was ‘normal’ for a particular sector.  Furthermore, it was suggested that 
a good faith component should be added to the definition of professional diligence in 
line with the already existing concept of good faith established by Directive 
93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms. The European Parliament attempted to upgrade 
the significance of good faith by the additional amendment proposed addicting the 
criterion of good faith to the first limb, i.e. that a practice has to be contrary both to 
professional diligence and good faith.369 These arguments of the European Parliament 
were partially followed as the final version of the adopted text the Directive may 
show.  
 
In defining the components of the duty to trade fairly, the Commission was aware of 
its tight liaison between the general duty of good faith and the necessity to show this 
connection. However, professional diligence and good faith, in particular those 
existing in national contract laws, are not the provision of the equal meaning.370 
Eventually, good faith requirement was incorporated in the text as a part of the 
definition that provides some explanation to the meaning of professional diligence 
through rather familiar concept.  
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Equally, instead of opting for the unclear concept of the ‘normal market practice’, the 
final version adopted the adjective ‘honest’ as a requirement of the quality of a 
trader’s market practices, following partially in that manner the general prohibition of 
unfair commercial practices provided by article 10bis of Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property.371 The Paris Convention itself represents the oldest 
international agreement that has ever contained a provision, article 10bis, which is 
aimed to secure effective protection from unfair commercial practices.372 All EU 
Member States are signatories of Paris Convention.373 Consequently, the idea was that 
the final wording of professional diligence encompasses in its text the notions of good 
faith and honest market practice which were already established in the legal systems 
of majority of Member States.374 
 
The interpretation of the professional diligence by the ECJ 
In its case law on the UCPD, the Court, provided some clarification of the definition 
of professional diligence. However, since professional diligence represents a standard, 
it is not possible to have a detailed and precise meaning of this definition, but the test 
is rather to be performed on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, the existing case law 
of the ECJ is of help to understand what the European meaning of professional 
diligence shall be.  
 
In Plus, the main subjects were business activities of a retail company in Germany 
whose promotional strategy was based on the invitation of consumers, through the 
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advertisements, to buy in their shops in order to collect bonus points. Those who 
collected a certain prescribed number of points were given the chance to participate in 
a lottery and to win prizes. Such a practice by the trader was prohibited on the basis of 
a provision of German national law on unfair competition.  
 
The Court concluded that maximum harmonisation character of the Directive 
precludes such a provision of German law.375 In this case, only the Advocate General 
addressed the question of professional diligence.376 The Court did not follow the 
Opinion of Advocate General since it did not perform a substantial analysis of the 
Directive, but rather focused exclusively on the scope of the application of the 
directive and the question of whether the UCPD precludes German law on prohibition 
of a form of commercial practice.377  
 
While examining whether a disputed practice could represent an unfair commercial 
practice under the general clause, the Advocate General identified that the practice in 
case, i.e. participation of consumers in a competition which is made conditional on the 
purchase of a product, can represent a form of breach of professional diligence.378 
Advocate General explained her views on the ground that “the use of games of chance 
in advertising is very likely to arouse the human pleasure in gambling”. As a 
consequence, the games of chance “can arouse the attention of prospective customers 
and direct them to certain ends by means of the chosen advertising strategy”.379  
 
Prior to reaching such a conclusion, the Advocate General referred to the Court’s case 
law on gambling and underlined the problematic moral component of games of 
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chance and that prohibition can be justified on the grounds of public policy. In spite of 
such an approach, Advocate General did not even attempt to assess this particular 
practice through the criteria of taste and decency as exceptions to the application of 
Directive’s regime. The explanation for this approach can be found in the fact that 
subjected commercial practice, besides its problematic moral justification, also 
impaired consumer’s economic interests by influencing him to buy the advertised 
products. This means that taste and decency in the context of the UCPD should be 
interpreted restrictively and that they do not fall under the Directive only in cases 
when consumer’s economic interest in not hindered. 
 
In Mediaprint, the Court provided clarification of the requirement of professional 
diligence. The question was whether possibility to take part in a lottery connected 
with the purchase of newspapers constituting an unfair commercial practice. On the 
basis of the fact that it is not contrary to the criterion of professional diligence, the 
Court simply stated that such a practice is allowed.380 However, the Court did not 
provide any assessment of the subjected practice under professional diligence which 
would be of help to understanding how this notion works in practice. Neither did 
Advocate General, whose Opinion the Court followed, offered any explanation while 
stating that a discussed practice does not represent a failure to fulfill the requirement 
of professional diligence.381 Advocate General only pointed out that it is for the 
national court to examine in detail whether a trader’s practice is against the 
requirements of professional diligence.382  
 
What seems particularly confusing is the inconsistency between the Opinions of the 
same Advocate General in Plus and Mediaprint, the two cases which were assessed a 
few months apart from each other. In both cases, the question was permissibility of 
sales promotions through possibility of the consumer to participate in a game of 
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chance in case he purchases the advertised products. However, in the first one, such 
behaviour of traders was considered as contrary to the requirement of professional 
diligence, whereas in the second, it was in accordance with this requirement. The 
explanation for diverse approaches in these two cases seems to be lacking in order to 
avoid any possible misinterpretations by the national courts.  
 
In Perenicova, the Court identified a false statement of annual percentage rate of 
charge in consumer credit contract by trader as a form of misleading action under 
article 6(1) of the UCPD.383 Alternatively to the assessment through the provisions of 
one of the small general clauses, the Advocate General performed the fairness test 
under the general clause which also came up with the conclusion that the practice in 
case was unfair.384 In her Opinion, the Advocate General pointed out that there was a 
breach of professional diligence requirement “since a trader must be expected to 
undertake his commercial activities in accordance with the relevant legislation and to 
demonstrate particular care in his dealings with a consumer, especially as the latter is 
dependent on the trader’s expertise”.385  
 
The Advocate General considered the provisions of the old Directive 87/102/EEC on 
consumer credit establishing the rules on interest rate were considered as relevant 
legislation. Consequently, provision of false information on interest rate would be 
considered as contrary to the requirements of professional diligence. However, the 
Court having respected the three step procedure on fairness assessment and having 
found that the disputed practice was a form of misleading action, on the basis of 
which breach of professional diligence is undeniably presupposed, did not have the 
need to proceed with the assessment of a practice under the general clause and verify 
whether the traders acted in accordance with the requirement of professional 
diligence.  
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In CHS Tour, the ECJ clarified that for the assessment of fairness of a commercial 
practice under the three small general clauses on misleading and aggressive practices, 
it is not required to also prove that trader has acted contrarily to the requirements of 
professional diligence.386 In other words, it is sufficient to prove that a particular fact 
can be subsumed under one of the three small general clauses and if that is the case, 
the presumption is that such a behaviour will always automatically represent a breach 
of requirements of professional diligence. In such a manner, it is possible to conclude 
that any illegitimate manner in which a trader prohibits a consumer to make an 
informed and free choice is also contrary to the requirements of professional 
diligence.  
 
Requirements of good faith and honest market practice 
Practical significance of good faith and honest market practice  
The examination of case law of the ECJ on the interpretation of professional diligence 
showed that the currently existing practice is not of particular usefulness to the 
national courts for understanding the autonomous concept of professional diligence. 
The Court provided hardly any universal guidance, but rather pointed out that 
professional diligence should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, in its 
documents that were issued after the adoption of the Directive, the Commission aimed 
to clarify ambiguousness and the other as the implementation and application report of 
the provisions of the Directive also touches upon the question of professional 
diligence inadequately and superficially.387 As a consequence, the lack of clear 
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European meaning of professional diligence seriously endangers the achievement of 
full harmonisation envisaged by the Directive.388  
 
For the correct understanding of professional diligence under the UCPD, the notions 
of honest market practice and good faith may be of great usage. Namely, the Directive 
identifies that professional diligence is a standard equivalent to the duties of good 
faith and honest market practice.389 However, again, neither the UCPD itself, nor the 
ECJ have provided what shall be meant under these two notions. The only 
clarification that the UCPD provides for interpretation of these two notions is that 
applicable honest practices and good faith are those existing in traders’ field of 
activity. It means that the two standards will be assessed from the perspective of 
particular industry sector to which the trader belongs. Limitation to particular industry 
sector is, as I will show later, particularly relevant when it comes to honest market 
practice since this requires taking into consideration private regulation that exists for 
the industry sector to which traders belongs. 
 
However, certain bordering and related areas of the law on unfair commercial 
practices may be of help clarify the meanings of good faith and honest practice under 
the UCPD. To start with, for understanding of good faith under its European meaning, 
case law of the ECJ developed in relation to the rules on unfair contract terms under 
the UTD is of great benefit. Such a European concept of good faith is examined in 
detail in the sections of the second part of this chapter where applicability of the duty 
to trade fairly on contractual relationship between trader and consumer is explained.  
Herein, I will focus on the examination of the requirement of honest market practice.  
 
In the context of understanding of the UCPD, honest market practice shall be 
approached from two perspectives: EU trademark law and private regulation.  First, a 
very similar concept, named as ‘honest practices’, had already existed in a bordering 
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branch of EU law, the law on trademark, where it represents a sui generis form of 
required behaviour in case of usage of trademark by a third party. Second, the 
requirement of acting in accordance with honest market practice emphasised and 
upgrade the standard of trader’s behaviour towards consumer at the market set by 
diverse forms of private regulation, in particular through code of conducts. 
Consequently, a breach of any code of conduct will also typically represent a breach 
of requirements of honest market practice and thus of a duty to trade fairly.390  
 
The approach of EU Trademark Law towards honest market practice  
The first perspective towards examination shall be from the position of Trademark 
law. Namely, the case law of the ECJ on the UCPD has not, so far, provided 
clarification what should be understood under honest market practice. However, the 
notion of honest market practice as defined by the UCPD materially resembles to the 
concept of ‘honest practices in industrial and commercial matters’ as defined and 
developed by EU Trademark law. In EU trademark law, from the concept of honest 
practices, the Court subsequently developed a rich jurisprudence.  
 
One of the major outcomes of this intensive judicial activity on honest practices in 
industrial and commercial matters is the establishment of a general duty to act fairly in 
trademark law.391 Due to the immediate obvious similarities between the duty to act 
fairly and the duty to trade fairly, as well as the tight connection between trademark 
and advertising laws, it is useful to examine what the Court understood under honest 
practices in its case law.  
 
The notion of honest practices was initially contained in Directive 89/104/EEC on 
trademark where it is mentioned twice in the context of the limitation of the right of 
trademark proprietor to prohibit a third party of using the trademark in certain 
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cases.392 The limitation is conditioned by the requirement to a third party to use the 
trademark “in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial 
matters”.393 However, neither does the Directive on trademark provide the exact 
meaning of this standard. The reason for this is well explained by Advocate General 
Jacobs who points out that for honest market practice “[b]y its very nature, such a 
concept must allow of a certain flexibility. Its detailed contours may vary from time to 
time and according to circumstances, and will be determined in part by various rules 
of law which may themselves change, as well as by changing perceptions of what is 
acceptable, however, there is a large and clear shared core concept of what constitutes 
honest conduct in trade, which may be applied by the courts without great difficulty 
and without any excessive danger of diverging interpretations”.394  
 
These words applied on the concept of honest market practice as prescribed by the 
UCPD may show that this clause guarantees the flexibility of the general fairness 
clause necessary for its function as a safety net and enabling its adaptability to the 
changes of consumer’s and trader’s behaviour, without the need to amend or modify 
the text of the Directive. 
 
Even after the repealing of directive with the new Directive 2008/95/EC on trademark, 
the requirements of honest practices in industrial and commercial matters remained 
untouched and unchanged.395 This is important since majority of relevant case law on 
honest practices of the Court is based on the old directive, but their legitimacy after 
the adoption of the new directive is not questioned since the applicable wording 
remained the same, showing also that there was no particular need for changing and 
clarification of this wording or concept.  
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The case law of the Court in this area is very fruitful. Consequently, these decisions 
can be of great help for understanding the meaning of the honest practice concept of 
the UCPD. It should not be forgotten in spite of the fact that they represent different 
branches of law, in reality there is a tight connection between commercial practices, in 
particular advertising and marketing, and trademark as confirmed by the ECJ.396 This 
is best explained by quotation saying: “A trademark is nothing without advertising 
and advertising is nothing without a trademark, in any event when consumer goods 
are concerned.”397 
 
Honest market practice in the ECJ case law 
In the case law of the ECJ in the area of trademark, honest practices were mentioned 
in several cases in the context of permissibility of the commercial practice that used a 
particular trademark. In one of the landmark cases in this area, BMW, the question was 
whether the owner of garage who sells second hand and repairs BMW model cars is 
allowed to use the trademark of the company BMW while advertising the services of 
his garage. In this case, the Court explained that the honest practice requires a third 
party not to make “the impression that there is a commercial connection between the 
other undertaking and the trade mark proprietor, and in particular that the reseller's 
business is affiliated to the trade mark proprietor's distribution network or that there is 
a special relationship between the two undertakings”.398 Consequently, third party is 
allowed to use trademark if it uses it in manner that does not mislead consumers.  
 
In Gillette, the usage of Gillette trademark in Finland by LA-LABS Gillette’s 
competitor in the area of disposable razor blades the Court was directly and explicitly 
asked to provide the meaning of honest practice. In this case, the Court enlisted some 
of concrete examples of dishonest practices applicable in all cases.399 Furthermore, the 
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Court pointed out to some forms of dishonest practices specific for the pending case. 
For instance, dishonest practice will be when a third party discredits or denigrates the 
trademark it is using400 or it presents its product “as an imitation or replica of the 
product bearing the trade mark of which it is not the owner”.401 
 
In Portacabin, the Court had to answer the question whether advertiser’s choice of a 
keyword for an Internet referencing service identical or similar to a registered 
trademark of another trader without his prior consent for advertising products identical 
to those for which the trademark has been registered, can be considered as a form of 
honest practice and, consequently, represent an exception to the general prohibition of 
the usage of a registered trademark. The answer of the Court was negative.402 The ECJ 
explained that this particular commercial practice does not represent a form of honest 
practice since it “does not enable average internet users, or enables them only with 
difficulty, to ascertain whether the goods or services referred to by the ad originate 
from the proprietor of the trade mark or from an undertaking economically linked to it 
or, on the contrary, originate from a third party”.403  
 
The question of honest practices was also touched by the Court directly in the context 
of advertising on the basis of Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading advertising. In 
Toshiba, one of the disputed issues was whether the indication of the product numbers 
of a trader by its competitor in its advertising practices can be considered taking the 
unfair advantage as defined by Directive 84/450/EEC on misleading advertising. The 
Court rules that such an advertising will be unfair only in case if the persons to whom 
the advertisement is directed to “associate the reputation of the manufacturer's 
products with the products of the competing supplier”.404 
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Similarly, in Siemens v VIPA the raised question before the ECJ was whether a trader 
is taking an unfair advantage if it uses in its advertising practices the competitor’s 
distinguishing mark that can be recognized by a specialist public. The answer of the 
Court was that by simply using a competitor’s distinguishing mark the trader does not 
take an unfair advantage, and consequently that such a commercial practice shall be 
permitted.405 
 
From the requirement to act in accordance with honest practice, the Court derived a 
general duty to act fairly406, established in relation to the legitimate interests of the 
trademark proprietor. The duty to trade fairly was confirmed in Brunnen where the 
Court indicated using of a geographic origin that is potentially aurally confusing with 
a registered trademark of a competitor is allowed if a trader uses it in accordance with 
the honest practice which “constitutes in substance the expression of a duty to act 
fairly”.407 The Court left to the national Court to decide whether such a practice is 
unfair by assessing all characteristics of advertising and, in particular, the shape and 
label of a bottle.408 
 
The examined case law proves the tight relationship between the concept of honest 
practices as the foundation of the duty to act fairly from Directive 2008/95/EC on 
trademark and the honest market practices as the source of the duty to trade fairly. 
Both of these concepts are primarily used in the context of advertising and marketing. 
Moreover, it must not be neglected that both of these directives also use the average 
consumer, equally defined as a reasonably well-informed, reasonably circumspect and 
observant consumer, as the principal benchmark of the directives.409 This is why for a 
proper understanding of the European meaning of the honest market practices, the 
case law example of the ECJ interpreting the provisions on honest practice in 
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trademark can be of great help. The examined case law enables the overview of some 
concrete examples of the meaning of honest practices.  
 
In spite of the fact that in these cases the questions raised before the Court concerned 
two traders, the decisions are applicable and relevant for understanding the concept of 
the duty to trade fairly as defined by the UCPD. This is because the analyzed 
commercial practices could also hinder economic interest of consumers. For instance, 
in case a consumer decides to buy a car in a shop with a BMW signs, and not in 
another shop, thinking that there exists a commercial connection between a garage and 
the car company.  
 
The existence of such a tight connection between the two areas of law is explicitly 
recognized by the UCPD in the provisions on misleading actions. Accordingly, “any 
marketing of a product, including comparative advertising, which creates confusion 
with any products, trade marks, trade names or other distinguishing marks of a 
competitor” will be considered as a misleading action.410 The previous cases were 
considered from the perspective of a trader, a trademark proprietor, yet from a 
consumer perspective they would have represented a kind of unfair commercial 
practice.  
 
Empowerment of private regulation through honest market practice 
The second perspective of honest market practice shall be from the position of private 
regulation. Namely, the clause on honest practice has also been incorporated into the 
system of protection provided by the Directive fairness requirements established 
through diverse pieces of private regulation. This in accordance with the increasing 
role that private regulation plays in the system of EU Law, described as “a growing 
phenomenon”.411 In case of the UCPD, a rising and important role of private 
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regulation for securing fair trade in business-to-consumer relations is particularly 
present.412  
 
Before the adoption of the Directive, the role, relevance and content of code of 
conducts in the national systems of protection from unfair commercial practices, differ 
significantly.413 Consequently, one of the policy goals of the UCPD is to encourage 
traders of different business sectors to adopt codes of conduct that would regulate 
their honest practices.414 In such a manner, through the adoption of pan-European 
codes of conducts in diverse market sectors, a final goal is to harmonize the standards 
of trading throughout the European Union.415 
 
The UCPD explicitly indicates that requirements imposed by code of conducts are to 
be taken into consideration while verifying whether a trader behaved in accordance 
with the principle of professional diligence.416 Such an approach already existed in 
Nordic countries where guidelines of fair conduct were drafted by Consumer 
Protection Agencies together with the representatives of particular industry sectors 
and have been traditionally used by the courts while assessing whether a trader 
behaved in a fair manner.417 Similarly, in the UK and Ireland there private regulation 
was a part of governmental strategy for securing fair marketing standards.418 A 
significant advantage of private regulation is that, being a soft law, its modification 
can be done in an easier and faster manner, than legislative changes, which thus 
enables private regulation to adapts better and more quickly to market changes and 
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developments.419 Again, this shows that flexibility of the general fairness clause is 
secured as a necessary prerequisite for its role as a safety net and possibility to adapt 
to all future changes of consumer’s and trader’s behaviour at the market. 
 
Different forms of private regulation contain rules relevant for requirements of honest 
market practice. They can be sector specific applicable for certain industries or 
general codes applicable for all or particular forms and means of advertising practices. 
This is why the UCPD itself delimits the requirement of honest market practice to a 
particular industry sector. The example for sector specific regulation is the Guiding 
principles for advertising and marketing communication to children made by the 
International Council of Toy Industries (ICTI).420 Accordingly, it applies exclusively 
in the case of advertising in the toy industry. It is recognized by Toy Industries of 
Europe whose member cover around 80% of the total European toy sale.421 This 
Guide defines some of the principles how a trader in this sector should behave. For 
instance, one of the rules states: “Premiums should be used and presented responsibly. 
There should be no sales pressure”.422 Consequently, if an allegedly unfair 
commercial practice was performed by a trader belonging to this industry group, the 
ICTI Guiding Principles will also be taken into consideration in order to verify 
whether that member acted in accordance with requirements of professional diligence.  
The example of a universal code for any kind of advertising practices is the main 
source of private regulation in advertising is the Code of Advertising and Marketing 
Communication Practice of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).423 The 
Code requires the Best Practices Marketing as the necessary basics for performing any 
kind of advertising activities. At the very beginning, the ICC Code indicates honesty 
as a fundamental requirement for any marketing communication. Besides being 
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honest, all advertising practices have to be legal, decent and truthful.424The 
requirements of honesty are defined in a manner that advertising practice must not 
“abuse the trust of consumers or exploit their lack of experience or knowledge”.425 
 
In case of alleged unfair commercial practices, all applicable codes shall be examined 
in order to verify whether trader acted in accordance with the provisions of the 
relevant codes. Private regulation through conducts can offer consumers a better and 
higher level of protection since it establishes minimum standards in accordance with 
which traders should behave. Accordingly, in order to protect consumer from 
misusage of their trust into code of conducts, the UCPD, as one of thirty-one 
commercial practices that shall be always deemed unfair, enlists trader’s false claim 
that he is signatory to a code.426   
 
The traders are motivated to be part of such a code since it provides them additional 
guarantee that their competitors will behave fairly and that the interaction at the 
market will be just, from which both traders and consumers will profit. Moreover, 
from a perspective of cross-border trade, in contemporary Europe the codes usually 
overpass the national borders which ensures a supranational unified level of 
protection. In that context, the Proposal of the UCPD recognized the capacity of 
private regulation help in providing a convergent interpretation of professional 
diligence.427 
 
On the other hand, the problem is that traders may base their defense on the honest 
practice in particular industry sector which was agreed by traders in their own 
                                              
424 Article 1 of ICC Code: All marketing communications should be legal, decent, honest and truthful. All 
marketing communications should be prepared with a due sense of social and professional responsibility and 
should conform to the principles of fair competition, as generally accepted in business. No communication 
should be such as to impair public confidence in marketing. 
425 Article 3 of the ICC Code 
426 Article 5(5) and point 1 of Annex I of the UCPD 
427 Commission, ‘Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Directive on unfair commercial practices ‘ 




interest.428 This is because it happens that the codes are sometimes established not for 
the sake of general or consumer interests, but rather in the interest for the involved 
industry sector.429 Consequently, national courts should be careful while applying 
them and approach them from a consumer perspective, in order to guarantee 
protection from unfair behaviour of traders.  
 
This is why by requirement of cumulative fulfillment of good faith and honest market 
practices criteria, the Directive secures that the interest of consumer does not get 
prevailed by the interest of traders as expressed in a code of conduct. In other words, 
criterion of good faith is used as a certain form of a control check that disables 
exemption from unfair clause in cases when a commercial practice of trader is in line 
with honest practice, in particular when defined by a soft law instrument, but it is 
contrary to the requirements of good faith. In such kind of cases a commercial practice 
shall be considered as being contrary to professional diligence.  
  
The scope of application of the duty to trade fairly 
The exemption of the taste and decency from the duty to trade fairly 
The duty to trade fairly, as defined by the Directive is aimed to protect exclusively the 
economic interests of consumers. Protection of any other non-consumer interest falls 
outside its scope as pointed out by the Court in its decision in Pelckmans, where the 
ECJ concluded that the provisions of the UCPD do not preclude rules of national laws 
that prohibits trader from keeping their shops open seven days a week, since such a 
provision is only aimed at protecting interests of workers and employees working in 
these shops, and not the interests of consumer.430 However, even in case of 
consumer’s interests, the duty to trade fairly is strictly limited to the protection of 
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economic interests of consumer, whereas all other forms of non-economic interests 
are not covered. 
 
This is particularly true with the taste and decency whose protection also falls outside 
of the scope of the Directive.431 Accordingly, Member States are allowed to maintain 
or adopt any national rules on unfair commercial practices whose goal is protection of 
taste and decency such as those dealing with “the protection of human dignity, the 
prevention of sexual, racial and religious discrimination, or the depiction of nudity, 
violence, anti-social behaviour”.432 However, the fact that these values fall outside of 
the scope of the UCPD does not impede their necessity to represent justified measures 
for cross border trade and free movement of goods and services. This is well 
noticeable in the decision of the ECJ in Omega where a national prohibition of 
commercial practices aimed at providing protection to human dignity was considered 
as a justified obstacle for free movement of services.433  
 
Some traders are worldly well-known for their ‘shock advertising’ approaches, as it is 
the case with fashion companies Benetton or Calvin Klein, whose advertising 
practices may sometimes be found offensive for certain groups of consumers, such as 
religious groups or women. The national courts of Member States have incoherent 
case law regarding permission of these kinds of advertisements: some of them find as 
part of advertising tactics within the limits of ethical and moral borders, whereas 
others prohibit them depending on the national approaches concepts of taste and 
decency.434 Through exclusion of the taste and decency from its scope, the Directive 
recognizes this diversity of approaches represents acknowledging this diversity of 
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cultural, social, moral and ethical approaches of Member States towards permission or 
prohibition of certain commercial practices.435 
 
Limited scope of application of taste and decency 
The importance of the values that these practices aim to protect, advocate for a very a 
broad understanding of the notions of taste and decency all kinds of interests and 
values of non-economic character, including ethical.436 This is why Member States 
should not be limited by maximum harmonisation character of the UCPD to protect all 
of their own non-economic interests and values in accordance with the particularities 
of national legal systems and society. However, too wide application of taste and 
decency would diminish the potential scope of the application of the Directive.437 In 
that context, an important question which rises in practice is how restrictively in 
practice the Court will interpret these exemptions in cases when a commercial practice 
concerns both the moral and cultural values of consumer and his economic interests 
since the line between these two areas is blurred in reality.438  
 
On the grounds of existing case law on the interpretation of the scope of application of 
the Directive made by the Court, it may be noticed that a seemingly wide nominal 
regulatory freedom of Member States in the area of unfair commercial practices that 
concern taste and decency is actually very limited in reality. The Court was very clear 
when it pointed out that the UCPD shall preclude not only the national provisions 
aimed exclusively to protect economic interests of consumer, but also those that 
besides protection of economic interests of consumer are designed to pursue other 
objectives.439 
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Accordingly, the provision of the Directive shall apply whenever economic interests 
of consumers may be hindered.440 The ECJ has left to the national courts the 
obligation to verify whether a particular provision is aimed to pursue protection of 
economic interests of consumers and thus to come with a conclusion of whether it 
falls under the scope of the Directive.441 As a consequence, the common European 
duty to trade fairly seems not be limited by the requirements of taste and decency 
since it will apply in case where a commercial practice, in particular an advertising 
practice, may hinder economic interests of consumers. 
 
The exemption of health and safety 
Besides exemption of the national rules on unfair commercial practices which are 
aimed to protect taste and decency, the Directive indicates that it is without prejudices 
regarding national bans on unfair commercial practices established on the basis that 
they protect health and safety.442  The necessary condition to be fulfilled is that they 
represent a justified measure in accordance with the EU law on free movement.443 In 
certain cases of protection of health and safety, common European rules are provided. 
This is for instance the case with advertising of pharmaceuticals, food or tobacco or 
product safety where the EU Law has established a detailed and sophisticated 
instruments whose main purpose is to protect health and safety of consumers. 
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This means that on the grounds of heath and safety, irrespectively whether on the 
basis of the EU or national laws, Member States may prohibit certain commercial 
practices which endanger health and safety of consumers without the need to assess 
them through the general fairness clause. Such a ban will not be considered as breach 
of the provision of the Directive, in particular its maximum harmonisation character. 
The explanation of the reasons why these interests are excluded are the same, since, as 
it has already been pointed out, the purpose of the Directive is the prohibition of 
exclusively economic and not any other interest of the consumer. 
 
However, this does not mean that commercial practices on alcohol, tobacco products 
and similar products that particularly may endanger health and safety of consumers 
are exempted from the general fairness assessment. It may be the case that on the 
grounds of health and safety they remain permitted, but that due to unfair behaviour of 
a trader, they endanger consumer’s economic interest. In these cases, when there is a 
suspicion that consumer economic interests might also be harmed, the general test of 
fairness will be performed. This is confirmed by the Directive since one of the thirty-
one exhaustively listed practices states is a case of “[f]alsely claiming that a product is 
able to cure illnesses, dysfunction or malformations” which shows well that economic 
component of such a practice is protected by the UCPD.444  On the other hand, the 
other component of a practice, the one that is related to potential harm to health of 
consumer is regulated by another piece of legislation.  
 
 
Material distortion of consumer’s economic behaviour 
Capacity for material distortion 
The second component of the general clause is related to the required effects of a 
commercial practice on consumers for a practice to be considered as unfair. In the 
case of a lack of a sufficiently clear and precise European concepts of professional 
                                              




diligence, the second component represents a fundamentally important element for the 
assessment of fairness of a commercial practice.445  
 
According to the text of the second limb of a general clause, a commercial practice 
will be unfair if “it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic 
behaviour with regard to the product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to 
whom it is addressed”.446 Fulfillment of this condition is also required for application 
of the three small general clauses.447 Whereas the requirements of professional 
diligence are focused on behaviors of traders, the second condition requires an 
examination of the effects of a commercial practice on consumer to which commercial 
practice applies.448  
 
The wording of this provision shows that a mere, abstract possibility to affect 
consumer’s behaviour is a sufficient pre-condition for a practice to be considered 
unfair. What is required is just the existence of the ability of a particular commercial 
practice to materially distort economic behaviour of an average consumer.449 
Consequently, such a provision also functions pre-emptively since it is not required 
that negative consequences of a commercial practice has occurred in reality. There is 
no need for a real damage to  the consumer.450 Such a broadly applicable formulation 
provides an additional layer of protection for consumer.   
 
The UCPD further explains what is meant under the condition of material distortion of 
consumer economic behaviour defining it as “using a commercial practice to 
appreciably impair the consumer’s ability to make an informed decision, thereby 
causing the consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken 
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otherwise”.451 The objective of this provision is to secure consumer’s freedom of 
choice through protection of the decision making process of consumers from the 
illegal influence of traders. The trader must not use his unfair tactics in order to 
influence the consumer’s mind. This does not mean that the Directive requires trader 
is prohibited to use commercial tactics with purpose of affecting consumer decision-
making process.  
 
Such a provision would be absurd since this is the purpose of all commercial 
communications. This is why traders invest an enormous amount of resources into 
advertising. In line with the importance of advertising, the Directive on the one hand 
explicitly encourages fair advertising, whereas on the other hand it secures that 
consumers are not treated unfairly by traders in order not to have “their freedom of 
choice impaired”.452 Accordingly, what shall be prohibited is only unfair behaviour of 
trader which affects consumer’s mind. This rule also indirectly protects other 
competitors, securing a general fair trade at the market since the competition at the 
market is not allowed to be endangered by traders who act against the rules.  
 
The additional requirement for distortion to be material is to be understood in the 
context of the proportionality principle, as a safeguard for too broad  an application of 
the Directive which may negatively affect the trade and competitiveness at the 
Internal market without proper counter effects for consumers.453 Consequently, this 
provision exempts any kind of regular and acceptable advertising tactics such as 
overstatement or pufferies or any kind of practices that do not distort consumer. This 
is particularly important in relation to the permissibility of so called ‘puffery’ 
advertising which sometimes is very unrealistic, including a statement such as ‘the 
most comfortable shoes in the World’.454 In general, these kinds of practices should be 
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allowed since average consumers will be able to understand that as part of advertising 
tactics and will not take their meaning literary. In these kinds of cases, what shall be 
assessed is whether the claim has a prevailing subjective character, or if it may be 
verified on the grounds of objective criteria.  
 
That said, advertising a pie as ‘the most tasty pie in Florence’ will typically not 
represent a form of unfair practice since it is not possible to objectively verify it. In 
addition, an average consumer would be aware of this, so such a practice cannot have 
illegitimate impact. However, advertising of the same pie as ‘The cheapest pie in 
Florence’ might more easily be seen as an unfair practice if that is not true since this is 
an objectively verifiable category and thus it may have an impact of the average 
consumer’s economic decision. The level of materiality of distortion must always be 
assessed on a case by case basis as it was pointed out by the Advocate General in 
Plus.455 However, in practice it may be difficult sometimes to distinguish between 
alternation of a product from the distortion.456 For instance, insisting behaviour of a 
car trader to buy car because it is a great offer or model. The level of distortion must 
be significant in the sense that it represents the main, or at least one of the main causes 
that influence consumers to make certain transactional decisions. 
 
The ability and effects of a commercial practice are always to be assessed on the 
ground of the average consumer, as a reasonably well-informed and reasonably 
observant and circumspect consumer, taking into account social, cultural and 
linguistic factors, as interpreted by the Court of Justice with a vulnerable consumer to 
be applied as a subsidiary benchmark.457 
 
                                              
455 Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-304/08 Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV v Plus 
Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [2010] ECR I-00217, para 102 
456 J Stuyck, E Terryn and T Van Dyck (n 429) 126 




The meaning of transactional decision 
The Directive provides also the definition of transactional decision as a fundamental 
element of the material distortion condition. Transactional decision is defined as “any 
decision taken by a consumer concerning whether, how and on what terms to 
purchase, make payment in whole or in part for, retain or dispose of a product or to 
exercise a contractual right in relation to the product, whether the consumer decides to 
act or to refrain from acting”.458 This definition enables a very broad interpretation of 
this provision which would include any kind of possible decision to be made by 
consumer.459  
 
Accordingly, the requirement of any decision may be also related to the negative 
decision of the consumer, and when they decide not to do something. Further to this, 
the ECJ provided an even broader definition pointing out that transactional decisions 
shall be always understood in a very broad manner, as referring not only to a decision 
to acquire or not to acquire a particular product, but also to a decision which is 
directly related to the decision to acquire or not to acquire a particular product as it is 
the case with the decision to enter or not to enter a shop.460 
 
 
The approach of the ECJ towards material distortion  
The Court had a chance to assess the question of material distortion several times. In 
Plus, the Court did not address the question of fulfillment of criteria defined by the 
two limbs. Only Advocate General touched upon this question. She pointed out on the 
necessity of an overall assessment of all circumstances in each particular case.461 Her 
analysis showed that to the average consumer it would be clear that they would not 
need to spend at least 100 EUR in order to join a game of chance at which he can 
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freely participate for a significantly less amount. Consequently, the second limb of the 
general clause is not fulfilled since “the consumer is free to decide whether to take 
part in the promotion or to purchase from a competitor”.462 
 
In Mediaprint, the Court considered that a possibility to participate in a lottery could 
represent one of the factors that would impair the consumer’s decision related to the 
purchase of newspapers.463 By this decision, the Court left it to the national courts to 
decide whether a practice is capable of materially distorting consumer behaviour by 
indicating that a possibility to participate in the lottery may represent one of the 
factors national courts should take into consideration while conducting the fairness 
assessments.  
 
In Ving Sverige, one of the raised questions was whether mentioning of only some of 
the main products’ characteristics in the advertising enables consumers to make the 
transactional decision. The Court left this issue to the national courts to be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis.464 In Perenicova, the Court pointed out that indication of false 
information of the annual percentage rate of charge is also likely to influence the 
consumer’s economic behaviour.465 This is well explained by Advocate General: “In a 
true-to-life situation, after all, it can be assumed that an average consumer will 
normally obtain offers from a number of potential lenders and decide to take out a 
loan on the basis of a comparison of those offers, including the costs likely to be 
incurred. In other words, comparatively favourable credit conditions usually have a 
decisive influence on the opinion formed by the consumer”.466 
 
In Trento Sviluppo, the case in which it was found that a trader provided false 
information regarding the availability of lap tops offered at a discounted price during a 
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period of time, the question raised before the ECJ was whether consumers act that 
anticipate his purchase of the offered product represent transactional decision as 
defined by the UCPD. In particular the question was whether consumer’s trip to the 
shop or the mere fact he entered the shop may be regarded as constituting 
transactional decisions. The judgment of the Court is of fundamental importance since 
its answer was affirmative confirming thus a very broad interpretation of transactional 
decision.467 Such a wide interpretation of the transactional decision shows a high level 
of powerfulness of the duty to trade fairly that imposes a general fairness requirement 
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Duty to trade fairly in consumer contract law 
 
The impact of the duty to trade fairly on contract law 
Previous sections of this Chapter examined and explain the meaning and the scope of 
the duty to trade fairly of traders in business-to-consumer relations which was brought 
by the UCPD.   Accordingly, duty to trade fairly clause secures prohibition of any 
kind of commercial practice of trader that is unfair. Herein, in the second part of the 
Chapter, I will focus on the impact that the examined duty to trade fairly has on 
consumer contract law and contractual relationship between trader and consumer. 
Herein, I argue that due to tight and inseparable connection between a commercial 
practice and a contract, the establishment of the duty to trade fairly by the UCPD has 
also led to the introduction of a general duty that applies to all phases and aspects of a 
contractual relationship between a trader and a consumer. However, the application of 
this duty is limited exclusively to trader, as a contractual party, in the attempt to 
equalize more the unequal contractual positions of consumer and trader.  
 
Through the introduction of general duty to trade fairly, a universally expected 
standard of expected behaviour of trader has been introduced for the first time into 
European consumer contract law. Due to its horizontal nature, the duty to trade fairly 
overcomes a prevailingly piecemeal and sector specific European approach towards 
contract law and applies to all forms and all phases of consumer contract, imposing 
general requirement of behaviour to trader in their relations towards consumers, with 
potential spill-over effects on the entire contract law. This is primarily the outcome of 
extremely broad formulations and flexibility of the general fairness clause that covers 
a widest possible set of pre-contractual and post-contractual practices.468 
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Commercial practices and contract 
Tight connection between unfair commercial practices and contract  
Commercial practices are tightly connected to contracts. Namely, the Directive 
defines a commercial practice as any act, omission, course of conduct or 
representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a 
trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to 
consumers.469 Such a definition includes a widest possible behaviour of traders in 
relation to a product.470 A product is defined extremely broadly to include all types of 
goods and services, including immovable property, rights and obligations.471 
 
The only two mandatory conditions are that the practice is commercial, i.e. that it 
originates from a trader and that it is directly connected with the promotion, sale or 
supply of a trader’s products to consumer.472 In case when any of these two conditions 
is missing, the duty to trade fairly as defined by the UCPD will not apply, as it was 
pointed out by the ECJ in its decision in RLvS. Accordingly, a newspaper publisher 
cannot be found liable for engagement in an unfair commercial practice for an 
advertisement of another trader that was published in the newspapers issued since that 
advertisement does not originate from newspaper publisher.473 
 
Moreover, the UCPD explicitly points out that the Directive shall apply “to 
commercial practices taking place before, during and after a commercial 
transaction”.474 Equally, a commercial decision includes any decision taken by a 
consumer concerning whether, how and on what terms to purchase, make payment in 
whole or in part for, retaining or disposing of a product or to exercise a contractual 
right in relation to the product, whether the consumer decides to act or to refrain from 
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acting.475 Such broad definition shows that the system of consumer protection 
provided by the UCPD will cover the entire contractual relationship between trader 
and consumer, all of its aspects, from a pre-contractual phase until the moment when 
all of trader’s obligations in relation to a contract have been fully and duly executed.  
 
For instance, the main goal of advertising practices, as the most common types of 
commercial practices, is certainly to have an impact on targeted categories of 
consumers by causing them to make certain economic decisions and to enter into 
certain contractual relationships, i.e. to acquire certain goods or to use certain 
services. In other words, the conclusion of a consumer contract will typically 
represent the result of a commercial practice.476 This is why traders compete and fight 
on the markets in order to attract as many consumers as possible and where 
commercial tactics play an essentially important role.  
 
It is true that the duty to trade fairly is undoubtedly focused on protection of consumer 
in the pre-contractual phase, before a conclusion of a consumer contract. In that 
aspect, it is possible to notice that among national legal systems of Member States 
there are particularly present differences in their approaches towards the pre-
contractual phase of contracts.477 In that sense, the imposition of the pan-European 
duty to trade fairly leads to a more unified regulatory approach of the pre-contractual 
phase of a consumer contract among twenty-eight Member States and contributes to 
the encouragement of cross-border trade since consumers are keener to shop cross 
border if the legal regimes are more similar.  
 
The scope of application of the duty to trade fairly overcomes the border’s of a pre-
contractual phase of a contract, since commercial practices also include trader’s 
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behaviour during and after formation of a contract.478 Accordingly, as emphasized by 
the Commission “[t]he trader will consequently need to ensure that commercial 
practices after sale meet the same fairness standards as commercial practices before 
sale”.479 For instance, the duty to trade fairly secures execution of certain consumer’s 
rights once a contract has been concluded. This is the case with consumer’s right to 
withdraw from certain consumer contracts without providing any justification within a 
limited period of time as established by EU consumer law.480 Equally, the provisions 
of the Directive secure that the consumer will be provided with promised after-sales 
services in the language he understands.481 In such a manner, the notion of 
commercial practice, as defined by the UCPD, fully and completely covers the entire 
life of a consumer contract.  
 
Law of unfair commercial practices as a regulatory part contract law 
The law of unfair commercial practices is described as a regulatory element of 
contract law, contrary to its traditional private autonomy element on the basis of 
which the contract law has been developing for centuries. As a consequence, there is a 
substantive tension between the ‘policing’ and ‘contractual’ normative positions 
within a legal system.482 However, it seems that there are still many obstacles, or 
“ideological wars” to implement and understand this regulatory part as a contract law 
component in spite of the close connection between the two parts.483 The clash 
between innovative, regulatory and the traditional, private autonomy approach 
towards contract law is hardly anywhere noticeable as it may be observed in case of 
EU Consumer law. 
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While drafting the unified European rules on unfair commercial practices, the 
Commission also observed the diversity among national contract laws as a significant 
obstacle for development of the internal market. However, besides the general 
opposition of Member States against any unification of contract law, the Commission 
pointed out that “attempting to tackle both in one project would have it unmanageable, 
given the extent of consumer contract law and the knock-on to other contract law 
issues”.484 Eventually, only the law on unfair commercial practices was harmonized, 
whereas the area of consumer contract law has remained regulated in a piecemeal and 
incoherent approach, but has again become affected by a general duty to trade fairly.  
 
In order to fully understand the impact of the duty to trade fairly on contract law, it is 
necessary to examine the concept of the duty of good faith both in national and in 
European contract laws. The reason for this is that, first, the UCPD makes an explicit 
connection of the duty to trade fairly with the notion of good faith so meaning of good 
faith shall be clarified for understanding of the meaning of the duty to trade fairly, 
and, second, to understand mutual correlation between these two duties in the context 




Good faith and national legal traditions of Member States 
Acceptance of general principle of good faith 
Good faith is an old concept of contract law, whose roots date back to the ancient 
Roman law and famous concept of bona fides which imposed certain general 
standards of behaviour on the parties while negotiating, concluding and executing 
contracts.485 The fact that the majority of European contract laws are based on the 
foundations laid down by Roman law also resulted that the concept of good faith has 
been widely accepted in national legal systems of the majority of Member States as 
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one of the ruling principles of their national legal systems, though in more or less 
different formulations, power and roles.486  
 
However, among the legal systems that have recognised a general principle of good 
faith in contract law, the formulation and wording of this principle differ.487 
Moreover, national courts among diverse Member States also have an inconsistent 
jurisprudence when it comes to the interpretation of the meaning of good faith and its 
scope of application in practice.488 Consequently, from the perspective of national 
contract laws, it is hardly possible to talk about a unified approach towards the 
principle of good faith and its substantial meaning and scope of application even in 
those countries that have adopted it as a general rule. 
 
Rejection of general principle of good faith 
Contrary to the recognition of the duty of good faith as a general principle, some legal 
traditions have a rather hostile attitude towards recognition of good faith as a general 
principle and its introduction with such a capacity into their national legal systems.489 
This is noticeable in case of English law which has been, to start with, very reluctant 
towards the adoption of any kind of general clauses as providing rather unclear and 
uncertain rules.490 The presence of such a reluctance is particularly noticeable in the 
case with the general clause on good faith.491 Teubner famously explaining the 
approach towards good faith an English law considering it as an infecting virus: 
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‘British courts have energetically rejected this doctrine on several occasions treating it 
like a contagious disease of alien origin’492  
 
The concept of good faith is tightly connected to the core of the national legal 
traditions and the related particularities which explains the hostile attitude of certain 
of Member States towards the provision of a universally applicable principle of good 
faith.493Brownsword explains diverse approaches towards general principle of good 
faith on the basis of diverse ruling values in societies from which a particular legal 
system has evolved. Accordingly, there are two possible ethics upon which the law of 
contract can be based: individualism and cooperativism.494 The lack of general 
principle of good faith is the consequence of prevailing individualist ethics. 
 
Good faith in European contract law 
The presence of good faith in European legislation 
The principle of good faith has a long history of being present in European private 
law, for almost three decades. The first directive that contained a good faith 
requirement was Directive 86/653/EEC on commercial agency that required both 
parties to act in accordance with the principle of good faith.495 
 
In the area of EU consumer law, good faith was already an established notion even 
before the adoption of the UCPD. Namely, more than twenty years ago, good faith 
was incorporated in the text Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms as part of 
the general test aimed to be used for assessment of fairness of a contract term in a 
contractual relationship between trader and consumer. Accordingly, “[a] contractual 
term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, 
contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
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parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the 
consumer”.496 
 
It is noticeable that there are two principal parts of the general test: first, stipulation of 
a contract term contrary to the requirements of good faith and, second, causation of 
significant imbalance, in such a manner, between the rights and obligation of the 
parties that is detrimental to the consumer.497  
 
Initially, good faith would be used as a separate criterion for fairness assessment of a 
contract terms, but in the end it was incorporated in the general criterion. This was the 
consequence of the opposition of some of the Member States, such as the United 
Kingdom and Scandinavian countries not willing to accept good faith as a separate 
clause having been considered as the attempt to adopt good faith as a general 
European legal standard.498 
 
Besides Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms, the concept of good faith is 
also mentioned in some subsequent European directives, though its practical role and 
significance is much less significant than in case of unfair contract terms. The old 
Directive 97/7/EC on distance selling indicated good faith in the context of the 
demanded manner in which trader is supposed to disclose required pieces of 
information to the consumer.499 Interestingly, Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer 
rights that fully repealed Directive 97/7/EC does not mention a good faith clause. 
Directive 2002/65/EC on distance marketing of financial services also uses the term 
                                              
496 Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms 
497 Case C-237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v Ludger Hofstetter and 
Ulrike Hofstetter [2004] ECR I-03403, para 19; Case C-243/08 Pannon GSM Zrt. v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi 
[2009] ECR I-04713, para 37 Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d'Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i 
Manresa (Catalunyacaixa) [2013] ECR I-0000, para 67 
498 M Tenreiro, ‘The Community Directive on Unfair Terms and National Legal Systems’ (1995) 3 European 
Review of Private Law 273, 277 




good faith in the context of a required manner of provision of pre-contractual 
information by trader in case a distance contract.500 
 
All of the old and currently pending projects on the unification of contract law in 
Europe also adopted good faith as one of the main principles of contract law. 
Accordingly, the principle of good faith and fair dealing was proposed as one of the 
pillars of the system of contracts proposed by the Principles of European Contract 
Law.501Equally, the Draft Common Framework of Reference also emphasised the 
principle of good faith and fair dealing,502 though with a partially limited effects and 
applicability.503 The same approach towards the role of good faith has been taken by 
the latest project of this kind, the currently proposed Optional Instrument according to 
which [e]ach party has a duty to act in accordance with good faith and fair 
dealing.504   
 
The initial lack of European meaning of good faith under the UTD 
Immediately after the adoption of the Directive 93/13/EEC, it was pointed out that the 
meaning of good faith as a European concept brought by this directive is 
mysterious.505 For instance, the Directive on unfair contract terms has brought a 
general concept of good faith into Irish contract law, at least when it concerns 
consumer contracts, but its meaning remained unclear to the Irish courts.506  
Surprisingly, in spite of such a long presence of a good faith principle in EU consumer 
law and the necessity to interpret it, it has taken the ECJ a period of roughly two 
decades to explain the common European meaning of good faith. As a consequence of 
such lack of judicial activity of the ECJ, the meaning of good faith as provided by 
Directive 93/13/EEC remained unclear for years.507  
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The House of Lords twice had a chance, even an obligation, to ask the ECJ for 
preliminary reference on the meaning of good faith, but has never done it.508 
However, even in case when a preliminary reference was indeed made by 
Bundesgerichtshof, the highest German civil court, on fairness of a specific contract 
term under the provision of the UTD, the ECJ despite having the opportunity to 
address this question, declined to provide an answer whether that particular contract 
term is unfair saying that this is the task of the national court, maintaining in such a 
manner opacity surrounding the European meaning of good faith.509 
 
Eventually, only some fifteen years after its adoption, since 2008, is it possible to 
observe an immense increase of the number of preliminary references made to the 
ECJ on the grounds of the UTD and thus an ever developing case law in this area.510 
Besides relevance on unfair contract terms in the context of global and European 
financial crisis that began in the same period as the increase of the numbers of referred 
cases, such a booming of judicial activism of the ECJ may be explained as a 
compensation for the impossibility of the Commission to amend and develop the rules 
on the unfair contract terms.511  
 
Namely, the Commission’s attempt to materially reform and unify into one piece of 
legislation a majority of consumer protection rules contained in eight different 
directives, including the UTD, failed.512 The result of this attempt is rather 
disappointing since what was eventually adopted is Directive 2011/83/EU that only 
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insignificantly modified the rules on unfair contract terms.513 Consequently, with the 
lack of legislative means, the intense Europeanization of national laws in this area had 
to be performed through the judicial activity of the ECJ. However, what particularly 
limits the potentiality of effects of this jurisprudence is a partial and minimum 
harmonisation carried out by the UTD.514 
 
The ultimate clarification of good faith by the ECJ 
The rise of the judicial activism of the ECJ in the area of unfair contract was also 
followed by the increased willingness of the Court to provide more direct answers on 
fairness of contract terms in concrete cases, overriding thus its initial reluctance to do 
so expressed in its judgment in Freiburger Kommunalbauten. The subsequent case 
law was prevailingly not focused on the assessment of fairness of contract terms per 
se, but rather on establishment and development of ex officio obligation of the national 
courts of verification of fairness of contract terms, affecting thus significantly 
procedural autonomy of Member States.515  
 
In line with such a focal point of the ECJ, it is true that the Court in these judgments 
did not directly decide itself whether a contract term is fair or not, leaving that to be 
decided by the national courts following in that sense its previous ruling in Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten. Importantly, however, contrary to its approach in Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten, the Court in its decisions provided clear guidance to the national 
courts on how to perform assessment of fairness of particular terms and on the basis of 
which it can be easily understood whether, in view of the Court, a specific term or 
terms that were the subject of a particular referred case shall be deemed unfair.516  
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In accordance with its booming and fruitful jurisprudence in the area of unfair contract 
terms, the ECJ eventually provided clarification on what shall be understood under the 
notion of good faith under the UTD. This is why the Court’s judgment in Aziz is of 
particular importance where the ECJ finally explained the meaning of good faith 
under the UTD. In its judgment, the ECJ has pointed out that while assessing fairness 
of a contract term, the national court shall understand ‘contrary to the requirement of 
good faith’, as a condition for a term to be declared unfair, as “whether the seller or 
supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that 
the consumer would have agreed to such a term in individual contract 
negotiations”.517 In other words, if the consumer would have not agreed, that is proof 
that a particular term is contrary to the requirement of good faith and if the 
requirement of significant imbalance has been fulfilled, such a term shall be 
considered as unfair.  
 
The same approach towards the meaning of the notion of good faith was confirmed in 
subsequent judgments of the ECJ in Banco de Valencia518 and Katalin519where the 
Court again pointed out to the criterion of what trader could have reasonably assumed 
from the consumer while negotiating and agreeing on a particular contract term as a 
criterion for assessment of fairness. Interestingly, the Court here idealizes the image 
of consumers that the national courts shall take into consideration identifying that 
consumer as a person who knows what term is good for him and which is not good, 
and it is only the fact that such a term was not individually negotiated that caused 
consumer to accept that term. 
 
Besides explaining the meaning of good faith, the Court in Aziz also elaborated the 
ambigious meaning of significant imbalance as the second essential component of 
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general fairness test under the UTD, providing guidance in that aspect to the national 
courts. Accordingly, while assessing the existence of significant imbalance, “it must 
in particular be considered what rules of national law would apply in the absence of an 
agreement by the parties in that regard. Such a comparative analysis will enable the 
national court to evaluate whether and, as the case may be, to what extent, the contract 
places the consumer in a legal situation less favourable than that provided for by the 
national law in force”.520  
 
In summation, under the interpretation of the Court in Aziz, a contract term will be 
unfair if, firstly, in case it had not be stipulated, the consumer would be in the more 
favourable situation and, second, if traders could have expected that consumers would 
not have agreed on this contract term if it had been negotiable. These two conditions 
must be fulfilled cumulatively.521 
 
 
The meaning of good faith under the UCPD 
The role of good faith 
Having analysed good faith and its meaning under the UTD, I return to the concept of 
good faith as used in relation to the trader’s requirement professional diligence under 
the UCPD and how this relates to consumer contracts. As pointed out above, the 
UCPD does not provide the meaning of good faith, though a general principle of good 
faith is mentioned as one of the two components of the notion of professional 
diligence.522 The related question is why the legislator at all used this notion in spite 
of the existence of such a divergence of the approaches of the Member States towards 
good faith and, at the time, in the lack of a unified European interpretation of this 
term.  
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The answer should be based on the fact that both the concepts of professional 
diligence and an honest market are innovative legal concepts whose meaning and 
purpose is not clear. The reason for using innovative legal terminology in the 
European private law is to avoid utilization of legal terms that have established legal 
meanings in the national legal systems.523 Contrary to the innovative legal 
terminology, a general idea of good faith is universally recognized, so the purpose of 
usage of this term is to provide the clarification of the provided term in a known legal 
language.  
 
Two types of good faith in European Private Law 
An important emphasis has to be made here. Good faith as understood in EU 
consumer law is not equal by its meaning to good faith used in general contract law. 
In general contract law a starting presumption is that contractual parties are equal, 
whereas in case of consumer contract law as approached by EU Law, the basic and 
initial hypothesis on which it has been founded is that there is an inequality of 
contractual parties.524  
 
This is why, for instance, the proposed Optional Instrument spells out while 
explaining the principle of good faith and fair dealing that the concrete requirements 
imposed by general duty of good faith shall depend on the relative level of expertise 
of the parties and shall thus be substantially different depending whether it applies on 
a contract between two traders or on a consumer contract where one party is a 
consumer and the other is a trader.525 Accordingly, the proposed Optional Instrument 
acknowledges this differentiation. 
 
                                              
523 S Vogenauer, ‘Drafting and Interpretation of a European Contract Law Instrument‘ in G Dannemann and S 
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Consequently, in European private law it is possible to observe two forms of good 
faith with different meanings: one is in the area of consumer law and the other one is 
used in these few remaining, non-consumer, areas of private law which have been 
Europeanised through common European pieces of legislation, as it is the case with 
commercial agency.526 In line with such a differentiation, it is possible to observe that 
in the case of the former category, good faith is imposed by EU legislation only for 
one party, the trader, leaving the consumer without a related general obligation of 
good faith, whereas in case of the latter category, good faith is a universally applicable 
principle for both contractual parties.527  
 
Since the UCPD applies exclusively in business-to-consumer relations, its 
understanding and application of good faith unquestionably shall be looked for in the 
first category. In that sense, there same concepts of good faith are used both in the 
UCPD and in the UTD, which means that clarification of good faith made under the 
provisions of the UTD contributes to understanding of good faith under the UCPD. 
Namely, these two directives have the same objectives since they are both aimed at 
securing fulfillment requirements for fairness in EU consumer law.528  
 
Moreover, a good faith clause should, being a flexible standard, guarantee a huge 
level of adaptability to the Directive and capability to cover a wide spectrum of 
commercial practices. This is in accordance with the general objective of the Directive 
drafted in such a manner to be able to cover all imaginable commercial practices and 
the design of the legal clause that can easily adapt to include any kind of innovative 
commercial practices which may arise in the future.  
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The horizontal effects of the duty to trade fairly on consumer contracts 
Coverage of all consumer contracts 
As identified at the beginning of this thesis, EU consumer law general division is to be 
made on its two substantial parts: the law on unfair commercial practices as regulated 
by the UCPD and consumer contract law developed by a set of sector specific 
directives. On the one hand, the legal regime of fair trading shows a high level of 
harmonization particularly due to a detailed regulation of the Directive strengthened 
by the maximum harmonization component. On the other hand, primarily due to a 
constant opposition of the Member States and the lack of a proper and secure legal 
basis, EU consumer contract law is characterized by a piecemeal and incoherent 
approach. 
 
At different times of their adoption, circumstances that followed, methods of drafting 
and diverse political factors resulted in occurrence of material incoherence among 
different directives on consumer contract law. For instance, a highly ambitious project 
of the general reformation of consumer contract law which initially aimed to revise 
eight directives into one coherent piece of legislation, was firstly diminished to cover 
four directives529, to the end that the final version which was adopted in October 2011 
repealed fully only two directives, amended and modifies to a limited extent a third 
directive, making some minor changes to the fourth.530  
 
The duty to trade fairly covers the situations where adequate contractual remedies are 
not provided, but also when they are available as a supplementary means of 
protection.531 In that sense, Keirsblick’s argumentation that contractual remedies are 
sufficient and that unfair commercial practices should cover exclusively the pre-
contractual phase to the conclusion of contract seem too restrictive.532 Moreover, it is 
not necessary condition that consumer has concluded a contract. It is only required 
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that consumer spends unnecessarily some time or do some unnecessary actions as a 
consequence of the unfair commercial practices.533 Due to this wide interpretation, 
consumers are awarded with an additional and complete level of protection during any 
type of their contractual relationship with a trader.  
 
It has already been pointed out that consumers do not even need to conclude a contract 
to be protected, since the Directive protects them ex ante from any potential negative 
consequences of conclusion of a contract. For instance, in case of doorstep selling 
contracts, the consumer has the right to, according to Directive 2011/83/EU, rescind 
the contract within 14 days, that he may have concluded just in order to get rid of an 
aggressive trader who has entered into his house. However, the Directive a priori 
prohibits such a practices and thus spares consumer all the efforts and time he or she 
would need to spend in order to terminate such a contract.  
 
In addition to this, the duty to trade imports fairly means new sanctions applicable 
also in case of consumer contracts. For instance, the rules on unfair commercial 
practices protects the consumer from unlawful unilateral rescission of contract that he 
concluded with a gym than the regular contractual remedies he would have the right to 
in any case. The additional sanction of public law for such unlawful behaviour will 
provide better protection for consumers. As a consequence, traders will be less willing 
to terminate the contract.  
 
In spite of its name, Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms did not bring in the 
general obligation of fairness. Rather, it brought in a selective obligation in relation 
exclusively to particular forms of contract terms, those that were not negotiated.534 
Contrary to the limited approach of the Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms, 
the requirement of fairness brought by the UCPD applies to all kinds of consumer 
contracts and the periods before, during and after conclusion of a consumer contract.  
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The role of duty to trade fairly in the proposed Optional Instrument  
The proposed Optional Instrument has kept the same formal borderline between fair 
trading law on the one hand, and the classical contract law on the other hand.535 
Nevertheless, the duty to trade fairly will continue to play a significant role when (and 
if) this Optional Instrument gets adopted. This is because the provisions of the UCPD 
as transposed in the national legal systems will continue to apply irrespectively of 
choosing or rejecting the Optional Instrument as the applicable legal regime.  
 
However, since the Optional Instrument is without legal consequences over the 
UCPD, its provisions will apply in any case. In that sense, consumers will be 
guaranteed a fair behaviour of traders and a constant level of consumer protection 
which would manage to diminish, though partially, the negative consequences that the 
adoption of the Optional Instrument might have over general level of consumer 
protection.  
 
The significance of the judgment in Perenicova 
The law on unfair commercial practices vs unfair contract terms 
The judgment in Perenicova was the first case in which the ECJ had a chance to 
assess the relationship between the UCPD and contract law, in particular in the area of 
unfair contract terms. This case is relevant from a perspective of the duty to trade 
fairly, since it has show the impact of general duty to trade fairly on fairness of a 
contract term, which had not previously been clear.536 The judgment in Perenicova is 
particularly significant since it clarifies the scope of the impact, at least to a certain 
extent. It also touches upon the effects of the duty to trade fairly on another European 
consumer contract law instrument, the old Directive 87/102/EEC on consumer credit.   
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In Perenicova, a dispute arose over a consumer credit agreement whose several terms 
were challenged by consumers as being unfair. Especially problematic was the 
stipulated interest rate which was higher than the amount which had been initially 
presented to the consumer before conclusion of the contract. As a consequence, one of 
the two main questions raised in this preliminary reference made by the Slovakian 
court was whether a provision of false information of the annual percentage rate of a 
charge in consumer credit contract represented a form of unfair commercial practice. 
Furthermore, if the answer to this question was positive, the Court was asked whether 
this also automatically lead to the unfairness of the contract which represents the 
result of such an unfair practice.  
 
In its judgment, the Court stated that provision of untrue information of the annual 
percentage rate is to be considered as a form of misleading action, in accordance with 
article 6 of the UCPD in relation to the price provision.537 However, the unfairness of 
such a practice does not cause directly that the unfairness of contract term concluded 
as a consequence of such a practice, but it represents one of criteria that the national 
courts should take into consideration while assessing the fairness of a contract term as 
provided by the UTD.538 The explanation of the Court was primarily based on the fact 
that article 3(2) of the UCPD indicating that the provisions of the Directive are 
without prejudice to contract law, so the fact that a contract was concluded as a 
consequence of unfair commercial practice cannot have any kind of direct effect on 
the validity of a contract.  
 
Eventually, two main consequences of the judgment are that, first, stipulation of an 
unfair contract term shall be considered a form of unfair commercial practice 
(misleading) action, and, second, that the breach of the duty to trade fairly does not 
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have any direct effect on the validity of a contract, but it represents one of the factors 
that may be considered while deciding in that respect. The crucially important 
question is what is the impact of this decision on the national legal systems. 
Previously to the judgment, the Member States diverge regarding their approaches 
towards effects of breaches on the duty to trade fairly on contract law.  
 
The differences regarding contract law consequences among Member States were 
regarded as one of the most problematic issues in the application of the Directive.539 
In some of the Member States, the breach of unfair commercial practices had direct 
effects on the validity of contract, causing contract concluded under the unfair practice 
to become null and void. On the other hand, in other Member States, the breach of the 
duty to trade fairly had no direct effects on life of a contract. What is now problematic 
is whether, due to the confirmed strict maximum harmonization character of the 
Directive, national legal systems are allowed to keep these provisions or they have to 
modify them in accordance with the judgment in Perenciova. The Commission, in its 
submission to the Court, considered that national laws which provide direct contract 
law consequences of the breach of the duty to trade fairly are to be considered as 
contrary to EU law.540 
 
Still, the Court in Perenicova through allowing the national courts to take into 
consideration the breach of the duty to trade fairly as one of the factors to be 
considered, left the door open to the national courts to apply their national rules and 
annul contracts if so is required by their national rules. All in all, the final result of the 
decision was that the duty to trade fairly has indirect effects on contractual 
relationships between traders and consumers.  
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The meaning of the duty to trade fairly in consumer contract law 
The duty to trade fairly, as a applied on consumer contract law, has a different nature, 
as well as a diverse meaning, than a general duty of good faith which exists in the 
national contract laws of Member States. While the duty of good faith in general 
contract law applies to all parties of a contractual relationship, the duty to trade fairly 
is exclusively a duty imposed on one party in a consumer contractual relationship, a 
trader, with the aim to equalize the existing imbalance between contractual parties. In 
other words, this imbalance between the parties represent the reason why the duty to 
trade fairly shall apply in accordance with a general scope of application of particular 
consumer law regime on a contractual relationship.541 
 
In that sense, the duty to trade fairly is focused exclusively on the trader, securing in 
particular consumer’s free and informed choice and breach of this duty leads to 
diverse public law or private law sanctions. Contrary to this, a consumer, being 
understood as a significantly weaker party is not imposed with a related duty. His only 
general obligation under EU consumer law is collect and profit from information 
presented to him by traders and to act in a reasonably observant and circumspect 
manner, i.e. to act as average consumer.  
 
In the case when a consumer does not act as an average consumer who be expected to, 
the only ‘sanction’ is that he is not protected by the duty to trade fairly. In other 
words, the duty to trade fairly in contractual relationships between traders and 
consumers is not assessed only from a perspective of trader and whether he acted in or 
contrary to the requirement of professional diligence and thus to the requirement of 
good faith and honest market practice, but it has also to be assessed in relation to the 
effects of particular behaviour of trader on an average consumer. In accordance with 
the approach of the ECJ on good faith under the UCPD, the duty to trade fairly should 
require the trader to be aware of what reactions they may expect of consumer.  
 
                                              




Such a duty to trade off fairly, under its procedural meaning, shall be understood in 
the context of inequality between trader and consumer and the obligation of fairness 
that is particularly imposed on traders so that he does not misuse his power. The 
substantial meaning of duty to trade fairly would refer to the required standard of 
behaviour of trader’s behaviour towards consumers, i.e. whether his commercial 
practices are fair in order to support consumer confidence.542  
 
For understanding of the duty to trade fairly in the context of contract law, a 
potentially useful aid that national courts may have are thirty-one concrete examples 
of unfair practices that are listed in the Annex I.  This list includes practices which are 
always considered unfair without the need to assess them under one of the three small 
general clauses or the general fairness clause.543 These practices are very useful for 
getting a general idea of what exactly is understood as a general obligation to trade 
fairly since some practices are closely related to contract law. This is for instance the 
case with “[c]reating the impression that the consumer cannot leave the premises until 
a contract is formed or the case of [p]esenting rights given to consumers in law as a 
distinctive feature of the trader’s offer”.544 
 
Besides having an impact on consumer contract law, it is highly likely to imagine that 
duty to trade fairly will have, at least to some extent, effects also on contractual 
relationship between traders. This is particularly the case with contractual relationship 
between two traders of unequal bargaining powers, i.e. the relationship between small 
or medium enterprises with big enterprises where again there is a fear that big 
enterprises may misuse their better initial bargaining positions.545  
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Besides a possible legislative action on the European level in this area, the duty to 
trade fairly may be spread, and in line with the lack of European legislation in the area 
also modified, through process of spontaneous harmonisation546 or as a result of spill-
over effects.547 In accordance with such potential effects of the duty to trade fairly, for 
instance, Miller pointed out that, as a consequence of introduction of general duty to 





This chapter of the thesis examined, what I call, a general duty to trade fairly brought 
by the Directive as a universally applicable standard of required behaviour of traders 
that is always required in the relationship towards consumers. The duty to trade fairly 
is particularly defined by the general fairness clause which, due to its universal 
character, has the potentiality to include a widest possible forms of trader’s 
commercial practices directed towards consumer. The two-limbs of the general clause 
explain well the substantive meaning of the concept of the duty to trade fairly.  
 
Accordingly, commercial practice has to be, first, contrary to the requirement of 
professional diligence, and, second, capable of materially distorting economic 
behaviour of an average consumer. The requirement of professional diligence is 
further explained through the notions of honest market practice and good faith whose 
explanation is necessary for understanding of the requirement of professional 
diligence and thus of the duty to trade fairly.  
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In addition to this, what I argued in this chapter of the thesis is that the duty to trade 
fairly as defined by the UCPD has also become a universally applicable duty in 
consumer contract law. As a result of an extremely tight connection between a 
commercial practices and a contract, followed by a wide horizontal scope of its 
application, the duty to trade fairly also represents the first universally applicable duty 
of a trader which regulates all phases and forms of contractual relationships between 





































CHAPTER IV – DUTY OF INFORMATION 
 
Introduction: A universal European duty of information  
One of the most fundamental novelties that the UCPD has brought is the introduction 
of a general duty of information in the entire EU consumer law. Through its provision 
on misleading omissions, as one of the three small general clauses for the assessment 
of fairness of commercial practice, a universal duty of information is imposed on 
traders.549 This duty now applies to all sets of commercial communications between a 
trader and a consumer. According to the UCPD, traders need to present to consumer 
all relevant pieces of information they may need to make an informed choice in an 
adequate and understandable manner. Moreover, the obligation of trader increases in 
case a commercial communication of trader represents an invitation to purchase since 
the consumer is in such situation closer to making an economic decision, so he should 
be additionally protected.  
 
Generally speaking, in EU Consumer Law, the duty of information has traditionally 
been considered as the most important regulatory instrument for consumer protection 
and has been thus incorporated in all directives on consumer contract law.550 The 
imposition of pre-contractual information requirements became the main regulatory 
tool for correction of the inequality in contractual relationships between trader and 
consumer particularly noticeable once it comes to possession of relevant information.  
 
However, until adoption of the UCPD, no general pre-contractual duty of information 
existed on the European level since each of the directives established particular sets of 
pre-contractual information duties applicable only for a specific form of consumer 
contract characterized by mutual incoherence and inconsistency. Moreover, pre-
UCPD information requirements were exposed to criticism of remaining without 
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expected effects in practice since they are drafted in a manner which does not 
correspond to the real consumer expectations and behaviour in practice. 
  
What I argue in this Chapter of the thesis is that the UCPD through its introduction of 
a general pre-contractual duty of information applicable to all types of consumer 
contracts has remedied, to a certain extent, previously present incoherence and 
information overload as defined by consumer contract directives. Moreover, I want to 
point out that general obligation of information disclosure of the UCPD is drafted in 
such a manner that it takes into consideration real trader’s and consumer’s behaviour 
in practice, so that it requires from trader to present the information which are really 
relevant to consumer and in an appropriate manner.  
 
Equally, the UCPD has established two levels of information requirements depending 
on the potential impact of a commercial practice on consumer. In case when a 
commercial communication is an invitation to purchase, the consumer is closer to 
concluding a contract, so that is the time when he needs more information. 
Consequently, through provision of a unified definition of invitation to purchase, the 
Court affected the previously existing national concepts of the invitation to purchase, 
at least when it concerns consumer contracts.  
 
An important remark has to be made here. In this Chapter and in my thesis in general 
unless otherwise specified, I refer to the duty of information exclusively as a pre-
contractual duty of information, i.e. the duty of information that is to be performed 
before conclusion of a contract since that is the one relevant in the context of 
misleading omissions, whereas I do not address the question of the contractual duty of 
information, i.e. the duty of information once a contract has been duly concluded.551 
Consequently, in the further text, the duty of information without the adjective ‘pre-
contractual’ will be used under the meaning of pre-contractual duty of information.  
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Duty of information under the UCPD 
Three small general clauses of the Directive  
The purpose of small general clauses  
The Directive establishes a hierarchical, three-step mechanism for assessment of 
commercial practice’s fairness of trader that national authorities have always strictly 
to followed while assessing whether a practice is to deemed unfair. The first step 
requires verification whether a practice of trader can be subsumed under one of thirty-
one exhaustively listed practices of Annex I of the Directive. The second step of 
assessment of commercial practice requires verification through one of the three so-
called ‘small general clauses’. Eventually, the third step is verification whether a 
practice is unfair through a general fairness clause.552  
 
The role of the second step and small general clauses is to prohibit three frequent 
forms of unfair commercial practices: misleading actions, misleading omissions and 
aggressive practices. All three small general clause use the average consumer as the 
main benchmark in comparison to which a legality of practice is to be assessed.553 
First two clauses on misleading practices are used to secure the content of the 
commercial practice, i.e. that trader provides consumers with pieces of information 
are truthful and non-decisive as well as complete and in a transparent manner. The 
main objective of provisions on misleading actions and misleading omissions is to 
enable consumer to make a fully informed, and thus efficient choice while acting on 
the market.554  
 
                                              
552 Joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07 VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV and Galatea BVBA v Sanoma 
Magazines Belgium NV [2009] ECR I-02949, para 52; Case C-304/08 Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren 
Wettbewerbs eV v Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [2010] ECR I-00217, para 41; Case C-540/08 
Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag v Österreich-Zeitungsverlag GmbH [2010] ECR I-10909, para 27. 
553 See Chapter II of this Thesis on Average Consumer 
554 Case C-281/12  Trento Sviluppo srl, Centrale Adriatica Soc. Coop. arl v Autorita Garante della Concorenza 




The third small clause on aggressive practices is focused on protection of consumer 
from any kind of illegal behaviour of trader that causes or is likely to cause an average 
consumer to take a transactional decision he would have not otherwise taken.555 Its 
main objective is to protect consumers from trader’s behaviour which is too much 
hard-hitting and unpleasant or considered as having illegitimate impact on the 
consumer, prohibiting a wide set of illegal behaviour of traders, and in such a manner 
securing that consumer can make a free choice without any inappropriate influence of 
traders.556   
 
Distinction between misleading actions and misleading omissions  
Both the provisions on misleading actions and the provisions on misleading omissions 
of the UCPD are adopted with the same purpose, as means to secure an informed and 
thus efficient choice of consumer through assurance that the consumer receives, both 
true necessary information he may need to make such an informed choice.557 The 
former is performed through the rules on misleading actions, whereas the latter is 
regulated by the provisions on misleading omissions. Through protection of his 
informed choice, the provisions on misleading actions and misleading omissions saves 
his economic interests.558 This is fully in line with EU consumer policy which is based 
on the presumption of a well-informed consumer as a necessary prerequisite for a 
functional and efficient market on the ground of which the entire EU consumer law 
has been built, with the duty of information being used as the principal regulatory tool 
for securing that the consumer is provided with all information.559  
 
The provisions on misleading actions and misleading omissions do not tend to affect 
legitimate advertising and marketing tactics “such as legitimate product placement, 
brand differentiation or the offering of incentives which may legitimately affect 
                                              
555 Case C-428/11 Purely Creative e.a. v Office of Fair Trading [2012] ECR I-0000, para 37 
556 See G Howells, ‘Aggressive Practices’ in G Howells, HW Micklitz and T Wilhelmsson, European Fair 
Trading Law. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (Ashgate 2006) 
557 Recital 14 of the UCPD 
558 Case C-59/12 BKK Mobil Oil Korperschaft des offentlichen Rechts v Zentrale zur Bekampfung unlauteren 
Wettbewerbs eV [2013] ECR I-0000 




consumers' perceptions of products and influence their behaviour under the condition 
that they do not weaken consumer possibility to make an informed choice”.560 The 
legality of such advertising tactics is certainly always to be decided on a case-by-case 
basis, bearing in mind the reaction of an average consumer.  
 
Despite having the same principal objective of protection, i.e. consumer’s informed 
choice, the provisions on misleading actions and misleading omissions differ 
considerably from a perspective of their development and recognition by national 
contract laws. This fact is an essential for understanding of the impact and correlation 
between these two provisions with contract law. Namely, what is called misleading 
actions under the UCPD has traditionally been regulated for centuries by all national 
contract laws, though in different forms, through sanctioning for provision of false 
information by an active behaviour of a party before conclusion of a contract.  
 
Contrary to this uniform approach towards provisions of untrue information, national 
contract laws had divergent approaches towards a pure failure of one of the parties to 
provide information before conclusions of contracts, understood under the UCPD as a 
misleading omission, typically not finding it illegal.561 Consequently, the rules on 
misleading omissions are a much more innovative category in the context of 
traditional contract law approach, than those on misleading actions, which also imply 
diverse contract law effects of their transposition on the national legal systems. 
Eventually, the directive has brought a general duty of information throughout the 
European Union for the first time. This is why the examination of the rules on 
misleading omissions deserves much more attention than analysis of the remaining 
two small general clauses. 
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Introduction of the general duty of information 
Duty of information before the UCPD 
The duty of information in the area of unfair commercial practices also existed in EU 
Law before the adoption of the UCPD. However, it was never imposed as a general 
duty, applicable to all commercial practices, but limited to specific sectors. Already in 
the eight decade of the twentieth century, certain harmonised rules on information 
duties were imposed on the European level as requirements for advertising of 
cosmetic products562, followed by the common European rules on foodstuffs 
advertising.563 Directive 84/450/EC on misleading advertising and Directive 97/55/EC 
on comparative advertising contained some rules on information requirements. These 
were of limited scope, however, in accordance with the narrow purview of these two 
directives.  
 
In its case law, the ECJ also emphasized the significance of information in 
commercial practices since its earliest judgements. In the famous case of Cassis de 
Dijon, where the Court pointed out that a disputed German rule which prohibited 
advertising of French blackcurrant liquor in Germany was contrary to the Treaty since 
the same goal of protection of consumers can be performed through introduction of 
the obligation to inform on alcohol content and the country of origin of the product. 
Accordingly, the ECJ considered that these information requirements were considered 
to be capable of achieving same protective effects as German rules on prohibition, but 
they would be less restrictive since advertising of the liqueur would be allowed, 
followed by provision of all relevant information.564 
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Equally, the Court underlined the significance and potentiality of the information in 
the Petillant De Raisin case. This case dealt with the marketing of a French drink 
Pettilant De Raisin which is traditionally packed in a specific kind of bottle, but 
whose advertisement in that kind of bottles was not allowed in Germany due to 
German fear that that type of bottle might mislead consumers. 565 Consequently, it was 
pointed out by the ECJ that total prohibition of advertising shall be substituted with 
obligation to provide information which will thus protect consumers.  
 
A similar approach was taken in the case relating to the prohibition by the national 
law in Italy of advertising of cheese with insufficient fat content while assessing its 
justification on the basis of fair trade and consumer protection. Namely, the Court 
held that it would be sufficient for Italian authorities to impose mandatory disclosure 
requirement on “the actual fat content of cheeses to enable consumers to make their 
choice in full knowledge of the facts”.566All this early pieces of legislation and case 
law shows that the idea of the significance of the duty of information was also present 
in EU Law before the UCPD, though it was never defined as a general principle of the 
law on unfair commercial practices. Likewise, irrespectively of these EU rules which 
certainly have affected the harmonised, sector specific areas, some national laws of 
Member States also recognized the duty of information, though the approach was 
rather non-equalized and heterogonous. 
 
Indirect manner of introduction  
In an indirect and nuanced manner, the Directive has introduced a universal duty of 
information in EU consumer law.  The duty is defined in a negative form, as the 
obligation of traders not to omit to, and disclose, all relevant information to consumer. 
In that sense, the trader is not explicitly and directly required to present all material 
information, but that is done indirectly: his failure to present material information to 
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consumers will constitute a form of unfair commercial practice for which he needs be 
sanctioned.  
 
Initially, the text of the Directive was supposed to contain an explicit and positive 
duty to inform consumers.567 The introduction of a general duty of information was 
identified as an essential tool for securing fair communication and all forms of 
commercial relations between a trader and a consumer.568 However, such a direct 
wording had to be modified as a consequence of lack of consent of relevant 
stakeholders. This is because, on the one hand, the advertisers had found such a 
provision to be too costly and burdensome, whereas, on the other hand, such an 
explicit provision was understood as too extreme by some of the Member States due 
to the divergences that existed among national contract laws of Member States in 
relation to the recognition of duty of information as well as a concern of possible 
impact that this duty may have on the national legal system.569  
 
Consequently, the solution on how to achieve the same results, but to avoid the 
resistance and a reach a political compromise, was eventually found in linguistic 
formulation through the usage of the innovative notion of misleading omissions. 
Besides misleading omissions, such original terminology used in the text of the UCPD 
includes the notions invitation to purchase or the previously examined concept of 
professional diligence. The notion of misleading omission represents a perfect 
example of the powerfulness that the usage of innovative legal terminology has 
obtained as a means of Europeanization of private law.  
 
First of all, by using the terminology of misleading provisions, the Directive managed 
to overcome concerns of Member States that the Directive interferes with their legal 
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traditions and that would impose a general duty of information since the notion itself 
sounds very neutral. Second, the creation of a new European legal terminology is part 
of process of making an original system of European private law to whose legal 
terminology “a special European meaning should be attributed, thereby reducing the 
risk that they might be interpreted as synonymous with concept in national legal 
systems”.570 Consequently, in case of misleading omissions, the idea is to diminish the 
impact of the traditional approaches of the national courts towards the duty of 
information in any form, irrespectively whether it is positive or negative, while 
interpreting and applying this provision.  
 
Eventually, and despite its inventive name, the provision on misleading omissions 
reached the objective they were drafted for. During the adoption process of the 
Directive, the capacity of the provisions on misleading omissions to constitute a solid 
ground for imposition of the general duty to information was questioned exactly as a 
result of its ambiguity and innovative terminology and unpredictable future 
interpretation and application.571 However, the Court is there to say and explain what 
the Commission did not dare to. Consequently, already in one of its first decisions on 
the UCPD, Ving Sverige, the ECJ has confirmed the immense impact of the provision 
on misleading omissions as a pan-European duty of information, pointing out that all 
commercial practices are subject to the information requirements imposed by this 
provision.572  
 
The meaning and conditions for misleading omissions 
The Directive provides a definition of misleading omissions in the following manner: 
A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual 
context, taking account of all its features and circumstances and the 
limitations of the communication medium, it omits material information 
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that the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an 
informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to cause 
the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not 
have taken otherwise.  
 
It shall also be regarded as a misleading omission when, taking 
account of the matters described in paragraph 1, a trader hides or 
provides in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner 
such material information as referred to in that paragraph or fails to 
identify the commercial intent of the commercial practice if not already 
apparent from the context, and where, in either case, this causes or is 
likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision 
that he would not have taken otherwise.573 
 
The first paragraph of the definition explains what is the content of a general duty of 
information of a trader in their relationship towards consumers. For the assessment of 
the fulfillment of this duty of trader, the definition identifies four fundamental 
elements that the national courts have always to take into consideration. First, the 
fulfillment of information requirements needs always to be assessed in relation to the 
average consumer as the main benchmark. Second, the obligation to provide 
information relates only to the provision of material information, i.e. those which are 
relevant for consumers to make an informed choice.  
 
Third, required information has to be of such quality that in case of trader’s failure to 
provide information, such an omission would be likely to cause a consumer to take a 
transactional decision he would have not otherwise take, i.e. it relates to the effects of 
the failure to provide information. Fourth, all circumstances, followed by the entire 
context of an unfair commercial practice, as well all relevant features together with 
                                              




any limitation of mediums on which information is to be provided, have to be taken 
into consideration.  
 
The second paragraph of the definition clarifies the manner in which a trader has to 
provide material information. Consequently, the duty of information requires what is 
called a meaningful transparency, i.e. a provision of information in such a manner 
that enables the consumer to really profit from it.574 Contrary to this, provision of 
form in an unintelligible, ambiguous or any other manner which does not enable 
consumers to understand disclosed information is equalized with the case when a 
trader has not disclosed all information.575  
 
Moreover, the second paragraph of the definition also establishes a general obligation 
of identification of commercial intent in each of trader’s commercial practices unless 
this is obvious from the context. Consumers must not get misled about the nature of 
certain advertisements in order to have a proper and objective understanding of the 
advertising message that, for instance, it does not represent a broadcasting of a neutral 
scientific study, but part of selling tactics of a particular company. The purpose of this 
provision is very similar to the point provided by Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive that requires that viewers have to be informed about sponsorship a 
programme in cases when audio-visual media services or programmes that are 
sponsored.576  
 
Two practices among the thirty-one explicitly enlisted practices of the UCPD 
practices which are always unfair also secures that the consumer does not get misled 
by a lack of provisions of the nature of an advertising practice. The fact that failure to 
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provide commercial intent of a will equally considered as a form of misleading 
omission just secures that such a sensitive issue will be adequately taken care of in all 
cases through a provision of a more general clause.577 In its decision in RLvS, the 
Court clarified that such identification of commercial intent is only the obligation of 
trader from which originates a commercial practice. In accordance with such a view of 
the ECJ, a provider of audio-visual media services cannot be found to be engaged in 
an unfair commercial practice under the UCPD in case identification of commercial 
intent was omitted to be included since a commercial practice does not directly 
originate from him, but from another trader.578 
 
In the following part, I will focus on the examination of fundamental elements of the 
provision on misleading omissions, with the exception of the average consumer which 
is the subject of a separate Chapter of this thesis. Moreover, I will also address the 
manners in which, according the UCPD, the information is required to be provided.  
 
Materiality of information 
Criterion of materiality  
Traders are not obliged to disclose to consumer all possible and available information 
they have, but only material information. The notion of material information is a 
standard which understands what information is necessary for consumers to make an 
informed choice. Traders’ failure to provide material information is likely to cause the 
consumer to take a transactional decision he would have not otherwise taken if that 
information had been provided.   
 
What is understood under ‘material information’, as well as the fact of whether a 
trader presented material information to the consumer, is something that needs to be 
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verified by the national courts in each particular case, on a case-by-case basis.579 For 
instance, an information that would typically not be considered as material is the 
failure of travel agent as traders to inform the consumer that the hotel in his package 
travel has been upgraded from a three star to a five star hotel at the same location for 
the same price. Such an information would not, by rule, have impact on the consumer 
who concluded that contract. In other words, consumer would have concluded the 
contract in any case. However, in case of an opposite occurrence of facts, when 
traders failed to inform the consumer that his hotel was downgraded from a five star, 
to a three star would typically be considered as a material information, capable of 
affecting consumer’s choice. 
 
In discovering what information the consumer really needs, behavioural studies are 
certainly of help for understanding what these most important pieces of information 
has to include. The area of information duties was identified as part of consumer law 
where the Economics approach shall be particularly applied since such an approach 
secures an efficient usage of information.580 The wording and flexible formulation of 
the UCPD on misleading omissions itself enables taking into consideration finding 
and application of behavioural studies. However, the national courts are certainly 
limited with the standard of the average consumer, as a normative concept, that 
defines how the consumer is expected to behave the market. The average consumer is 
also the one who deserves the protection and who profits from the information. It is 
for the consumer that the duty of information has been imposed, so his behaviour shall 
be taken as a model.581  
 
Empirical studies in behavioural economics, cognitive psychology and theory of 
marketing have shown the existence of bounded rationality of human behaviour.  In 
accordance with their lack of rational behaviour, people are found to be imperfect 
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information processors.582 This is why there is a constant advocacy for applying more 
behavioural economics in European consumer policy and while interpreting and 
applying consumer law in practice.583 According to the behavioural economics, proper 
framing of disclosure techniques is of fundamental importance for information to have 
an effect and that consumer may profit from it. Accordingly, information requirements 
shall be always designed and interpreted in accordance with real needs of 
consumers.584 
 
Moreover, instead on the basis of their rationality, it was empirically proven, that 
consumers rather rely on their emotions in their decision-making processes.585 This 
factor has to be taken into consideration while deciding whether an information is 
material. Furthermore, several other factors were identified to be more important for 
consumers when making certain transactional decision that mere disclosure of certain 
information and this is why they should certainly be taken into consideration while 
deciding on materiality of the information. These factors include life style, culture, 
peer press, emotions, social class, context in which product is presented, level of 
involvement.586  
 
From a European perspective, among the enlisted factors, culture seems to be 
particularly important. Namely, the entire situation with assessment of consumer 
behaviour and designing of an adequate legal mechanism becomes even more 
complex in case of the European Union due to its highly present multicultural 
character. This is so because consumer behaviour differentiates depending on the 
culture to which any certain consumer belongs. So depending on the culture they 
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belong to, consumers will react in different manner and consequently they may 
consider different information as representing material.587  
 
Such a complexity is emanated through part of the definition of the average consumer 
as the main benchmark where it is pointed out that social, cultural and linguistic 
factors shall be taken into consideration while deciding on fairness of a commercial 
practice, though this exception may have a limited effect as a consequence of the 
maximum harmonisation character of the UCPD.588 These factors were identified as 
playing a potentially important role for the assessment of fulfillment of the duty of 
information.589  
 
Obligation de résultat instead of obligation de moyens  
In accordance with the outcomes of the studies in behavioural sciences on deficiencies 
in the duty of information, it should be very thoroughly researched what kinds of 
information are to be considered as material. Otherwise, the imposition of too much 
information will result in an increase of trader’s costs and consumer being incapable 
of profiting from disclosed information. Information disclosure produces costs which 
will be eventually passed to consumers and in that sense, Stuyck points out, “a “high 
level” of protection does not necessarily mean the “highest” level of consumer 
welfare”.590  The criterion of materiality enables flexibility in that aspect and 
possibility to choose which information is really relevant for the consumer and from 
which they can really profit. In such a manner it remedies a highly disputable 
tendency of increasing the number of information to be disclosed to consumers in 
European law.591  
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Moreover, previously existing duty of information of directives on consumer contract 
law was considered as a failure and incapable of protecting consumer’s consent.592 
This is why such a general formulation of the provisions on misleading omission of 
the UCPD is good as it enables taking into consideration real needs of consumer. 
Certain consumers know, namely, what information they need and they look for it. 
However, some consumers do not know what information they need to make an 
informed choice and it is exactly in accordance with the needs of these consumers that 
duty of information and what information considered as material, should be 
‘tailored’.593  
 
In such a manner, with its flexible wording, the UCPD leaves place for assessment 
and taking into consideration of real behaviour of consumer in practice. Such a view is 
confirmed by the ECJ who in its case law provided guidance to national courts on how 
to identify whether an information is material. In Purely Creative, the question 
referred to the ECJ by an English court was related to the interpretation of one of 
thirty-one exhaustively listed practices in Annex I of the Directive.594 The question 
was whether even the existence of a minimal cost, that the consumer needs to bear in 
order to obtain a much more valuable prize, shall be considered as a form of unfair 
commercial practice. The Court adopted a very pro-consumer oriented judgement in 
which it pointed out that such a practice of traders would be an unfair commercial 
practice, even if the cost that consumers shall bear is minor in comparison to the 
prize.595 
 
From a perspective of the duty of information, this judgement is relevant since, in it, 
the Court clarified the method that the national courts shall use the fulfilment of the 
duty of information. Accordingly, the national court shall check the following criteria: 
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“the availability of the information and how it is presented, the legibility and clarity of 
the wording and whether it can be understood by the public targeted by the 
practice”.596 Equally, it is for the national courts to establish whether the information 
supplied is sufficiently clear and comprehensive for the public targeted by the practice 
to enable the average consumer of the group concerned to take an informed 
decision.597   
 
Moreover, in the same case, the Court acknowledged the relevance of taking 
arguments of cognitive psychology while assessing fulfillment of the duty of 
information, as well as the fact that the consumer does not behave in a rational 
manner: “the psychological effect caused by the announcement of the winning of a 
prize, in order to induce the consumer to make a choice which is not always rational, 
such as calling a premium rate telephone number to ask for information about the 
nature of the prize, traveling at great expense to collect an item of low-value crockery 
or paying the delivery costs of a book which he already has”.598 
 
 
Duty of information shall be understood as, what sometimes is referred to in private 
law as an obligation du résultat, and not as an obligation de moyens.  In other words, 
the regulatory mechanism shall be focused not only on the fact that trader present 
information and thus fulfills their obligation, but it shall rather secure that the 
consumer is presented information in such a manner that he or she really profits from 
it.  
 
Two cases of materiality under the Directive 
Besides a rather abstract criterion for verification of materiality of information to be 
disclosed to consumer, the Directive itself provides two cases when an information 
has to always be considered as material. This means that in case of alleged breach of 
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the duty of information, the court or other competent bodies will not need to the assess 
their quality of being material bearing for  the consumer’s behaviour and their impact 
on consumer’s choice, but they will be automatically considered as material.  
 
The first case is when a commercial communication is an invitation to purchase. In 
these cases, five groups of information exhaustively listed in the UCPD, will always 
be considered as material.599 This list of information is defined by the Directive 
because in cases of such types of commercial communications consumers are much 
more likely to enter into a contract, i.e. they need less time or effort and consequently 
they are more affected by commercial practice.600 In addition to classifying the 
information requirements in two categories depending on consumer’s need for 
information, the first case of materiality is important from a perspective of contract 
law since the UCPD has introduced through it, a common European understanding of 
the invitation of purchase, as it will be explained later.601 
 
The second case includes all information duties established through dozens of diverse 
directives in the area of consumer law. This information also will always be 
considered as material without necessity to be assessed on case a by case basis, 
bearing in mind their effects on consumer economic behaviour. A list of these 
information requirements is provided in Annex II of the Directive.602 Importantly, 
unlike Annex I which contains an exhaustive list of thirty-one practices which are 
always unfair, i.e. Member States may not establish any additional practice besides 
these, the list of Annex II is just an exampli causa list and it only identifies some of 
the European legislation in the area (some which of which has already seen changes 
by new directives).603 
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Through the imposition of a higher standard of the duty of information in case of 
invitation to purchase, the Directive has highlighted the importance of the pre-
contractual phase that precedes the conclusion of a consumer contract, making in that 
manner a tight interaction between unfair commercial practices and contract law. It is 
notable that the differentiation between the two levels of information requirements 
depending on the moment where information is to be provided is not radically 
innovative, since some of the directives makes the distinction between the sets of 
information which are to be provided during advertising and the sets information 
which are mandatory to be disclosed before conclusion of a consumer contract. This 
was the case with the contracts on package travel604 or consumer credit.605  
 
The introduction of the invitation to purchase now enables better understanding of the 
borderline between pre-contractual phases and when which of these two sets of 
information duties from contract law directives will have to be disclosed. 
Accordingly, if a commercial communication is an invitation to purchase, that this 
will require disclosure of pre-contractual information and if it is not, then those aimed 
at advertising. Moreover, since this differentiation existed only in cases of certain 
types of consumer contracts, now it applies to all consumer contracts.  
 
This second case has two main purposes. First, it codifies into one piece of legislation 
for the first time all information duties dispersed in diverse directives, in particular 
those in contract law. Second, the rules on information requirements as defined by 
directives on consumer contract law are typically not followed by provisions of any 
sanctions. Sometimes they were simply transposed in national legal systems of 
Member States, but due to lack of European rules on sanctions, they were left without 
any remedy, or at least functional remedy.  Through the establishment of their 
permanent quality of material information, the UCPD secures that all of information 
requirements from directives on consumer contract law will be sanctioned though 
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sanctions which are provided in national legal systems in cases of unfair commercial 
practices. All legal systems of Member States have developed sanctions for breach of 
the rules of the UCPD and in particular on misleading omissions as one of Directive’s 
fundamental components.  
 
It has to be noted that the qualification of materiality applies only to those information 
duties which are established by European legislation. In other words, additional pieces 
of information that were developed in the national legal systems in line with directives 
which require only minimum and not a maximum harmonisation do not automatically 
fall under this category. Consequently, in case of failure to provide any of these 
information requirements, material character of this information is not presumed, but 
it will have to be proven. In such a manner coherence of the provisions of the 
Directive and its unified application, all Member States secured by requirements of 
maximum harmonisation shall be maintained.  
 
Transactional decision 
Likelihood of taking a transactional decision  
The requirement of materiality of information is in tight connection with the 
requirement of likelihood of taking a transactional decision. Namely, material 
information will be only that information which causes or is likely to cause an average 
consumer to take a transactional decision in relation to products that he or she would 
have not otherwise made. As confirmed by the Court, the assessment of effects a 
failure to provide information is an essential condition for applying the rules on 
misleading practices. In its judgement in Trento Sviluppo, the ECJ answered the 
question referred by an Italian court on whether for a commercial practice is to be 
considered as misleading it is sufficient that it simply contains false information or 




necessary that such a practice influences consumer to take a transactional decision he 
would have not otherwise taken.606 
 
In its answer, the Court pointed out that the likelihood of causing the consumer to take 
a transactional decision he would have not otherwise taken a necessary condition for a 
practice to be considered as misleading.607 This is explained through the fact that the 
UCPD objective is to provide a general prohibition of all unfair commercial practices 
that distort economic behaviour of the consumer. In other words, the assessment of 
fairness of commercial practice by the national court must be done through a pure 
examination of traders’ commercial practice, but it has to be executed in the light of 
its potential influence on economic behaviour of the consumer.  
 
Despite the fact that this judgment dealt with misleading actions, this rule shall also 
mutatis mutandis apply to the provisions on misleading omission since they are two 
forms of misleading practices.608 Moreover, the objective of both is the protection of 
informed choices of the consumer.609 Accordingly, a mere failure to provide material 
information is not enough for the existence of misleading omissions, but such a failure 
has to be likely to cause an average consumer to take a transactional decision where 
he or she would not have otherwise. 
 
Lack of obligation to verify the breach of professional diligence requirements  
Conditions for application of the small general clauses, including the rules on 
misleading omissions, are less demanding than those applicable for general clause of 
fairness. The Court pointed out that exclusively conditions which are explicitly 
mentioned in these articles apply and that no other conditions exist. Consequently, 
misleading and aggressive practices are prohibited if, in accordance to their nature and 
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the entire factual situation they are likely to take a transactional decision that he would 
have not otherwise taken.610  
 
Namely, for application of any of three ‘small general clauses’ it is not required to be 
proven, unlike in the case of the general clause and its first limb, that trader has acted 
against the requirements of professional diligence as pointed out by the Court.611 
Namely, in CHS Tour Services the question raised on whether trader’s breach of 
professional diligence requirements is a necessary pre-condition of prohibiting a 
commercial practice on the grounds that it represents a misleading practice. 
 
The Court was clear that this is not required and pointed out that such an interpretation 
is in accordance with the requirements of effectiveness for application of the 
provisions of the Directive.612 This is because in case of the examination on the basis 
of the small general clauses the breach of professional diligence is indisputably pre-
supposed and, as a consequence, the trader cannot base his defense on the fact that 
they behaved in accordance with the requirements of professional diligence. Provision 
of false information, deliberately omitting to disclose information or coercing 
consumers with purpose of influencing them to make a commercial transaction that 
they would have not otherwise performed per definitionem show that a trader has 
acted contrarily to professional diligence.  
 
Equally, for the application of provisions on misleading omissions it is absolutely 
irrelevant whether traders who failed to provide information are a public or private 
body, or its performances tasks of public or private interest. This does not make any 
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difference as it was pointed out by the ECJ in its judgment where an involved trader 
was a German public health insurance fund.613 
 
The context of in which information is provided 
The significance of the context and limitation of the medium  
The UCPD establishes a clear obligation that while assessing fulfillment of the duty of 
information, “factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances and 
the limitations of the communication medium” of commercial practice have all to be 
taken into consideration.614 The Directive continues that “[w]here the medium used to 
communicate the commercial practice imposes limitations of space or time, these 
limitations and any measures taken by the trader to make the information available to 
consumers by other means shall be taken into account in deciding whether 
information has been omitted”.615 The limitation of medium for information is a  
category that always needs to be verified empirically, on a case by case basis.616 
 
The level of imposed information duties on traders depends on whether his 
commercial communication is considered as an invitation to purchase. The Court 
confirmed in Ving Sverige that the invitation to purchase is a particular form of 
advertising which demands stricter information requirements.617 The Directive enlists 
five sets of information duties that have to be presented to consumers when a 
commercial communication is an invitation to purchase. These pieces of information 
include the main characteristics of the product, the address and the identity of a trader, 
the total price of a product with all applicable taxes and dues, all other relevant details 
about the product, such as delivery or complaint policy if they are contrary to the 
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requirements of professional diligence and the existence and details on the right of 
cancellation and withdrawal.618  
 
The means of provision of information 
In Ving Sverige, the ECJ offered some guidance on the requests regarding how the 
information shall be provided and when it shall be considered that a trader has duly 
fulfilled his duty of information. The judgment in Ving Sverige is the first decision in 
which the Court interpreted the provisions of the Directive on misleading omissions. 
The dispute was raised in relation to the content of an advertisement of Swedish travel 
agency, published in Swedish daily newspapers.  
 
In its publicity, Ving Sverige was promoting its package travel to New York City. The 
advertisement contained the information on starting price of the travel arrangement 
(‘from SEK 7 820’). What the advertised price would include, followed by starting 
price of any extra night in a hotel. Furthermore, the disclaimer was provided on a 
limited period of time and number of places to which the advertisement was 
applicable. The Internet web address and the telephone number of the travel agency 
were provided at the bottom of the advertisement.  
 
The Swedish ombudsman for consumer protection (‘Konsumentombudsmannen’) 
considered the advertisement as being contrary to the Swedish Law through which 
Sweden transposed the provisions of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive into 
its national legal system. Accordingly Konsumentombudsmannen commenced the 
process before the Swedish commercial court (Marknadsdolstolen) on the basis that 
Ving Sverige’s advertisements represented an invitation to purchase and as such it 
represented a misleading omission since the information on the main characteristics of 
the advertised product were not provided. Marknadsdolstolen referred to the Court for 
the clarification of the notions provided by the Directive.  
 
                                              




In its judgment, the Court left it to the national courts to decide whether a consumer 
can take a transactional decision on the basis of an entry-level price. In their 
assessments, national courts used the nature and characteristics of the advertised 
product and the commercial medium of communication used.619 Through such 
reasoning the Court took into consideration real consumer behaviour.  
 
However, the ECJ pointed out that if the consumer has been provided only with the 
entry price supported by the additional information which would direct him to the 
mediums where he can check all other relevant information, such an advertising 
cannot be considered as a form of misleading omission. Moreover, from a perspective 
of a trader, it would be absolutely impossible to get advertised in cases when his 
product is offered in various versions and under different prices if he was obliged to 
disclose all information. Such an obligation would seriously breach one of the two 
objectives of the Directive on strengthening of the Internal Market. 
 
In its judgment, the ECJ pointed out that a verbal or visual reference may enable the 
consumer to form an opinion on the nature and characteristics of the product for the 
purpose of taking a transactional decision, and that includes a situation where such a 
reference designates a product which is offered in many versions.620The Court refers 
to the possibility envisaged by the Directive that price and/or other costs of the 
product cannot reasonably be calculated in advance.621 The extent of the information 
relating to the price will be established on the basis of the nature and characteristics of 
the product, but also on the basis of the medium of communication used for the 
invitation and having regard to additional information possibly provided by the 
trader622 
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Through this reasoning, the Court again protected advertising practice as a necessary 
element of trade, taking into consideration real behaviour of a consumer. On the other 
hand, consumers are not less protected with such an approach, similarly as in the case 
of the entry price, since they can check all of the product options on the website, 
through phone or other mediums of communication if it is duly provided in the 
commercial communication.  
 
It should be underlined that the competent court should take care of all circumstances 
and features of the advertisement and particularly of the communication medium 
through which the information is supposed to be provided. The competent court shall 
pay attention to the fact where the advertisement is being presented, so the same 
criteria cannot be applied if, for instance, an advertisement takes just a small part of a 
page of newspapers in comparison to an advertisement taking exclusively two pages, 
as it was pointed in the Opinion of Advocate General in Ving Sverige.623 It is 
absolutely logical that the standard of information requirements in these two cases 
should differ and this provision makes such a different approach lawful.  
 
Such a view of the Court is in line with urging that behavioural economics and 
neuroscience shall be taken into consideration while implementing the provisions of 
the UCPD.624 The European Commission itself has suggested taking into 
consideration behavioural economics while interpreting and applying the provisions of 
the Directive.625 In Purely Creative, the ECJ pointed out that it is on the national 
courts to establish whether the information supplied is sufficiently clear and 
comprehensible for the public targeted by the practice to enable the average consumer 
of the group concerned to take an informed decision.626 In this case, consumers were 
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informed that they won a prize, but they were not informed that acquiring of the prize 
brings costs to the consumer despite the fact that these costs were minor.  
 
The rules regulating the duty of information request not only that an information gets 
presented, but also that it needs to be disclosed in a particular manner. Otherwise, the 
legal consequences would be the same as if the information was not disclosed at all. 
The point of this provision is that an addressee of advertisement, primarily the 
consumer has to be provided with the information in such a way that he can profit 
from it.  Namely, as it was well noted, traders are skilled in manipulating the 
presentation of information.627  
 
This is why the UCPD provides that as misleading omission will be considered an 
information that is presented in unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely 
manner, or if with the information the commercial purpose of ad was not mentioned, 
under the condition that it causes or is likely to cause consumer to take a transactional 
decision he would not have taken otherwise. In that manner, through obligation to 
provide information in clear and intelligible manner, a connection is made between 
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Duty of information in consumer contract law 
 
The paradigm of informed consumer  
The core of the entire European consumer policy, since its very beginning in the 
eighth decade of the twentieth century, has been based on protection of the informed 
choice of consumers in line with their right to information.628 In its judgment in GB-
INNO-BM, the Court recognized the fundamental character of this right of the 
consumer under EU Law.629 Equally, today the TFEU emphasizes the significance of 
the consumer’s right to information on whose promotion the European Union shall 
invest further efforts.630 In order to secure the consumer’s right of information, EU 
Consumer Law has introduced the duty of information as the main regulatory tool. 
From a regulatory point of view, the imposition of information requirements 
represents a less radical form of intervention that what would represent an 
introduction of substantive mandatory law.631 
 
The duty of information has been established and extensively developed through 
diverse legislative pieces on consumer contract law. The consumer has continuously 
been approached and described as a weaker party in his relationship with the traders 
who tend to profit from the consumer’s weakness while concluding contracts.632 That 
weakness and inequality between trader and consumer is particularly noticeable when 
it comes to possession of information, so the imposition of information obligation 
corresponds “to balancing of the interests of the two parties”, as the Court identified in 
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its judgement in RWE.633 The national contract laws had diverse approaches towards 
the duty of information, though similarities are obviously presented in these areas of 
consumer contract law for which common European rules were provided. 
 
Consumer’s necessity for information is tightly connected with the promotion of 
European concept of confident consumer.634 Basically speaking, the confident 
consumer is the one who is not afraid to act on the market, who knows his rights and 
thus is much more keen on making economic decisions on the market and concluding 
contracts with traders and this is why he needs information.635 Accordingly, the duty 
of information has been imposed, as  a means of securing that the consumer will get 
the necessary information.  
 
It is possible to speak about two main rationales for introduction of the duty of 
information. The first one is moral argumentation based on the arguments of social 
justice, pointing out to the existing inequality and different starting position in trade 
relations between the consumer and trader. The second is based on argumentation in 
findings on the economics of information. Consequently, the justification is that 
consumer needs information in order to be capable of making rational choices. 
Otherwise, if he does not have the information, no rational choice can be made which 
results in failure of the entire market where consumers are essentially important 
players. However, it has been pointed out that the duty of information is actually the 
result not only of one of these rationales, but also that it shall be observed as the 
outcome of both of them.636 
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Two rationales of duty of information  
Argumentation on the ground of moral and justice 
The reasons of moral and justice are pointed out as the grounds for full transparency 
of information between two parties which are willing to stipulate a contract.637 In that 
sense, one of the most famous ancient Romans, Cicero, was among the first to discuss 
the duty of information from a moral perspective. Cicero examined what is supposed 
to be considered as moral in two hypothetical cases.  
 
The first one is when on the island of Rhodes there is famine and one merchant arrives 
from Alexandria with the food, but it is only he who knows that behind him a few 
other ships with the food will arrive. The moral question is whether he should inform 
people of those ships coming or he should simply reject to disclose that information 
and sell the food at a higher price. The second one is the case of the sale of a house 
that has some defects (for example being unsanitary and thus substandard to the 
requirements of normal life), with which only the seller is familiar. Should the seller 
disclose those facts. Cicero argues that the arguments of morality require the 
disclosure of the facts in both the hypothetical cases.638  
 
Consequently, it has been considered that the general duty of information is derived 
from the moral obligation to talk to and inform the other party about everything which 
a just consciousness would require to be disclosed. Further to this, requirements of 
justice provide that each of the parties shall disclose to the other party all relevant 
information for the conclusion of the contract and to protect the weaker party in a 
contractual relation. In this sense, the contract law is to foster those moral standards 
by imposing the duty of information as the instrument to protect the weaker party 
from the exploitative and abusive behaviour of the other party.639 This is in close 
relation to the concept of cooperation between the parties, especially when one of 
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them is materially weaker, as it is the case with the consumer. In that sense, the duty 
of information is to be used as one of the instrument of contractual justice.640 
 
The imposition of the duty of information is also in line with the a specific concept of 
justice that the European Union has developed which, inter alia, requires protection of 
a weaker party, in particular a consumer in his relationship to significantly more 
powerful traders. That is the concept of social justice.641 In the context of the duty of 
information, the idea of social of justice is based on the concept of solidarity tightly 
linked to the idea of fairness which requires the protection of a weaker party in a 
contractual relationship, i.e. consumer, who is considered as neither possessing 
necessary information, nor of being able to acquire them.642    
 
Argumentation on the ground of information economics  
Besides moral argumentation, the imposition of the duty of information has also been 
explained on the grounds of economics, in particular the findings of the information 
economics. Namely, it was argued that the informational failure leads to an inefficient 
market, so that is considered to be the main argumentation of economists used to 
explain why there is a need for the legal activism in consumer markets.643 The duty of 
information is there to resolve that information asymmetry, since perfect information 
is one of the necessary pre-requisites for a perfect and efficient market.644 As a 
consequence of lack of information, the consumer cannot make an informed, and thus 
a rational, economic decision which results in market failure. 
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However, state intervention at the market is a subsidiary mechanism of the protection 
of the market and it is only justified in cases when private mechanisms would fail.645 
Consequently, the justification for the intervention on the market and imposition of 
mandatory disclosure rules is based on the fact that without such an imposition on the 
market there are informational deficiencies of consumers who generate inefficient 
choices that eventually lead to the market failure.646 
 
This was famously explained by Akerlof in his example about the used car market. In 
this example, the car market was taken as a model to show how an important pre-
requisites for an efficient market is the fact that the consumer possesses all relevant 
information before making his economic decision. Namely, at the market of second-
hand cars, the good and the bad cars cannot be easily differentiated and they look 
much the same. The bad cars will be cheaper and that fact will cause the buyers to buy 
the bad cars because they are cheaper and they look very similar to good cars, so the 
consumer cannot distinguish their quality, but only the car price.  
 
Consequently, a buyer will buy a bad car because it is cheaper. This would lead to the 
fact that the dishonest traders will chase away the honest traders from the market who 
will not have any more incentive to participate in that market. Therefore, the cost of 
dishonesty does not include only the amount for which the buyer is cheated, but also 
the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence. 647 
 
                                              
645 F. Rischkowsky and T. Döring, ‘Consumer Policy in a Market Economy: Considerations from the 
Perspective of the Economics of Information, the New Institutional Economics as well as Behavioural 
Economics’ (2008) 31 Journal of Consumer Policy 285, 290 
646 S Weatherill, ‘Justifying Limits to Party Autonomy in the Internal market’ in S Grundmann, W Kerber and S 
Weatherill (eds), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market – an Overview (Walter de 
Gruyter 2001), 180;  
647 G Akerlof, ‘The Market for 'lemons': Quality uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 The 




Duty of information in national contract laws  
Means of causing fraud 
The principle of prohibition of provisions of false information through active 
behaviour by one party to the other during the contract formation dates back to the 
ancient laws.648 In national contract laws, it is emanated principally through contract 
law rules on consent defects, and in particular through provisions on fraud. They are 
named in different manners depending on a legal system (dol, misrepresentation, 
dolo…), but they all are aimed to provide remedy in case of provision of false 
information and thus they represent functional equivalents.649  
 
Moreover, a general principle is that on the grounds of fraud, the provision of false 
information which caused an innocent party to stipulate a contract or particular contract 
provision shall be sanctioned. Such a contract or contract term is typically considered as void 
or voidable and the innocent party also has the right to compensation for suffered damages.650 
However, national contract laws have diverse approaches when it comes to legal 
consequences of failure of one party to provide information to other parties before the 
conclusion of a contract. 
 
Traditional principle of Caveat Emptor 
A general principle of caveat emptor,651 developed in ancient Roman Law, remained 
applicable for many centuries in the majority of national legal systems of Member 
States. This notion applied to Emptio-Venditio contracts, i.e. the fact that in sale-
purchase contracts the buyer was the one who was expected to take care of potential 
defects of the object of contract, and that a seller was not obliged to disclose them to a 
buyer.652 
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However, in the ancient Roman Law, in certain cases seller was obliged to disclose 
information regarding the defects of the object, otherwise buyer s could use actio 
empti against seller in cases where the seller fraudulently did not disclose certain 
defects of the object653. In the later stage of the development of Roman Law, aediles 
curules widened this protection by adding a new system of remedies for certain 
market transactions, predominantly sale of slaves and livestock.654  
 
Changes in national contract laws 
National contract laws also did not traditionally recognize a failure to provide relevant 
information as one of the grounds for rescission of a contract. Traditionally, 
exclusively active behaviour was considered as capable of causing fraud, while this 
was not the case with passive behaviour.655 Initially, such provisions on fraud were 
interpreted in a narrow sense; so passive behaviour was considered as incapable of 
causing fraud. Nineteen-century codifications of private law provided that fraud could 
be caused only with active behaviour.  
 
The primary reason for such an approach was based on the fact that for the existence 
of fraud, the consent of one of the parties is required to be defected as the 
consequence of behaviour of the other party, and in case of passive behaviour it is 
hardly possible to show that it was the silence that was the cause of the consent defect, 
so in that case fraud is missing its mandatory element, so it cannot exist. Eventually, 
during the second half of the twentieth century, certain changes to this approach may 
be noticed. For instance, in 1954, in its decision (and confirmed in another later 
decision in 1958656), the French Supreme Court, Cour de Cassation, accepted the 
claim on the ground of dol caused by passive behaviour of the other party, concluding 
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that fraud can also be caused by passive behaviour, by the so-called la réticence 
dolosive, or fraudulent non-disclosure.  
 
Similar views were also adopted, again in the second half of the twentieth century, in 
the other civil law systems where this question was disputed, such as it was the case 
with Spanish or Italian law.657 In all of them, duty of information developed through 
broadening of the contract law notion of fraud by imposition of the duty not to 
fraudulently omit any material information while concluding the contract. Equally, for 
example, a new codification at the time of Slovenian and Croatian law of the 
obligations in 1978 (at the time both of these countries were part of one state, 
Yugoslavia) also explicitly recognised the possibility that fraud may be caused by 
passive behaviour of one contractual party.658  
 
The reluctance to accept the duty of information  
Contrary to the approach of the majority of European legal systems, the English law 
has been very reluctant towards recognition of the duty of information. In England, 
the courts were faced with the same question as in French law: whether 
misrepresentation can be caused by passive behaviour. The answer to this question is 
radically different than to the one given in some of the civil law legal system. English 
law is very strong on its general position that misrepresentation can be caused 
exclusively by active behaviour, and not by passive behaviour – or silence.659 This is 
because the simple omission of a party in the form of mere silence is not considered as 
a representation since it does not represent the statement of fact and, therefore, it is not 
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a conduct, and the English law attaches liability responsibility exclusively to a 
conduct.660  
 
The refusal to make any changes in that aspect is explained by English lawyers that an 
imposition of a duty of information would be unjust since the information should be 
regarded as the property of the subject who possesses it, so making him share that 
information would not be “so different than forcing it to give away physical assets”.661 
This is in line with general English reluctance to recognition of any kind of general 
principle in contract law.662 
 
Misleading omissions in the context of national contract laws 
The relevance of the rules of national contract laws from the perspective of misleading 
omission lies in its innovative approach. Namely, from the perspective of legality of 
particular behaviour, the provision of misleading actions by the UCPD does not 
represent anything radically and revolutionarily innovative, but rather a reformulation 
on a harmonised European level of what shall be understood as fraudulent behaviour 
of a trader and provision of untrue information in business-to-consumer relations. 
Moreover, in such a manner, the Directive establishes grounds for provision of a 
supplementary layer of protection, through the introduction of additional, primarily 
public law, sanctions besides the regularly exiting private law sanctions. 
 
Accordingly, the interaction of the provisions on misleading actions with contract law 
is primarily focused to interpretation, i.e. that interpretation and application of the 
provisions on misleading provisions may influence and may be influenced by the 
national concept of consent defects, and in particular those on fraud.663 Equally, the 
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rules on aggressive practices of the UCPD have provided a common European 
meaning to aggressive practices of trader whereas behaviour equivalent to what is 
understood under aggressive behaviour has also traditionally been sanctioned through 
national contract law rules on duress.  
 
Both the rules on aggressive practices and on the duress have the same objective: to 
secure freedom of choice of contractual parties, in particular when it comes to making 
the decision whether or not to enter into a particular contract and the content of that 
contract. To sum up with, neither the concept brought by the rules on misleading 
actions nor the one brought by the provisions on aggressive practices represent 
something radically new and innovative from the perspective of contract law, but 
rather a reformulation of the existing models. 
 
This is why the provision on misleading omission brought by the UCPD is so 
fundamentally important: for the first time a general pre-contractual duty of 
information has been brought, applicable to all types of consumer contract, which, to 
some extent, remedied the previously existing incoherence and partiality character of 
regulation of the duty of information as contained in directives on consumer contracts. 
Also the imposition of universal duty of information in consumer contract law may 
have a spill over effect on general contract law,664 or even get directly introduced at 
least in case of certain business-to-business contracts. Moreover, the provisions on 
misleading omissions have also affected some ‘hard core’ contract law notions 
through producing a common European notion on invitation to purchase which is a 
par excellence contract law concept.  
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As a consequence of the UCPD, the duty of information now exists for all types of 
consumer contracts, both those on sales as well as those on services.665The provision 
from failure to provide information through the rules on misleading omissions seem to 
be even more protective than the legal systems which have traditional recognized a 
duty of disclosure.666 
 
Duty of information in European contract law 
Duty of information in consumer contract law 
Starting from the first directive in the area of consumer contract law, Directive 
85/577/EEC on doorstep selling, and in all subsequent directives in this area, the duty 
of information takes a central place in defined regulatory mechanism for protection of 
consumer and its glory still lasts, even more it is enhanced form.667 The main 
objective of information duties was to equalize the unequal pre-contractual positions 
of consumer and traders.668 The imposition of the duty of information in contractual 
relationships both restricts and protects freedom of contract.669 It restricts freedom of 
contract in such a manner that it imposes an obligation on trader, where it protects it in 
a sense that it helps the consumer to make a fully informed choice. 
 
Consumer contracts are understood as contracts where on one side there is a trader 
which is an economically stronger party and, more importantly, whose main purpose 
of conclusion of consumer contract is acquiring of profit, whereas on the other side 
there is the consumer, or economically weaker party, whose main purpose of entering 
contract is not profit, but fulfilling of its necessary life needs. The existence of such an 
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unequal positions of contractual parties and different interests due to which they 
decide to enter into contracts was underlined by the ECJ in it case law.670  
 
This is why all consumer contracts have to be transparent and all necessary 
information must be disclosed to the consumer because only through that way he will 
they be able to understand whether they really want to conclude that contract or not. It 
is true that in such a manner party autonomy of the trader is limited, but it should not 
be neglected that party autonomy does not lead automatically to a fair and just 
contract and sometimes certain legal measures, such as the duty of information, are 
needed in order to protect potential abuse of party autonomy by a trader.671  
 
Accordingly, in order to secure that consumer the directives provided set of 
information requirements applicable for certain types of consumer contracts, such as 
doorstep selling,672 consumer credit,673 package travel,674 timeshare675 or distance 
selling.676 Besides imposing information duties, these directives also require traders to 
provide this information in clear and comprehensive manner. In addition to these 
specific types of consumer contracts, transparency and legibility of contract terms is 
secured by a horizontal Directive 93/13/EEC, though with limited effects since the 
application of its provisions is limited exclusively to contract terms which were not 
individually negotiated.677  
 
In the context of contract terms, the ECJ pointed out that it is essential to explicitly 
inform consumers about essential elements of the contract, such as the existence of the 
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consumer’s right to termination and all important price related information, whereas 
provision of this information is not accepted.678 In its judgment in RWE, the ECJ has 
underlined the significance of information in the context of fairness of contract terms 
by pointing out that “[i]nformation, before concluding a contract, on the terms of the 
contract and the consequences of concluding it is of fundamental importance for a 
consumer. It is on the basis of that information in particular that he decides whether he 
wishes to be bound by the terms previously drawn up by the seller or supplier”.679 
 
Fragmentation of information requirements  
A rather piecemeal character of regulation of information requirements in the 
directives on consumer contract law is focused exclusively to certain specific types of 
consumer contracts followed by lack of general consumer contract legislation on the 
European level. This has resulted in the fact that no general and unified duty of 
information applicable to all types of consumer contracts was established. This is why 
the information requirements were underlined only in the areas where there was 
relevant European legislation, as it is the case for instance with distance selling or 
package travel contracts.680 
 
Moreover, as a consequence of piecemeal regulatory approach of EU consumer law 
towards the duty of information, different time periods that directives on consumer 
contract law were adopted and diverse compromises that were supposed to be made as 
necessary prerequisites for their adoption, the content of the duty of information was 
characterized by high levels of mutual divergence. Consequently, European directives 
on consumer contract law were not coherent on the imposed information duties which 
all resulted in a significant fragmentation of these rules.681 
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The occurrence of the fragmentation phenomenon has resulted in the fact that 
different pieces of European secondary legislation in this area provides different 
information requirements and the required manner in which these pieces of 
information are to be disclosed.682 Further to this, in case of certain contracts, traders 
may be subjected to more than one set of information rules,683 e.g. timeshare contract 
concluded at distance’.684 As its final outcome, fragmentation of the rules on 
information requirements resulted in legal uncertainty.  
 
The phenomenon of information overload  
Besides for its fragmentation, the rules on information duties as defined in consumer 
contract legislation were also criticized for overloading consumers with information. 
The criticism of the duty of information from the quantitative perspective is primarily 
based on the regulatory design of the duty of information as it stands now in the 
European consumer law requires presentation of too many information, so that the 
consumer simply cannot process all of them and, eventually, profit from them.685 
Empirical studies in neuroscience have shown that cognitive limitation of people 
inable them to process information in cases when they are overloaded with it.686 It was 
pointed out that the more information is presented to the consumer, the less capable he 
or she is to process all this information.687 
 
It has been pointed out that the attention of EU consumer policy makers is 
predominantly concentrated on mere imposition information requirements and that the 
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effects of information on consumers in practice are insufficiently assessed.688 
Consequently, the problem is that consumers among all that information are incapable 
of making distinction which information they actually need the most to make a 
rational decision. Moreover, presentation of huge amount of information may end up 
with the result those pieces of disclosed information looks so complex and exhaustive 
that a consumer decides not to use or process any of the disclosed information. In such 
a case, information requirement would just represent an additional cost for traders, 
eventually transferred to the consumer, from which the consumer is not going to 
benefit. 
 
A Nobel Prize winner in economics, Herbert Simon, was among the first scholars, 
four decades ago, to notice such a phenomenon of negative effects of overload of 
information on the basis that ‘a wealth of information creates poverty of attention’. 
Subsequently, numerous empirical studies by economics, psychologists, 
neuroscientists and sociologists have been performed showing that overload of 
information produces negative effects on the side of consumers.689 
 
An empirical study, which was performed in the United States several years ago, 
demonstrated the presence of a tendency of declining usage of information from food 
nutritional labels, very important for health, by consumers. As one of the most 
probable explanations was pointed that products started also containing too much 
information which now included, for instance, organic certificate or welfare issues, to 
which consumers have started paying attention, consequently ignoring information 
from nutrition labels.690 This is why it is essentially important to bear in mind real 
behaviour of consumers in practice while defining and assessing fulfillment of 
information requirements.  
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An additional example is the case of Terms and Conditions, which are often so 
exhaustive that a consumer almost never reads any of them. In other words, in such an 
ocean of information consumers do not pay attention to any of the presented 
information, so that the final effect is the same as if a trader had not disclosed any of 
the information at all. This was well noted by Ben-Shahar who pointed out that “[r]eal 
people don’t read standard form contracts. Reading is boring, incomprehensible, 
alienating, time consuming, but most of all pointless. We want the product, not the 
contract”.691 
  
This phenomenon has also been noticed by the Commission which pointed out “[a] 
large amount of information may distract consumers from focusing on the most 
important aspects, and cause them to make decisions with less reflection, rather than 
more”.692 However, no related proposal on how to overcome this phenomenon was 
mentioned.  
 
Following this, in the European Union the problem with overload of information is 
closely linked with the issue of fragmentation of the common European regulation of 
information requirements.693 Namely, the horizontal fragmentation of these rules has 
led to the fact that different pieces of European secondary legislation in this area 
provide different information requirements and the required manner in which those 
information are to be disclosed.694 Through adapting information requirements to each 
medium in which an information is to be presented the Directive controls and 
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manages information overload of consumers, contributing to consumer’s profit of the 
presented information.695  
 
Information requirements in contract law after the UCPD 
The significance of the provisions on misleading omissions 
The transposition of a dozen of European directives on consumer contract law in the 
national legal systems of Member States brought a certain level of harmonization of 
the approaches towards the duty of information at least when it concerns consumer 
contract law. However, such a duty was still, all until the adoption of the UCPD, 
provided in fragmentary, partial and incoherent manner through sector specific 
directives, based primarily on vertical approach and being rather prescriptive than 
principle based. The problem with such a fragmented approach is that it is not capable 
of “fully meeting the requirements of today’s rapidly evolving society and 
markets”.696 
 
In that aspect, the provisions on misleading omissions are of fundamental importance 
since they have brought, for the first time, a general duty of information, always 
applicable and adaptable to all kinds of business-to-consumer relationships that 
subsequently opened a door for introduction of such a general duty through a contract 
law instrument, i.e. Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights (“Directive 
2011/83/EU”).697 Namely, Directive 2011/83/EU is the first European contract law 
instrument that brought a general pre-contractual duty of information that applies to 
all consumer contracts which represents one of few general duties introduced by EU 
contract law.698 
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However, information duties defined by Directive 2011/83/EU, especially those 
applicable in case of distance selling,699 are very numerous, up to twenty in total, 
which is all confusing for a consumer.700 An excellent and actual example in 
European consumer law could be found in the new European Directive 2011/83/EU 
on consumer rights addition to this, in the case of distance and off-premises contracts 
these requirements increase so, besides these nine general sets, traders are obliged to 
provide a supplementary set of information. Accordingly, a problem of information 
overload was identified in Directive 2011/83/EU and it was particularly noted that 
imposition of such an amount of information is not in line with the current 
development of technology and devices on which information needs to be 
presented.701 
 
The Optional Instruments has also adopted a general duty of information in business-
to-consumer contracts.702 However, both in the case of information requirements in 
Directive 2011/83/EU and in the case of the Optional Instrument the distinction 
between two levels of information requirements on the ground of invitation to 
purchase seems to be ignored. Moreover, through their exhaustive enlistment of all 
information duties to be disclosed, the consumer is again faced with information 
overload which prohibits him or her from profiting from disclosed information. This 
has contributed to the re-establishment of incoherence of information requirements in 
diverse instruments of EU consumer law, despite the fact that a general duty of 
information was also recognized by the European legislation on consumer contracts.   
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The invitation to purchase 
The significance of the invitation to purchase 
The Directive imposes higher standards of information requirements in case when 
trader’s commercial communication represents an invitation to purchase. In such case 
stricter information duties are imposed as a consequence of the fact that an invitation 
to purchase is considered as a critical moment in the consumer’s decision making 
process when a more impulsive reaction of the consumer can be expected and hence 
when a consumer is exposed to higher risks of being misled.703 As Advocate General 
Mengozzi correctly observed in his Opinion in Ving Sverige, a trader has the option to 
choose among other forms of advertising practices which require less information 
duties, but in case he opts for advertising practices that represents an invitation to 
purchase, in such a manner he also takes the risk of higher information 
requirements.704  
 
In case a commercial communication is an invitation to purchase, the Directive 
defines that five sets of information will be considered as material. Namely, unlike in 
the case of a general duty of information in commercial communications which are 
not invitations to purchase where a more abstract information duty is provided, herein 
there is a list with concrete examples. These information requirements relate to the 
main characteristics of the product, the geographical address and the identity of the 
trader, the price inclusive of taxes, the arrangements for payment, delivery, 
performance and the complaint handling policy, the exploitation by the trader of any 
specific misfortune or circumstance of such gravity as to impair the consumer’s and 
the existence of the right of withdrawal and cancellation.  The introduction of this list 
was criticized for being too long and closed from the perspective of economics and 
possibility to assess what information the consumer really needs.705 
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From a contract law perspective, the importance of the invitation to purchase of the 
UCPD is twofold. First, the notion of invitation to purchase as defined by the 
Directive directly interferes with the existing national contract law concepts similar to 
the invitation to purchase, at least when it comes to consumer contracts. Second, pre-
contractual information obligations of trader will vary depending on the fact whether 
or not particular commercial communication is an invitation to purchase.  
 
The notion of the invitation to purchase in European Private Law 
The notion of invitation to purchase (or in French l'invitation à l'achat) is an 
innovative legal term brought for the first time by the UCPD into European private 
law. Its innovative character is part of the process of forming of an original body of 
European private law with its own legal terminology that has a common European 
meaning which differs from similar existing concepts in national legal systems of 
Member States.706 Its original naming may also be explained by the fact that in such a 
manner it avoided opposition of Member States that would have certainly risen if any 
of traditional contract laws concepts had been used in the UCPD.  
 
The invitation to purchase is defined by the Directive as “a commercial 
communication which indicates characteristics of the product and the price in a way 
appropriate to the means of the commercial communication used and thereby enables 
the consumer to make a purchase”.707 Such a definition shows the existence of not 
only terminological, but also substantial similarity between the notion of invitation to 
purchase and certain related core contract terms of the national legal systems that are 
related to the offer and the formation of contracts. The similarities of this notion with 
English contract law term of invitation to treat, or French contract law term invitation 
a offrir, are easily noticeable.  
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Consequently, the definition provided by the UCPD has brought a common European 
meaning of contract law term ‘invitation to purchase’ at least when it comes to 
consumer contracts. Importantly, this definition was further interpreted by the ECJ in 
its judgment in Ving Sverige which is the first case in which the Court had to interpret 
the meaning of the provisions on misleading omissions.708 The divergence among 
national legal cultures is well spotted in the written observations in Ving Sverige 
submitted to the Court by some of Member States. Governments of Member States 
showed significantly different views and opinions in relation to the question whether 
commercial communication which was subject in the case shall or shall not be 
considered as an invitation to purchase.709 
 
Namely, after the adoption of the Directive, what remained particularly unclear was 
how wide the invitation to purchase should be interpreted. In its Guidance on the UK 
Regulations implementing the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive issued in 2008, 
the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) as the principal British authority in charge of 
enforcement of the rules on unfair commercial practices provided its own 
interpretation according to which the invitation to purchase shall be interpreted in a 
narrow manner. Accordingly, the invitation to purchase should include only the 
situation when consumers have the chance to directly place the order, for instance, a 
page on a website on which consumer can place the order.710 Contrary to such a view 
of the OFT, the European Commission opted for a much broader meaning of the 
invitation to purchase.  
 
According to this interpretation, an invitation to purchase would be any commercial 
communication that promotes a definable product for a particular price.711 In its 
judgment in Ving Sverige the Court followed the views of the Commission expressed 
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in the Guidance and provided a very broad meaning of the invitation to purchase. 
Such an approach of the Court was explained on the grounds that the invitation to 
purchase represents the only concept of the Directive that is to be interpreted only in 
accordance with one of its objectives: the objective of a high level of consumer 
protection defined in article 1 of the UCPD.712   
 
Contrary to the relevance of this objective, the requirements for strengthening of 
internal market are not to be taken into consideration when it comes to the invitation 
to purchase. Accordingly, the ECJ pointed out that a commercial communication, in 
order to be considered as an invitation to purchase, does not necessarily need to 
“include an actual opportunity to purchase or for it to appear in proximity to and at the 
same time as such an opportunity.”713 Consequently, the Court concluded “an 
invitation to purchase exists as soon as the information on the product advertised and 
its price is sufficient for the consumer to be able to make a transactional decision”.714 
Through providing how the invitation to purchase shall be interpreted and applied by 
the national courts, the ECJ also intervened in the core of national contract laws.715  
 
Implications of wide interpretation of the invitation to purchase 
A wide interpretation of the invitation to purchase by the Court in Ving Sverige is very 
pro-consumer oriented. However, what may be the problem with such a wide 
interpretation of the Court is that it may decrease the significance of classification of 
the information duties established by the Directive. Now, an extremely broad scope of 
commercial communications may be considered as an invitation to purchase.  
 
Consequently, it may be hard to imagine in practice an advertising practice that should 
not be taken as an invitation to purchase and the goal of the Directive was to make 
some order in the overload of information requirements imposed by EU Law. In that 
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sense Advocate General with its proposal for narrower interpretation seemed to have 
offered a more plausible interpretation in his Opinion which was eventually overruled 
by the Court. The Advocate General was opting for a more restrictive approach 
arguing that while assessing what represents an invitation to purchase, a balance 
between consumer’s and trader’s interest has to be made.716 Furthermore, the Court 
points out that, argumentum a contrario, if this was not considered as sufficient 
condition for invitation of purchase, the invitation of purchase would be too limited 
which might be misused by advertisers.717  
 
However, through flexible interpretation of articles 2(i) and 7(4)(c) of the Directive 
which provide that a disclosure of all main characteristics of a product or its full price 
in a particular form of commercial communication that is considered as an invitation 
to purchase is not necessarily mandatory, the Court managed to establish the right 
balance between the interests of traders and the interest of consumers.  As a result, a 
number of traders’ commercial communications will be forms of invitation to 
purchase but traders have the possibility to provide missing information at another 
place than in their commercial communication in cases when the medium of 
advertising is limited to show all necessary information.718 In accordance, with 
expected behaviour of consumer under EU consumer law as provided in its definition, 
the average consumer will not be lazy, but he will check the information provided on 





This Chapter examined the duty of information in business-to-consumer relation 
which was introduced, at the moment, in EU consumer law as a general duty of 
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traders through the provisions on misleading omissions of the Directive. 
Consequently, traders’ failure to provide the consumer with material information in 
any commercial practice that causes or is likely to cause the consumer to take a 
transactional decision he would not otherwise have taken will always represent a form 
of an unfair commercial practice. Previous to the adoption of the Directive, duty of 
information was contained in sector specific directives on consumer contract law, 
characterized by high levels of mutual incoherency and with a presence of information 
overload on consumers which decreased the possibility of consumer to profit from 
presented information.  
 
Contrary to the previously existing contract law approach, the UCPD has introduced a 
universal duty of information which applies to all types of consumer contracts. This 
obligation is drafted in such a manner that enables taking into consideration real 
consumer behaviour, as well as all circumstances of a particular case, while deciding 
whether information has been duly fulfilled which is not the case with directives on 
consumer contract laws and thus represents an improved regulatory response to the 
problem of asymmetry of information between trader and consumer.  
 
Moreover, depending on the relevance of a particular situation for consumer’s 
decision making process, a distinction regarding information requirements is made. 
Therefore, when a commercial communication is an invitation to purchase, imposed 
information duties are stricter. This division of information requirements is also 
important since it has also brought a European meaning of invitation to purchase, a 
par excellence contract law term, which has now received its own European meaning, 









































CHAPTER V – REMEDIES 
 
Introduction: Remedies and enforcement in EU Consumer Law  
In this Chapter of my thesis, I examine the relationship between the law on unfair 
commercial practices and contract law from a perspective of remedies where a vibrant 
mutual interlink is present. The Directive has introduced a well-developed and 
complex three-step mechanism that secures that any unfair commercial practice is 
prohibited. However, contrary to its rather exhaustive substantive provisions, the rules 
of the UCPD are very limited when it comes to remedies and enforcement. These few 
provisions show that the Directive is focused on the collective dimension of 
enforcement, whereas individual enforcement is left aside.719  
 
What has remained untouched by the Directive is the right to redress of an individual 
consumer who was a victim of an unfair commercial practice through providing him 
with an adequate individual remedy.720 In that aspect, the question of particular 
importance is the effect of the occurrence of unfair commercial practices on the 
validity of a contract term or the entire contract which was concluded as a 
consequence of a trader’s unfair commercial practice and what an individual 
consumer can do in such situations. 
 
As a result of the lack of individual remedies prescribed by European legislation, 
consumers have to rely on traditional, national contract laws and, in particular, on the 
national rules about consent defects. The capability and capacity of existing contract 
law concepts to remedy the consequences of unfair commercial practices is, however, 
disputable. Consequently, contract law has to be modified and amended to adequately 
respond to the introduction of the rules on unfair commercial practices. Moreover, the 
presence of similarities between the concepts brought by the provisions on misleading 
and aggressive practices of the Directive and national contract rules on consent defect 
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is certainly noticeable. The presence of these similarities resulted in modification of 
existing and development of new contract law remedies. Such a process is of a rather 
spontaneous character as a consequence of strict formal separation between the law on 
unfair commercial practices and contract law.721 Accordingly, the UCPD does not 
establish an imperative duty of Member States to modify their contract laws in order 
to remedy consequences of unfair commercial practices, but its transposition into 
national legal systems had effects on contract law.  
 
Further to this, from a perspective of remedies, a correlative interaction between the 
provisions on unfair commercial practices with the existing rules of European contract 
law is noticeable. Accordingly, the consumer may rely on contract law remedies, as 
forms of individual redress, established by diverse directives in the area of consumer 
contract law. In addition to this, the UCPD has brought an additional level of 
protection to consumer’s contractual rights, since the breach of any of consumer’s 
contractual rights will typically represent a form of unfair commercial practice. 
 
 
Remedies and enforcement under Directive 2005/29/EC 
General approach towards enforcement by the UCPD 
The principle of effective judicial protection 
The principle of effective judicial protection is one of the fundamental principles of 
EU Law, identified in articles 6 and 13 ECHR which all Member States of the EU are 
a part of and confirmed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. In its judgment in Alassini, the ECJ confirmed a mandatory 
obligation of Member States to secure consumer’s right to effective judicial protection 
and access to justice.722 Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty in its Article 81(2) established a 
legal basis for adoption of common European legislation related to the access to 
justice or alternative resolution disputes, which do not need to have the objective of 
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strengthening of the internal market as it is required by article 114 TFEU, thus 
overcoming its limited scope of application.723 
 
Accordingly, consumers need to have guaranteed effective means in national legal 
systems to enforce their rights which are established by European legislation. Despite 
the existence of considerably developed European consumer legislation, the regulation 
of enforcement of consumer law has still remained primarily the competence of 
Member States. EU Consumer Law is focused on the provision of the rules of 
substantive character, whereas procedural issues are just briefly touched.  
 
Only few pieces of European legislation are exclusively dealing with the question of 
enforcement of consumer law and in particular those in Directive 2009/22/EC on 
injunctions724 as well as Regulation 2006/2004 on consumer protection 
cooperation.725 However, even these legal instruments are focused on the cross-border 
element of enforcement, rather than on national systems of enforcement. In addition to 
these two, Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative resolutions of consumer disputes726 
and Regulation 524/2013 on online resolutions of consumer disputes727 were adopted 
in order to provide unified rules and promote the alternative means to resolution of 
consumer disputes, providing a common principles on which all mechanism for 
alternative resolution of consumers throughout the European Union have to be based.  
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Procedural autonomy of Member States 
EU Law provides very vague and fragmented rules on enforcement of consumer law. 
This is also the case with the UCPD which, as it was well observed in the Opinion of 
Advocate General in Banesto, carries out only full harmonisation of substantive rules 
on unfair commercial practices, whereas much more freedom is left to Member States 
for regulation of procedural means for combating against unfair commercial 
practices.728 Accordingly, the Directive only imposes on Member States the obligation 
to adopt such systems of enforcement that will ensure that the adequate and efficient 
means for combating against unfair commercial practices exist under national laws.729  
 
In such a manner, the Directive has respected procedural autonomy of Member States 
in the regulation of enforcement enabling them to establish the rules in accordance 
with their needs and particularities of their national legal systems and society. 
However, the procedural autonomy is not absolute, but it is limited with the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness, as pointed out by the Court. Consequently, the 
requirement of adequate and efficient means needs to be understood in relation to 
these two principles. The principle of equivalence requires that the rules of Member 
States applied for enforcement of EU consumer law are not less favourable than those 
governing similar situations which are subject to domestic law. The principle of 
efficiency means that the national rules of Member States must not make it impossible 
in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by European Union 
law on consumer protection.730  
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The outcome of the lack of unified rules on enforcement is that there is a material 
divergence among national approaches towards enforcement of the rules of the UCPD 
as transposed in the national legal systems of Member States. This is particularly true 
regarding the national institutional patterns in charge of enforcement of consumer law 
where impact of EU Law is especially weak.731 Accordingly, on the one hand some 
Member States opted for enforcement through diverse public authorities, such as the 
consumer ombudsman (e.g. Sweden), diverse public authorities (e.g. Italy) or 
departments of the Ministry (e.g. Belgium). On the other hand, certain Member States 
rely primarily on private enforcement initiated by competitions (e.g. Germany).  
However, the majority of the countries combine the two approaches, public and 
private, towards enforcement.732  
 
The existence of such fragmentation and diversity of the regulation and approaches 
towards enforcement of the rules on unfair commercial practices results in a rather 
paradoxical situation bearing in mind the fact that substantive rules are characterised 
with highly praised and strictly enforced principles of maximum harmonisation.733 
Eventually, it is argued that the result of this paradox is that in reality a full 
harmonisation cannot be achieved, and what is obtained is merely a fake 
harmonisation - or as it has been said in French, la harmonisation de façade.734 
Moreover, cross-border unified action, as an advanced form of action in comparison 
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to coordinated action, among actors from two or more Member States is hardly 
possible as a consequence of the lack of unified rules.735  
 
The Commission is fully aware of that and this is why the enforcement of the rules on 
unfair commercial practices has been considered as an area into which additional 
efforts shall be invested in the future with the Commission taking a more prominent 
role, in particular when it comes to consistency in application of the Directive.736 For 
instance, one of the tools aimed at contributing to a more uniform application was the 
launching of the Unfair Commercial Practices Database in September 2010 that 
contains case law and legal scholarship from all Member States, but which remained 
with much effects and which is in need of more regular update of data.737 However, 
while awaiting more action of the Commission in that direction, the Court has already 
taken some important steps, as it can been in its decision in Köck.738 
 
Requirements for sanctions for breach of the UCPD 
Member States are also given wide autonomy when it comes to designing of penalties 
for breach of the UCPD where common European rules are also very limited. EU 
Consumer law only imposes to Member States an obligation to establish adequate 
penalties that would fulfill a general requirement of being effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive. These types of penalties are also required in case of breach of the rules of 
the UCPD.739 However, again the meaning of these requirements has not been further 
explained, neither by the text of the Directive nor by other pieces of consumer 
legislation that also applies to them referring it to the ECJ for clarification. 
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Eventually, in its judgement in Crédit Lyonnais, the Court provided some clarification 
to the meaning of these provisions, in particular what shall be understood as 
dissuasive.740 In that aspect, the ECJ has already established a rather general principle 
in relation to the breach of competition law that is always required to be followed by a 
dissuasive sanction.741 The subject of Crédit Lyonnais was not a provision of the 
UCPD itself, but one with the same wording regarding required sanctions for breach 
of the rules of Directive 2008/48/EC on consumer credit.742 The question referred to 
the ECJ by a French court was whether sanction provided by French law for creditor 
who failed to assess debtor’s creditworthiness before conclusion of a credit agreement 
shall be considered as dissuasive.743  
 
According to the French law, the provided sanction was that in such a case, a creditor 
looses the right to contractual interest rate, but once he has lost it, the creditor 
becomes entitled to a statutory rate which was, in this particular case, even slightly 
higher than the stipulated contractual rate. In other words, it may be noticed that 
creditor actually profited from his failure to fulfill the obligation. In order to reach its 
decision, the Court compared the seriousness of the sanction established by French 
law with the severity of the infringement, in particular verifying whether such a 
penalty is of genuinely dissuasive effect. Eventually, the ECJ came up with an 
unsurprising conclusion that this particular sanction does not fulfill the requirement of 
being genuinely dissuasive as required by EU Law.744  
 
Moreover, the ECJ also gave some clarification on how fulfillment of requirement of 
dissuasiveness shall be interpreted by the national courts. Accordingly, a sanction will 
not be considered as genuinely dissuasive and thus it will not be in line with EU Law 
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in case when the amount that a creditor should receive in case of his failure to fulfill 
the obligation is not significantly smaller than the amount which creditor would have 
received if he had fulfilled his obligation.745 This judgement of the Court is certainly 
useful for better understanding of what shall be required for penalties for breach of the 
rules on unfair commercial practices.  
 
Limitation of procedural autonomy through substantive rules  
Despite the formal recognition of procedural autonomy of Member States limited only 
with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, the decision of the ECJ in Köck 
shows a rather fragile character of this autonomy which may be easily shaped by the 
judicial activity of the Court.746 In lack of clear and concrete procedure rules, this is 
done through the interpretation of the substantive rules of the UCPD as tactics used by 
the Court to intrude into the areas of law that have not been harmonized.  
 
Such a phenomenon does not represent anything particularly innovative or surprising. 
The ECJ already had the same approach in case of Directive 93/13/EEC unfair 
contract terms, developing a significant case law that has materially affected 
procedural autonomy of Member States and shaped national rules on enforcement,747 
spreading it subsequently also to some other areas of consumer law, such as consumer 
sales under Directive 99/44/EC on sales of consumer goods and associated 
guarantees.748 In such a manner, the Court through its judicial activity has become a 
powerful and important instrument for Europeanization of private law in the areas 
where there is a lack of common European legislation.749 
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In Köck, the ECJ had to assess the legality of provision on clearance sales as defined 
by the Austrian Federal Law on Unfair Competition through which Austria transposed 
the provisions of the UCPD in its national legal system. This provision represented a 
form of preventive measure requiring traders to acquire permission from relevant state 
authority in case of their intention to initiate clearance sales previous to the 
commencement of the sales. Namely, in case of clearance sales, ex ante system of 
protection from the unfair commercial practices seems to be relevant since ex post 
seems inefficient due to the fact that one clearance sales has ended, trader will 
probably not exist anymore, so no sanction could be effective. This was well pointed 
out by the Austrian government to which the Advocate General agreed.750  
 
However, the Court did not agree with the Advocate General and approached this 
provision not from a procedural perspective, but rather considering it as an explicitly 
envisaged form of unfair commercial practice that allows prohibition of a commercial 
practice without performance of fairness assessment under the hierarchical three-step 
mechanism. Consequently, such Austrian rules were found to be contrary to the 
UCPD and its maximum harmonisation character.751  
 
In its judgement, the Court pointed out that it is true that the anticipatory or preventive 
measures can be in some cases more adequate and more appropriate than subsequent 
measures, but this shall only apply in case of such commercial practices „whose 
nature makes such measures necessary with a view to combating unfair commercial 
practices“.752 Moreover, these measures must not simply prohibit commercial 
practices under the assumption that they are unfair without assessing them in 
accordance with the assessment system provided by the Directive.753  
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While deciding, the Court was faced with the dilemma between the requirements of 
maximum harmonisation as applied to substantive provision of the Directive on the 
one hand and the procedural autonomy left to the Member States to regulate 
enforcement of unfair commercial practices’ rules on the other side. Eventually, 
priority was given to the maximum harmonisation spreading the scope of the UCPD 
materially and narrowing the procedural freedom of Member States.  
 
Despite the fact that Court left the possibility to national legal systems to introduce or 
maintain national rules that would ex ante verify whether a practice is unfair, such a 
possibility in practice, after this decision, is very limited indeed. Through introduction 
of such limitation, the Court diminishes the scope and impact of inevitable 
consequences of procedural autonomy which result in a divergence of approaches 
among Member States.754 Consequently, the judgement in Köck shows well how the 
Court is interfering with procedural rules of Member States through the substantive 
rules of the Directive.  
 
Collective enforcement  
The approach of the UCPD towards enforcement 
Collective redress is an instrument of procedural law that enables unification of many 
single claims or mobilisation of diffused interests into one single claim for the reasons 
of procedural efficiency and effectiveness. In the context of consumer law, it refers to 
two essential demands that can be made. The first is the injunctive relief, as a request 
to traders to stop with an illegal behaviour and breaching of consumer law. The 
second one is compensatory relief as a demand to traders to provide compensation for 
the suffered damages that have occurred as a consequence of their illegal behaviour.  
 
Due to the particularities of the system of consumer protection, collective redress 
plays an essentially important role in securing effective protection of consumer rights. 
In her Opinion in Invitel, the Advocate General explained well what is the purpose of 
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collective redress from a perspective of consumer law. She pointed out that „[t]he 
successful enforcement of rights by way of a collective action creates a just balancing 
of the interests of consumers and undertakings, ensures fair competition and shows 
that collective actions are just as necessary as individual actions in order to protect the 
consumer“.755 Accordingly, there has been a noticeable tendency of increasing and 
emphasising a more prominent role of collective redress by the national legal systems 
of Member States.756  
A generic term of collective redress incorporates many diverse forms of collective 
enforcement of consumer law that may be divided into four main groups: 
representative action, group action, model or test case and class action (US style).757 
Contrary to this complex character of collective redress, individual redress represents 
a more traditional approach, which is used as a means for enforcing of the rights by an 
individual, in particular a consumer, whose rights were breached.  
 
A significantly important role of collective redress is that it plays in  enforcement of 
consumer law is the outcome of several mutually tightly interlinked factors that 
challenge the effectiveness, capacity and applicability of traditional individual redress 
to address adequately and always the occurrence of breaches of consumer law. First, 
consumers’ knowledge about the existence and content of their rights is rather limited. 
Second, even in cases when they are familiar with their rights, particularly as a 
consequence of all the efforts aimed to educate consumers about their rights, the 
problem that remains is inconstant willingness and motivation of consumers to 
enforce their rights, as well as the familiarity and accessibility of the mechanisms they 
may use to enforce their rights.  
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Third, a particularly important element of accessibility is of the financial nature and 
the costs of enforcement, in particular if it is a litigation before the court. Fourth, the 
value of the product which would be the subject of the case is typically of low value 
which additionally decreases the motivation of an individual consumer. Fifth, fighting 
for the rights can be time consuming. Sixth, consumers may have doubts against 
whom they should complain in certain cases: seller, producer, importer or 
distributor.758 
 
The provisions on enforcement as provided by the Articles 11 to 13 of the UCPD, 
though being few and vague, are focused on the collective dimension of 
enforcement.759 A rather reluctant approach of the Directive towards defining any 
rules for individual enforcement has been well described as if according to the 
Directive it represented a stepchild of enforcement.760 Such an approach is the result 
of the fact that the UCPD was designed to primarily protect economic interests of 
many consumers rather than the economic interests of an individual consumer, 
approaching thus consumers rather as a generic category than as individuals.761 
 
The UCPD and Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions 
Through its emphasising of the collective dimension of envisaged redress the UCPD 
makes a tight liaison with the provisions of Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions, as 
one of few pieces of European legislation on procedural issues. Accordingly, this 
directive contributes to a more uniformed application of the UCPD throughout the 
European Union, also introducing some common rules on collective redress. Directive 
2009/22/EC is aimed at securing cross border protection of consumers, in particular 
when consumers in one Member State are affected by activities of a trader from 
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another Member State. This is especially applicable in the context of the UCPD since, 
for instance, an advertising coming from one country may also affect consumers in 
other country.   
 
Directive 2009/22/EC secures that there shall be always an action for injunction 
possible when collective interests of consumer have been harmed as a consequence of 
breach of EU consumer legislation, including the UCPD, as transposed in the national 
legal systems of Member States.762 The required condition of collective interests is an 
abstract notion, that does not mean a simple accumulation of individual interests, but 
it is more than that. The innovative character of this notion was pointed out as being 
potentially incomprehensible to national courts and the existing frameworks of civil 
procedure laws.763 
 
As persons and entities entitled to seek protection of collective interests of the 
consumer when they are harmed, this directive appoints qualified entities. 
Accordingly, qualified entities in one Member State are allowed to ask the court or 
administrative authority of the other Member State to issue measures of cessation or 
prohibition of any breach of consumer law that infringes collective interests of 
consumer in the first Member State. However, despite the fact that Directive 
2009/22/EC is focused on cross border dimension of injunction, it is also relevant 
from a perspective of national laws since it represents the benchmark according to 
which national collective remedies have to be evaluated.764 
 
In accordance with the freedom left to them by Directive 2009/22/EC, Member States 
have recognized the status of qualified entities to diverse subjects, as well as to 
diverse numbers of qualified entities. It is possible to make a distinctions between 
three approaches towards qualified entities. The first group would include those 
                                              
762 Article 1(1) of Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions 
763 C Poncibo, ‘The Reform of Directive 98/27/EC’ in F Cafaggi and HW Micklitz (eds), New Frontiers of 
Consumer Protection – The Interplay Between Private and Public Enforcement (Intersentia 2009), 288 
764See HW Micklitz, ‘A common approach on the collective enforcement of Unfair Commercial Practices and 




countries that recognize consumer organization(s) as the only qualified entities, for 
instance the Netherlands or Portugal. The second one would include those countries 
that consider only a State body as a qualified entity, as is the case for Ireland or 
Sweden.  
 
Eventually, the third category is a mixed one, both consumer organizations and State 
entities have the recognized right to ask for injunctions, as it is the case with Spain or 
Cyprus. Moreover, among the countries, the number of qualified entities differ, 
between one and several dozens. For instance, in Sweden there is only, Consumer 
ombudsman, whereas there are seventy-seven in Germany or seventy-one Greece.765 
Moreover, the Directive also entitles Member States to freely decide before which 
institution, the injunction process will be lead. Accordingly, Member States have 
opted between the courts and administrative authorities.  
 
Further Europeanisation of collective redress 
Directive 2009/22/EC has brought only partial and fragmented rules in relation to 
collective redress and in last couple of years there has been a strong advocacy in 
favour of introduction of a more developed set of European rules on the collective 
enforcement of consumer law as a necessary means for effective protection of 
consumers throughout the European Union.766 Consumer groups also insist, as was 
heard at the last European Consumer Summit which took place 2013.767 Herein, it 
needs to be noted that the discourse on defining a complete set of rules on collective 
redress on the European level is not anything impressively innovative, but that it has a 
long tradition which dates back to 1984 and the Memorandum that the Commission 
published on Consumer Redress.768 However, there was lack of political will to 
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Europeanize this more sensitive question. The discussions were more focused on 
resolving the dilemma on how to regulate this area, than regarding the consensus on 
the need for adoption of collective redress. 
 
In that aspect, particular concern is related to the impact that US consumer law may 
have on EU Consumer Law.769 Namely, the US was the first jurisdiction where class 
action was allowed and developed. In the United States today, the class action 
represents a very much used means of enforcing consumer law that has maximally 
diminished the role of the State in the system of protection of consumers. It is beyond 
this thesis to assess and compare this system with the European approach, but herein I 
just want to emphasize the significance of class action in the US.   
 
Mentioning just briefly, from a European perspective, the US class is exposed to 
severe criticism.  It has been pointed out that it is in no case suitable for Europe due to 
its potential abuse and frivolous character when class action is used not as means for 
protection of consumers’ rights and interests, but for exclusively pecuniary interest of 
the people leading the class action and this is why another model of class action was 
suggested for the European Union.770 However, such a characterization of the 
American system was described as being incorrect since the competent courts have 
proven their effectiveness when it comes to screening on non-meritorious suits.771 
 
In the EU Consumer Policy strategy 2007-2013, the Commission identified collective 
enforcement as one of the key priorities for future action and pointed out that the 
introduction to collective redress mechanism both in case of breach of competition 
and of breach of consumer law will be assessed and considered.772 As the first 
outcomes of this policy dedications, in case of competition law, a White Paper was 
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published in April 2008, whereas in November of the same year, the Green Paper on 
consumer collective redress in non-competition cases was issued, proposing diverse 
potential options for the future action.773 It was possible to see a rather radically 
different view of consumer group and industries on how to proceed with collective 
redress.774 
 
Eventually, in June 2013, the Commission published the Recommendation in which it 
recommended that all Member States should have collective redress mechanism in the 
area of consumer protection in order to ensure the consumer’s access to justice.775 The 
Recommendation in accordance with its legal nature contains non-binding principles 
that Member States are expected to develop in their national legal systems by mid 
2015. The purpose of the Recommendation is to overcome the existing divergent 
approaches towards collective redress, at least to some extent. 
 
The main objective of the Recommendation is to motivate Member States to have 
systems of collective redress that allows seeking both for an injunctive and the 
compensatory relief. Moreover, the envisaged collective redress procedure in the 
national laws of Member States shall be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively 
expensive.776 Certain important procedural safeguards are introduced in order to 
protect traders from abuse of the right.  
 
Again, even after the principles of the Recommendation is fully implemented in 
practice, the enforcement will still remain a combination of judicial and administrative 
enforcement where most important roles will be played by Member States and where 
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the Commission is given only residual competences.777 The reluctance of the 
Commission to introduce binding common European rules on consumer protection is 
explained by the fact that EU Consumer Law as it stands now is primarily market 
oriented and dedicated to achievement of market oriented goals, whereas it misses a 
social perspective and thus it does not address the requirements of consumers.778 
 
Collective redress in the ECJ case law 
In the case of consumer contract law, the ECJ has already confirmed the significance 
that a positive action taken by a person not related to a particular consumer contract 
plays in securing of effectiveness of protection consumer rights, bearing in mind the 
existing inequality between contractual parties where such an action represents 
sometimes the only manner to protect consumers.779 In this case law, the ECJ 
primarily referred to the crucially important role that consumer organisations shall 
have in enforcing of the rights granted to consumers under EU Law, emphasising in 
such a manner the relevance of collective element of protection.  
 
However, the Court pointed out that this right shall be given only to the persons or 
organizations which have a legitimate interest in taking these actions. Through 
introduction of this legitimacy requirement, the Court seems to protect from the 
‘Americanisation’ of the European concept of collective redress.780 In other words, 
collective redress is encouraged since it is essential for securing protection of 
consumer rights, but it shall be allowed only to those who would initiate collective 
redress with the aim of protecting consumers and not to those who would do it due to 
their lucrative interests.  
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From the perspective of consequences of collective redress, the judgment of the ECJ 
in Invitel is particularly important.  In this case, the Court has dealt with the 
consequences of collective redress represented by a Hungarian consumer organisation, 
the Court identified erga omnes effects of the decision adopted as a result of such 
collective redress. Accordingly, the national court is required „to draw all the 
consequences provided for by national law in order to ensure that consumers who 
have concluded a contract to which those GBC apply will not be bound by that 
term“.781 This decision shows that the consequences of collective redress are not 
necessarily only limited to issuing of order to trade for cessation of breaching of 
consumer law or demanding compensation of damages, but that they can also touch 
upon contract law issues, as it was in particular in this case in relation to a validity of a 
contract term.  
 
Individual enforcement  
The UCPD and individual redress 
Generally speaking, individual redress was identified as an area where many more 
efforts are required in order to improve the access to justice of an individual 
consumer.782 For instance, the capacity of the ordinary courts, as the places which a 
majority of individual consumers obtain access to enforce their individual rights 
seems rather problematic together with the usage of general procedures of civil law 
which results in negative impact of enforceability of consumer law by individual 
consumers.783 
 
From a perspective of improvement of position of a consumer as initiator of individual 
redress, the UCPD is of no benefit. Namely, the rules on individual redress in case of 
breach of the provisions of the UCPD are exclusively provided by the national laws of 
Member States. According to the UCPD, protection of rights of individual consumers 
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who were victims of unfair commercial practices as well as private law consequences 
of unfair commercial practices are beyond its scope. As pointed out by the Directive 
itself, it is supposed to be „without prejudice to individual actions brought by those 
who have been harmed by an unfair commercial practice“.784 The lack of the 
individual remedies is the result of strong opposition of some Member States towards 
their introduction, in particular from Germany.785  
 
Consequently, the consumer, a victim of an unfair commercial practice, shall typically 
rely on the existing contract law concepts, such as fraud or duress, though no formal 
link has been made. Contrary to this, in some cases, there may be also a question of 
whether there are consequences for the fact that there was a consent defect for the 
assessment of fairness of a commercial practice. For instance, in case when an 
individual the consumer decides directly to go to the civil law court to ask for contract 
annulment on the basis of a fraudulent advertising message, and the court may annul 
the contract on the grounds that the consumer was misled by the trader, so the 
question is what shall be the effects of that decision regarding the fairness of a 
commercial practice.  
 
In that context of what seems particularly problematic is the lack of link between 
collective and individual redress that the provisions of the Directive do not resolve.786 
This is why consumer groups have advocated strongly in favour of introduction of an 
explicit linking point in the Directive that would link its provisions with contract law 
remedies in case of contracts concluded under the influence of unfair commercial 
practices enable such consumer to easily terminate such contract.787 Herein, it is 
important to underline that an unfair commercial practice shall be always be subjected 
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to injunctions and penalties, irrespectively of potential and applicable remedies that an 
individual consumer, victim of unfair commercial practice may have under the 
national law.788 
 
Development of individual redress? 
The remaining question is what kind of redress should an individual consumer be 
entitled to in case of a trader’s engagement in an unfair commercial practices that has 
affected him. In that sense, Keirsbilck argues in favour of adoption of a common 
European remedy whose main goal would be to return the consumer to the position in 
which the consumer was before the unfair commercial practice took place, i.e. as if the 
unfair commercial practiced had not occurred.789  
 
Certain national legal systems developed particular new individual legal remedies for 
consumers, victims of unfair commercial practices. However, in the majority of 
European legal systems individual consumers can still rely only on the existing legal 
doctrines of national contract laws, in particular those on consent defects. By a general 
rule, a misleading practice will give grounds for application of the contract law rules 
on fraud, where an aggressive commercial practice corresponds to the national rules 
on violence.  
 
The question of the significance of an unfair commercial practice and whether there 
was an unfair commercial practice immediately fulfills the criteria for a fraud (dol). It 
was pointed out that the fact that there was a unfair commercial practice improves 
„the  chances  of  the  consumer  to  avoid  a  contract  by  arguing  lack  of  
consent“.790However, no formal interlink has been made and this has remained 
primarily a doctrinal dilemma since, so far, no court decisions can be found that 
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would clarify this relationship. A possible explanation may be that there was simply 
no need for such a clarification because the existing legal doctrines provides a 
satisfactory protection to consumers. 
  
The general principle in private law Ex turpi causa non oritur action, which points out 
that no-one shall profit from its own illegal acts, would not support the claim of a 
trader who insists on a maintenance of a contractual relationship that resulted from an 
unfair commercial practice. Private redress is particularly problematic. The 
approaches of Member States towards regulation of private redress materially differ. 
Some Member States have recognised it. For instance, in Ireland, according to the 
Consumer Protection Act 2007, a consumer who is aggrieved by an unfair commercial 
practice has the right of action for damages that include exemplary damages.791  
 
In practice, the cases where a trader will use unfair commercial tactics with the 
purpose of attracting consumers are not rare. However, in certain cases, before 
conclusion of a contract, traders will correct its unfair commercial practice saying that 
actually something else is a real truth, and the consumer will decide to enter the 
contract in any case, with full knowledge of correct information. Despite the fact that 
a commercial practice is found to be unfair, and that a contract has been concluded as 
an outcome of such a practice, such a contract is, from the perspective of the rules on 
consent defects perfectly valid. This is why it shall be very cautious while deciding 
about potential individual legal remedies for a consumer who is a victim of unfair 
commercial practices.  
 
Impact on existing contract law remedies 
Diverse forms of impact  
Certain provisions of the UCPD show a high level of resemblance to the existing 
traditional contract law concepts established in the national legal systems. That is 
particularly the case with contract law remedies in case of consent defects which show 
                                              




substantial and teleological similarities with three small general clauses of the 
Directive: misleading actions, misleading omissions and aggressive practices. In the 
previous Chapter on the Duty of information of the thesis, it was possible to observe 
how closely interlinked are the provisions on the misleading omissions and the 
national rules on fraud where informed consent of consumer is endangered by a 
trader’s failure to provide material information to a consumer which results in the 
consumer taking a transactional decision he would have not otherwise taken. The fact 
that there was an unfair commercial practice will be an important factor that the courts 
will certainly take into consideration while deciding on a claim made by consumer on 
the grounds of consent defects.792  
 
In that aspect, particularly noticeable is a potential impact of the concepts established 
by these three small general clauses on traditional contract law remedies available in 
case of fraud or duress. As a consequence of the lack of provided individual remedies, 
in case of contracts concluded under impact of misleading or aggressive selling, the 
consumer will have to rely on already established contract law remedies. Through the 
same objective of protection, i.e. free and informed consent of consumer while 
entering into a contract, but still to a certain extent different understanding of what 
shall be understood as free and informed content, these provisions of the UCPD 
measures represent a form of irritant to the settled ways of private law.793 
Consequently, through the porous nature of these provisions, the concepts of the 
UCPD are capable of affecting these traditional national concepts.794 This is pointed 
out with such a high probability that it is described, at least when it comes to the UK 
courts, that „it would be remarkable if courts were not pressed to develop concept s 
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such as misrepresentation, duress and undue influence“.795 The same observations are 
made for the French law and its provisions on consent of defects.796 
 
Importantly, the Directive representing the first European instrument that shall apply 
to all commercial practices, and thus ipso facto as a result of tight connection between 
commercial practices and consumer contract, also applies to all consumer contracts. 
The UCPD has also finally made a distinction in contract law between general 
contract law and consumer contract law.797 It is true that such a distinction already 
existed in a majority of the legal systems, but the Directive is the first legal instrument 
that has formalized this distinction from a European perspective.  
 
In general contract law, a starting presumption is that contractual parties are always 
equal, whereas in case of consumer contract, the initial approach is from the inequality 
of the contractual powers, where consumer is regarded as the significantly weaker 
party. This differentiation of approaches is particularly relevant when it comes to 
interpretation of both the law and the facts of a case since that is an aspect where the 
interaction between the rules on unfair commercial practices and contract law seem to 
be particularly noticeable.798  
 
The rules on misleading actions and fraud 
The Directive prohibits any form of misleading action that causes or is likely to cause 
consumer to take a transactional decision he would have not taken otherwise.799 The 
UCPD provides a very complex definition of what is meant under misleading actions. 
The essential principle is that a commercial communication must not contain any kind 
of untrue information. Consequently, as misleading may be considered only those 
information whose correctness may be verified and not the information for which 
                                              
795 C Willett, ‘Fairness and Consumer Decision Making Under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’ 
(2010) 33 Journal of Consumer Policy 247, 253 
796 H Collins ( n 706) 114 
797 L Miller The Emergence of EU Contract Law: Exploring Europeanization (Oxford University Press 2011), 
21 
798 S Whittaker (n 794) 149 




assessment aesthetic or emotional criteria apply, as it could be the case with 
advertising of the most beautiful beach on the Mediterranean Sea.800 
 
Moreover, even if the provided information is true, a commercial communication will 
be considered as unfair if it, primarily in the context of overall information, misleads 
consumer. Such a definition shows a clear intention of broad understanding and 
application of the rules on misleading actions.801 It is also very tightly connected with 
the rules on misleading omissions. This is because the trader provides some true 
information, but some other information is missing for having an overall clear picture. 
In accordance with the internal market objective of the Directive, this second 
possibility of misleading action should be interpreted restrictively since there is not 
such a clear lie of trader as in case of untruthful information.   
 
It is noticeable that the Directive besides the general prohibition of provision of untrue 
information, also prohibits the usage of true information that through the manner in 
which it is presented may mislead the consumer. In Mars the provided information 
was true, but the context in which it was presented was considered as misleading by 
the German court since despite the fact it was true that product was increased for 10%, 
consumers could have been misled that the price of the product remained the same or 
that the product was enlarged for more than 10% since the sign covered more than 
10% of the label’s surface. However, the ECJ did not agree with the German approach 
under the justification that such a form of labelling is not capable of misleading an 
average consumer.802  
 
The necessary pre-condition for applications of these rules is that the untrue 
information, or the overall presentation of true information, influences consumers’ 
transactional decisions. The mere likelihood that the consumer may perform a 
                                              
800 T Wilhelmsson, ’Misleading Practices’ in G Howells, HW Micklitz, and T Wilhelmsson, European Fair 
Trading Law–The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (Ashgate 2006), 128 
801 Ibid, 126 




transactional decision is sufficient for fulfillment of this condition. The meaning of 
transactional decision is to be interpreted very broadly. Besides contract conclusions 
which are the most obvious example, it also includes the negative decision of 
consumer: not to purchase certain product. The Guidance to the UCPD enlists as the 
examples of obvious transactional decisions „placing an order, making a reservation, 
accepting a commercial offer“.803 
 
Six elements of misleading actions 
The Directive enlists six diverse groups of facts in relation to which untrue 
information shall be provided in order to constitute a form of misleading action. From 
the wording of the Directive, it seems that these elements are directed primarily to the 
second limb of the rule on misleading actions which provides that a commercial 
practice which contains a true information will be unfair if its overall context would 
mislead the consumer, whereas the untrue information is prohibited in any case. 
 
These six elements are defined in such a broad manner to include all possible 
situations so this question does not seem to be particularly important from a practical 
point of view. These elements include, inter alia, the existence or nature of the 
product, the main characteristics of the product, the extent of the trader’s 
commitments, the motives for the commercial practice, the price or the manner in 
which the price is calculated, the need for a service, part, replacement or repair, the 
nature, attributes and rights of the trader or his agent as well as provision of any false 
information regarding consumer’s rights. 
 
Besides a general prohibition of the usage of untruthful information, the Directive 
indicates two additional examples of misleading actions. The first one is the unlawful 
creation of any confusion with a product, trademark, trade name or a distinguishing 
mark of a competitor. In case of trademark law, it should not be neglected that the 
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prohibition of the unfair competition was firstly prohibited by Paris Convention on 
Intellectual Property of 1883. Through this provision, the Directive also influences 
trademark law since the breach of trademark will also be considered an unfair 
commercial practice.  
 
The second type of particular form of misleading actions is the breach of the code of 
conduct by which a trader is bound. In this case, it is noticeable that there is no 
classical fraudulent behaviour of the trader, but it is rather the breach of a required 
manner of behaviour that is sanctioned. In case of private regulation, the Directive 
gives an additional strength to private regulation since it is now binding also from a 
public (state) legislation perspective. The private regulation also plays a role in case of 
the two limbs of the general clause. Consequently, the UCPD breach of private 
regulation is sanctioned by a piece of state (public) legislation.  
 
Shifting of burden of proof 
A very important question in law is who shall bear a burden of proof. In case of 
misleading actions, the question is who should prove that the information provided in 
a commercial practice was unfair. In general contract law, it is always one person who 
claims that certain information is false, to prove its falsity. This is the case with the 
national rules on fraud.  
 
Despite the initial intention to include a clear rule in the Directive which provided that 
marketing information shall be understood as false if they cannot be proven by a 
trader,804 the adopted version of the Directive did not follow the proposal, but only 
adopted a significantly less powerful rule in the part of the Directive dealing with 
procedural elements which necessitate  Member States „to require the trader to furnish 
evidence as to the accuracy of factual claims in relation to a commercial practice if, 
taking into account the legitimate interest of the trader and any other party to the 
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proceedings, such a requirement appears appropriate on the basis of the circumstances 
of the particular case“.805  
 
In case of the demand for the annulment of the contract that was concluded as a 
consequence of unfair commercial practice before general civil law court, in lack of 
any particular consumer law provisions, the consumer would have to base his claim 
on the grounds of fraud as defined by general contract law rules. The question is how 
the general civil law court would approach the question of burden of proof. The court 
would probably consider that the burden of proof lays with the trader. In its case law 
in the bordering area of the European legislation on trademark, the Court has already 
pointed out that it is on the party which invokes that has the right to use the 
competitor’s trademark to prove it.806  
 
In that sense, of particular importance is Article 12 of the UCPD. No answer on that, 
though it would be essentially important.807 Accordingly, the guidance says „[i]n 
order not to trigger the prohibition, traders must be able to substantiate any factual 
claims of this type with scientific evidence. The fact that the burden of proof rests on 
the trader appears to be a logical enforcement approach reflecting the principle, more 
broadly formulated in Article 12 of the Directive“.808 This is where the rules on 
misleading actions play an important role. They apply in cases of consumer contracts, 
independently of private law sanctions, when consumer contract has been concluded 
as a consequence of misleading actions, i.e. provision of untrue information or even in 
cases when true information has been provided but its overall context misled 
consumer.  
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In such a manner, consumers have received an additional level of consumer 
protection. For instance, in case of the requirements of conformity of the contract as 
defined by Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sale, misleading actions will apply in 
case if the consumer goods do not „comply with the description given by the seller“809 
or „show the quality and performance which are normal in goods of the same 
type…taking into account any public statements on the specific characteristics of the 
goods made by the seller…particularly in advertising or labeling“.810 
 
On the other hand, in cases when a misleading action results in a contract, the 
applicable remedies will be the rules on fraud. In some of the national contract laws of 
Member States, the mandatory condition for the application of the rules on fraud is 
that fraud represents the main reason due to which a party entered into a contract. If 
that is not the case and the party would have entered a contract even if it had know 
about the fraud, but under different conditions, the general rules on fraud are not 
applicable. In these kinds of situations, a contract cannot be rescinded, and only 
damages are awarded.  
 
The rules on misleading actions, however, equalize these two situations through a 
very broad provision of what is understood under the transactional decision. It was 
possible to see that condition for the application of the rules of misleading actions 
does not necessarily understand that a party was induced to enter into a contract, but 
also that he had concluded a contract under certain terms, this will also constitute a 
form of misleading action. 
 
Aggressive commercial practices and duress 
Besides protecting consumers from the unfair content of a commercial practice, the 
Directive also protects consumers from unfair approach by traders, securing thus his 
free consent to enter into a contract. The aggressive approach of traders is prohibited 
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since it is capable of negatively affecting consumers’ decision making process by 
materially impairing consumers’ freedom of choice.811 A prohibition of certain forms 
of aggressive behaviour can be found is some older piece of EU consumer legislation, 
but a general prohibition of all aggressive practices was missing.  
 
For instance, the Commission identified that consumers are particularly exposed to the 
pressure of the trader to acquire his product or use his services in case of door step 
selling when there is a moment of shock for the consumer and lack of time and means 
to think well and examine the price and characteristics of the offered product. This is 
why Directive 85/577/EEC on doorstep selling, as the EU consumer contract law 
instruement, provided a particular legal regime of protection for this kind of 
contracts.812 
 
In order to be prohibited, an aggressive practice has, according to the UCPD, first, to 
impair consumer’s freedom of choice, and, second, to cause him to take a 
transactional decision he would have not taken otherwise. In accordance with the 
average consumer as the main benchmark for assessment whether a practice is 
aggressive, a certain level of robustness is expected, which means that the impairment 
of freedom of choice is not so easy as in case of a vulnerable consumer.813 This must 
always be taken into consideration by a competent authority that applies the rules on 
unfair commercial practices.  
 
The examination of some of concrete examples of aggressive practices enlisted in 
Annex I of the Directive may show that aggressive behaviour of a trader towards the 
consumer shall have a very broad meaning so that it includes practices which are 
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rather irritating than aggressive.814 For instance, this would be the explicitly envisaged 
case of a traders’ „persistent and unwanted solicitations by telephone, fax, e-mail or 
other remote media“.815 The rules on aggressive practices also provide protection to 
all consumer’s contractual rights since imposition of any kind of onerous or 
disproportionate barrier by the trader on consumer so that he is allowed to enforce his 
contractual rights, will represent a form of aggressive commercial practice. This 
would be the case whenever a trader, in an illegitimate manner, disables consumers 
from enforcing his right of withdrawal by putting up a lot of administrative obstacles. 
  
Aggressive behaviour of traders was already, to a large extent, sanctioned by the 
national rules on contract and criminal law, but the UCPD extended this protection by 
adding a new layer of consumer protection through public law proceeding without the 
need to initiate a civil or criminal law proceeding.816 Consumer victims of aggressive 
practices will typically have to rely on the national contract law remedies for violence 
 
Understanding of aggressive practice 
According to the Directive, „[a] commercial practice shall be regarded as aggressive 
if, in its factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances, by 
harassment, coercion, including the use of physical force, or undue influence, it 
significantly impairs or is likely to significantly impair the average consumer’s 
freedom of choice or conduct with regard to the product and thereby causes him or is 
likely to cause him to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken 
otherwise“.817  
 
The very wide definition, includes a broad scope of unfair practices. It is possible to 
notice that the Directive has three main elements: first, the aggressive behaviour that, 
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secondly, impairs consumers’ freedom of choice and, third, and that such a behaviour 
will have the influence of consumer’s transactional decision. The third of the 
conditions is contained in all of the three small general clauses, and its analysis has 
shown that it is to be understood very broadly. Therefore, since there are no special 
particularities required for transactional decision making in case of aggressive 
behaviour than those relevant for misleading practices, I will focus on the first and 
second conditions and different aggressive manners in which trader can hinder 
consumers’ freedom of choice.     
 
According to the Directive, there are three manners of aggressive behaviour: 1) 
harassment, 2) coercion and, 3) undue influence. The Directive does not explain what 
is meant under harassment and coercion, where undue influence is defined as 
„exploiting a position of power in relation to the consumer so as to apply pressure, 
even with- out using or threatening to use physical force, in a way which significantly 
limits the consumer’s ability to make an informed decision“.818  
 
The reason why the Directive provides only the definition of the undue influence, and 
not of coercion and harassment lies in the fact that these two notions are innovative 
terms in private law, established as part of the strategy of construction of an original 
system of European private law which ideally will not be melted with the national 
legal systems. On the other, undue influence is a common law term for a form of 
consent defect. This explains why the definition has been provided to establish an 
autonomous, European, meaning of undue influence as contrary to the term of English 
law.  
 
The list of seven forms of aggressive practices enlisted in Annex I to the Directive 
which are always considered as unfair proves excellently how wide the potential 
scope of application of the rules on aggressive practices is. For instance, an aggressive 
practice will be the imposition of any kind of illegitimate obstacle for a shift from one 
                                              




mobile phone operator to the other phone. It is possible to notice that in this case no 
aggressiveness can be spotted, but again since it represents a form of an aggressive 
practice.  
 
In the case Purely Creative, the object of the preliminary reference before the ECJ 
was one of the seven explicitly enlisted forms of the aggressive practices, i.e. the 
interpretation of the provision which identifies the making of false impression that 
consumer has won a prize. The Court concluded that an aggressive practice will be the 
provision of false information that the consumer has already won a price whereas a 
consumer has to pay money or incur any cost regarding obtaining the information or 
the possession of the prize. The ECJ interpreted this provision very strictly and 
considered that in the occurrence of any kind of costs, irrelevant whether a trader will 
benefit from it, is sufficient. This prohibition is absolute.819The objective of ensuring a 
high level of consumer protection established by the Directive requires that no cost 
may imposed on the consumer who has won a prize.820 
 
The basis for such a prohibition is that informing a consumer that he has won the prize 
has a psychological effect on consumers that, considering that they  have won the 
price, make a transactional decision they would have not have otherwise made.821 
These costs might relate to, for example, calling of the premium rate telephone 
numbers to get additional information about the price, traveling at great expense to 
collect a priceless object or paying the delivery costs of a book consumer already 
owns.822 
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Adoption of new contract law remedies  
Formation of new remedies 
In certain cases, the UCPD caused an establishment of new contract law remedies. 
Namely, as a consequence of transposition of the rules of the Directive into their 
national legal systems, some Member States introduced new contract law remedies 
whose main objective is to provide adequate protection to an individual consumer 
who has concluded a contract under the impact of an unfair commercial practice.  
 
This is because the capacity of previously existing, traditional contract law remedies 
was not capable of adequately remedying the consequences of unfair commercial 
practices on an individual consumer.823 Since the UCPD itself does not provide any 
provision in that regard, some of the Member States developed new contract law 
remedies which facilitate consumers to remedy the negative consequences of unfair 
commercial practices.  
 
Belgian law 
Besides its significant influence on consumer contract law terminology,824 the UCPD 
also had influence on the expansion of contract law in Belgium. Accordingly, the 
Belgian Law on market practices and consumer protection in its general part on 
consumer contracts, provides that a consumer contract may be interpreted in particular 
according to the commercial practices that were directly connected to it.825  
 
Further to this, Belgian law developed a particular contract law remedy in case of 
breach of the rules on unfair commercial practices. This provision, first, allows to 
consumer to ask traders for reimbursement for the delivered product without the 
requirement to return the product to trader within reasonable period of time as of the 
moment when the consumer knew or was supposed to know about the existence of the 
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unfair commercial practice.826 Such a possibility is given to consumers not in all cases 
of trader’s engagement into unfair commercial practices, but only in case of six types 
of misleading and aggressive practices, which are considered particularly severe, from 
the list of thirty one practices of Annex I of the Directive as transposed into Belgian 
law.827  
 
Second, for the remaining cases of the unfair commercial practices, when a contract 
was concluded under the influence of an unfair commercial practice other than those 
six, the judge may order the trader to reimburse all the money that the consumer paid 
for a delivered product without the obligation of the consumer to return the product. 
The difference is that in the previously mentioned set of six cases the option to ask for 
reimbursement is on the consumer, whereas in the remaining cases, that is left to the 
discretionary power of the judge who shall decide.  
 
However, this remedy provided by Belgian law seems to have produced very limited 
effects in practice. Three main factors have been identified as the main reasons for 
non-extensive application of these rules: „1) the unclear application criteria, which 
make it hard to predict whether or not the remedy will be applied, 2) the fact that 
consumers will have to bear the costs of the procedure and compensate the trader in 
case they cannot convince the court to apply the remedy and 3) the fact that 
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According to the Luxembourgish law, besides a fine of up to 120 000 EUR for a 
trader who breaches the rules of Consumer Code on unfair commercial practices,829 a 
clause or all clauses of a consumer contract which are concluded as a consequence of 
unfair commercial practices are considered as null and void. The nullity can be 
invoked before the competent court only by the affected consumer.830 Consequently, 
this is a classic example of individual redress that Luxembourgish law has developed.  
 
French law 
Similarly to the case of Luxembourgish law, the French law introduced that a 
consumer contract concluded under the impact of an aggressive commercial practice 
is to be considered as nul et de nul effet.831 In other words, aggressive practice results 
in absolute nullity of contract. However, such effects are only limited to aggressive 
practices whereas in case of failure to present all material information in an 
advertisement or in case that they are not true, the applicable remedies will be the 
ones derived from general contract law on consent defects, and fraud (dol) in 
particular. Consequently, the consumer will be allowed to terminate the contract (art 
of Code Civil) and will have the right to ask for damages.832  
 
It is true that from the perspective of the directive making of such a distinction is 
legal, but it is again hard to explain why the French policy makers decided to 
introduce such a sanction only in case of aggressive practice, whereas in case of 
misleading practices general rules of contract law from Code Civil apply. The 
explanation may be found in the fact that misleading practices in French legal theory 
are considered as less harmful for consumer-to-business relations than aggressive 
practices.833 
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831 Article L. 122-15 of the French Consumer Code 
832 T Revet, J Rochfeld and C Peres,  ‘Les pratiques commerciales trompeuses sur les sources du droit des 
contrats’ (2008) 4 Revue des Contrats 1083 
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The United Kingdom 
In English law, the existing traditional doctrines on consent defects of private law 
were found to be unsatisfactory to provide an adequate legal protection for individual 
consumers. The problem was that the existing concepts of consent defects are not 
adapted to the UCPD and consumer needs. For example, consumers seldom use the 
concepts misrepresentation, duress and undue influence as defined under English 
contract law since they are complicated.834 Accordingly, this was the reason why after 
transposition of the UCPD in English law, the Law Commission initiated a process of 
introduction of private law redress in English law. The same initiative was launched in 
Scotland, by the Scottish Law Commission.  
 
The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission in their mutual Report on 
Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices pointed out the fact that 
the Unfair Trading Regulations of 2008 does not give a right to consumer to initiate 
himself an action in order to receive compensation or other remedies.835 This is why 
consumers „must rely on existing private law doctrines, such as the law of 
misrepresentation and duress. This is problematic: the law of misrepresentation is 
complex and uncertain; while the law of duress leaves gaps in protection“.836   
Accordingly, new remedies are about to be adopted in the UK, in particular the right 
to unwind as pointed out in Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014 
accepted by the British Government.837 
 
Poland 
In Poland, the consumer who was a victim of unfair commercial practice has the right 
to file a claim directly against traders and to ask for cancellation of the contract. 
                                              
834 G Howells, ‘Unfair Commercial Practices – Future directions’ in R Schulze and H Schulte-Nölke, European 
Private Law - Current Status and Perspectives (Sellier 2011), 137 
835  
836 Law Com No 332 and Scot Law Com No 226, Consumer Redress for misleading and aggressive practices, 






However, as a consequence of social and economic factors, i.e. primarily the 
consumer’s ignorance of their rights and lack of motivation, willingness and resources 
to ask for contract termination, the consumer rarely initiates individual actions against 
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Remedies under consumer contract law  
 
Contract law remedies of European contract law 
Despite the fact that, generally speaking, the rules on unfair of commercial practices 
are focused on the collective dimension of the protection of consumer interests, 
whereas the provisions of consumer contract law prevailingly deal with individual 
protection, an intense mutual interaction between these two sets of rules may be 
observed. This interaction and the mutual correlation will be examined in this part of 
the Chapter. To start with, on the one hand, the rules on unfair commercial practices 
may represent useful tools for consumers to secure their contractual rights and 
remedies that are granted to them by contract law instruments.  
 
On the other hand, a consumer who is victim of unfair commercial practices that 
resulted in the formation of a contract, besides relying on the traditional contract law 
concepts, in particular those on consumer defects, may also use some of the legal 
instruments that have been introduced by European contract law and transposed in 
national legal systems as remedies. Among them, provisions related to unfairness of a 
contract term, right to conformity, right of withdrawal and inertia selling seem to be of 
particular importance. These concepts may prove to provide, in certain cases, a very 
efficient protection to the consumer who has concluded a contract under the impact of 
unfair commercial practice.  
 
Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms  
The ambiguous relationship between the UCPD and the UTD 
Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract terms (“UTD” or “Directive 93/13/EEC”) is 
one of the most important instruments of EU Consumer Law. Adopted more than 
twenty years ago, it was the first piece of European legislation which introduced the 
concept of the duty of good faith into EU consumer law, though with limited effects 
being applied only to non-individually negotiated contract terms.  
 




terms in consumer contracts and continuous usage of such a practice by traders. In 
accordance with such a purpose of the UTD, Member States are required to secure 
that consumers are not bound by contract terms which are unfair.839 This is because 
traders traditionally had a common business practice of imposing the same contract 
terms to a large groups of consumers who, due to their lack of bargaining power and 
economic incentive, are not capable of imposing their own terms.840 Unlike the 
UCPD, the UTD is a directive that requires only minimum harmonisation.  
 
German law was the inspiration for the adoption of unified European rules both in the 
area of unfair commercial practices and the area of unfair contract terms since both of 
these branches of law have their roots based in the German legal tradition: The 
German Act on General Terms and Conditions of Trade (AGBG) and The German 
Unfair Competition Act (UWG).841 The objective of the UTD partially overlaps with 
the UCPD since the UTD is also aimed at protecting consumers from unfair behaviour 
of traders, in particular thorough prohibition of stipulation of contract terms in 
consumer contracts that are considered as unfair. This is why Advocate General 
Trstenjak calls for „a coherent interpretation of the relevant rules of law so as to avoid 
conflicting assessments, which is all the more necessary as the two directives 
demonstrate a convergence in the direction they take to afford protection, in as much 
as both seek to protect the ability to make judgments and the freedom of choice in 
business dealings“.842 
 
After the adoption of the UCPD, what remained imprecise was the relationship 
between the provisions of the two directives, in particular regarding their mutual 
correlation.843  On the one hand, it was unclear what were the consequences on a 
contract term of a situation when it is discovered that such a contract term was 
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840 HW Micklitz, N Reich and P Rott, Understanding EU Consumer Law (Intersentia 2009), 122 
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stipulated as a result of an unfair commercial practice. In particular, the question was 
whether an unfair commercial practice necessarily means that a contract term 
concluded as its outcome shall also be automatically declared unfair. In that aspect it 
was argued that the requirements of good faith in the fairness test of the UTD allows, 
and even obliges, the national courts to take into consideration the advertising 
practicing while assessing the fairness of a contract term.844 On the other hand the 
dilemma was whether usage of contract terms represents a form of unfair commercial 
practice.  
 
Herein, it is important to emphasise that there is difference among national legal 
systems regarding legal consequences of the cases when a contract term is found 
unfair. Accordingly, some of Member States, such as Germany, Spain or Romania, 
opted for the principle of absolute nullity, i.e. an unfair contract term is considered 
null and void. The relative nullity, i.e. that an unfair contract term is voidable and 
consumer may ask for its annulment, was also one of the choices of national 
legislators, for instance those in the Netherlands or the Czech Republic. However, in 
some of Member States (Belgium, Poland), it seems to be unclear what are the legal 
consequences of an unfair contract term. Scandinavian countries allow their courts to 
substitute or modify the unfair provisions in order to make them fair.845 This initial 
observation is important since it shows that the lack of unified approach towards 
effects of unfairness of a contract term among Member States, unlike in case of 
unfairness of commercial practice where in all countries there is unanimous 
prohibition of all practices which are found to be unfair.  
 
Indirect effects of unfair commercial practice on contract term 
The ambiguousness between the rules on unfair commercial practices and unfair 
contract terms was clarified by the ECJ in its judgment in Perenicova.846 This was a 
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case referred to the ECJ by a Slovak court in which the dispute arose over a consumer 
credit agreement whose several terms were challenged by consumers as being unfair. 
Especially problematic was the stipulated interest rate which was higher than the 
amount which had been initially presented to consumer before conclusion of the 
contract. One of the two main questions raised for a preliminary reference was 
whether provision of false information of the annual percentage rate in consumer 
credit contract represents a form of unfair commercial practice.847  
 
Furthermore, if the answer to this question was affirmative, the Court was asked 
whether this automatically leads also to the unfairness of a contract term which 
represents the result of such an unfair practice. In its judgment, the Court stated that 
provisions of untrue information of the annual percentage rate is to be considered as a 
form of misleading action.848   
 
Such an approach is in accordance with the rules on provision of false information to 
the consumer in relation to the price provision as defined by the UCPD.849 However, 
the unfairness of such a practice does not result directly in the unfairness of a contract 
term concluded as a consequence of such a practice, but it shall represent one of 
criteria that the national courts may take into consideration while assessing the 
fairness of a contract term as provided by the UTD.850 The explanation of the Court 
was primarily based on the formal separation between the two sets of rules introduced 
by the UCPD.851 As a consequence, the fact that a contract was concluded as a 
consequence of unfair commercial practice cannot have any kind of direct effect on 
the validity of a contract.  
                                              
847 The other question was exclusively related to the interpretation of the provisions of the UTD, so it is not 
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What seems particularly noticeable in Perenicova is the diversity of the view of the 
parties that submitted their observations on the case to the ECJ. In that sense, slightly 
surprising are the arguments of the Commission which in its submission to the Court 
asked for a very narrow and strict interpretation of article 3(2) of the UCPD arguing 
that any prescribed contract law consequence of an unfair commercial practice by 
national laws are to be considered as illegal and as being contrary to EU law and 
maximum harmonization character of the Directive.852 Bearing in mind the fact that 
article 3(2) of the UCPD was primarily introduced as a safeguard of national contract 
laws, representing an outcome of Member States’ opposition to any kind of 
interference into their contract law traditions, it is very surprising to notice that a view 
of the Commission is more extreme than of the Member States which participated in 
this case with their submissions.  
 
The Austrian Government claimed that the sanction of contract invalidity is to be 
considered as disproportionate, as well as contrary to article 3(2) of the UCPD, but did 
not argue that this article prohibits prescription of such effects in national laws.853 The 
submissions of the German and Slovak governments were materially more moderate 
and in line with the views of the Court pointing out that the fact that an unfair 
commercial practice may have influence on the fairness of contractual terms in 
accordance with rules on assessment of contract term fairness prescribed by article 4 
of the UTD.854  The Spanish Government argued for a much more consumer friendly 
interpretation claiming that an unfair commercial practice shall have effects on 
validity of consumer credit agreement if that is a more favourable approach for the 
consumer who has been affected by such a practice.855  
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However, in Perenicova, the Court confirmed its previous case law on the 
interpretation of article 6(1) of the UTD which required from national courts or other 
competent authorities to „draw all the consequences that follow under national law, so 
that the consumer is not bound by that term“.856 Further to this, competent national 
authority shall assess whether a contract can exist without the unfair contract term. 
Article 6(1) of the UTD itself, as it stands, does not allow the national authority to 
declare the entire contract void if such a contract can exit without the unfair term.  
 
The voidance of the entire contract may be provided only by Member States, in 
accordance with the principle of minimum harmonisation as prescribed by the UTD, 
under the condition that such a measure provides a better level of protection for the 
consumer.857According to the UTD a contract term is unfair when it was not 
individually negotiated, it is contrary to the requirements of good faith and this causes 
a significant imbalance in the mutual rights and obligations arising from consumer’s 
contract to the detriment of the consumer and this test must always be performed.  
 
In summation, two main consequences of the judgment are that, first, the stipulation 
of an unfair contract term will typically represent a form of unfair commercial 
practice, and, second, that the breach of the provisions of the UCPD does not have a 
direct effect on a validity of a contract or its term, but it will represent one of the 
factors that may be taken into consideration while deciding whether a term is unfair. A 
crucially important question is what this decision implies for the national legal 
systems since a diversity of approaches towards a validity of a contract, or a contract 
term, were identified as one of the most problematic issues in the application of the 
Directive.858 In other words, the question concerns which cases the consumer, as a 
victim of unfair commercial practices which resulted in a contract, will be actually 
able to rely on the rules on unfair contract terms as an effective remedy. 
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Which terms are covered? 
The scope of application of the UTD is limited exclusively to non-individually 
negotiated contract terms. This means that a term which has been individually 
negotiated falls out of the scope of the UTD. Initially, the Commission also intended 
to include in the scope of application of the directive the contract terms which were 
individually negotiated, but such an idea was eventually rejected.859 However, non-
individually negotiated terms are to be interpreted in a very broad manner.860 
 
Therefore, on the European level fairness of individually negotiated terms are only 
covered by the provisions of the UCPD, unless the scope of application of the UTD is 
widened under the national laws. Consequently, an individually negotiated contract 
term, if it is false, may represent a form of unfair commercial practice. Moreover, the 
UCPD protects consumers ex ante from unfair contract terms, since, under the 
condition they fulfill the requirements to be considered as unfair commercial 
practices, the terms will be prohibited before the contract is concluded.  
 
While examining the question posed by the referring court on the effects of unfair 
commercial practices in contracts, what has to be taken into consideration is the other 
question posed in the same request for preliminary reference: whether a consumer 
contract containing unfair contract terms is to be considered in its entirety as non-
binding for consumers if that is more advantageous for consumers. The Court in its 
answer opted for the objective approach, explaining that contracts will continue to 
exist without the unfair contract term if that is possible. Any advantages for 
consumers are not taken into consideration while deciding whether a contract may 
exist without the unfair contract term unless such a possibility has not been 
established under minimum harmonization principle advocated by the UTD.  
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It should not be neglected that the UTD has a limited scope of application, and applies 
only to non-individually negotiated terms, whereas the terms which were individually 
negotiated fall out of the scope of the directive. In certain cases, they may fall under 
the transparency requirements under  article 5 UTD, but legal consequences of breach 
of transparency requirements are not defined by EU Law. Moreover, Directive 
87/102/EEC on consumer credit, as noticed by the Advocate General, does not 
provide any legal consequences in case of incorrect indication of annual percentage 
rate.861  
 
Therefore, the follow-up question is what is the consequence for the contract or its 
term if its stipulation is not sanctioned by any EU legal instrument and the national 
legislation does not provide adequate legal mechanisms. This was probably on the 
mind of a judge in a Slovakian court who could see how disadvantageous these 
contracts for consumers could be. Considering that the Court might opt for the 
objective interpretation while deciding whether the entire contract containing unfair 
terms should be void, as it eventually did. The Court asked whether the fact that there 
was an unfair commercial practice could save consumers from the contract.  
 
Eventually, what is the outcome of Perenicova is that the unfair commercial practice 
cannot per se have any direct effects on the validity of the entire contract, but only on 
its terms, through the application of the rules on assessment of fairness of contract 
terms as established by the UTD. However, again this impact is limited only to the 
particular contract terms since the unfairness of a contract term will lead to the nullity 
of the entire contract only if the contract cannot continue to exist without these 
contract terms.  
 
As pointed out above, what remains problematic is when a particular contract term 
cannot be subsumed under the UTD. What are then the contractual consequences of 
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unfair commercial practices? The burden of regulating  consequences on a contract 
stipulated as an outcome of unfair commercial practice has remained with the Member 
States. However, the question is what if the Member States, as it is the case in 
Slovakia, do not provide an adequate mechanism for consumers in the case of 
contracts stipulated under the impact of unfair commercial practices? 
 
Transparency requirements  
Directive 93/13/EEC on contract terms imposes strict requirements on traders for full 
transparency of contract terms. In all cases when the consumer is provided with the 
terms of the contract in writing, these terms have to be drafted in plain, intelligible 
language.862 The assessment of fairness of the main subject matter of the contract and 
the stipulated price and remuneration are left out of the scope of the application of the 
directive with the exception of transparency obligation. Therefore, so called ‘core 
terms’ of a contract will be considered as unfair if they are not provided in plain 
intelligible language.863 Consequently, the transparency represents the minimum level 
of regulation that the European Union provides for core terms.864 This is why in 
practice these rules play an important role.  
 
The requirement of ‘plain, intelligible language’ is a standard that shall always be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. Its purpose is, as it was identified in Commission v. 
Spain by Advocate General Geelhoed that the terms contained in general conditions 
have to be „completely plain and intelligible to the consumer. Their meaning must not 
depend on which of a number of possible divergent interpretations is placed on 
them“.865 Besides this form of protection, the Directive adds another layer of 
protection stating that in case of any doubts about the meaning of the term, the one 
that is most favorable for the consumer will prevail.866 
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The UTD requires that consumer contracts have to be drafted in plain, intelligible 
language. The main purpose of this provision is that the consumer may more easily 
understand the purpose of a particular contract term, both from a formal aspect, i.e. 
that a consumer may easily read a contract term prohibiting thus, for instance, a 
common practice of drafting terms and conditions in a small font, and from a 
substantial practice, that a term is comprehensible for the consumer, and not, for 
instance, that a term is drafted in an incomprehensible and ambiguous manner.  
 
This is in line with the general rules on the duty of information as one of the main 
instruments for consumer protection in EU consumer law, which requires not only 
clarification of what information has to be presented to consumers, but also in what 
manner such an information has to be presented, with the aim that consumer may truly 
profit from the presented information. 
 
The lack of any prescribed clear consequences of the lack of transparency of contract 
terms has been subject to serious criticism as one of the most distinguished 
shortcoming of the directive.867 The UTD only establishes the rule of intepretatio 
contra proferentem, i.e. that in case when there is a doubt about the meaning of a 
term, the more favourable interpretation for consumer shall prevail.868 However, it 
should be noted that in certain cases this will not be sufficient, since a more consumer 
friendly option would be to declare such a term as void in order to secure a better 
protection of the consumer than he would receive under a more favourable 
interpretation of a term.869 
 
This has not been clarified by Directive 2011/83/EC which only in a very gentle 
manner affects Directive 93/13/EEC. In the CESL, the fulfillment of prescribed 
transparency requirements is one of the factors that shall be taken into consideration 
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while assessing fairness of a contract term.870 It is not sufficiently clear what is the 
aim of such a provision, in particular whether a lack of fulfillment of transparency 
requirement would directly lead to the unfairness of contract term and what effects it 
will have in practice.  
 
Nevertheless, this is a point in which, from a perspective of consequences and 
remedies, the UCPD shall play an important role. The rules on misleading omissions 
establish that a form of misleading omission will be not only lack disclosure of 
material information to consumers, but also provision of material information to 
consumer in „an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner“.871 
Consequently, a usage of contract terms which does not fulfill the transparency 
requirement prescribed by the UTD may represent a form of unfair commercial 
practice.872 However, such a contract term will represent an unfair commercial 
practice under a condition that it represents the information „that the average 
consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision 
that he would not have taken otherwise“.873  
 
Is there anything else beyond the decision? 
The follow-up question is whether something more lies behind the decision of the 
Court in Perenicova and whether the abolition of article 3(2) of the UCPD could 
result in a more coherent and effective system of consumer protection. I would argue 
that there are two additional factors that would prohibit direct influence of the breach 
of the duty to trade fairly on contract law even if this was put aside. The first factor is 
of legal, and the second is of a factual nature.  
 
First, the factor of legal nature is a lack of a European unified enforcement system and 
imposed constitutional constraint arising thereof. Namely, in general, there is 
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significant differentiation among the Member States in relation to the established 
mechanism of enforcement of the provisions of the UCPD as transposed in national 
legal systems. It is possible to make the distinction between two systems of 
enforcement: through the general civil courts or through the administrative institution.  
 
In those countries which opted for administrative systems, the relevant authorities can 
adopt the provisions on infringement of the duty of to trade fairly and issue adequate 
sanctions. Contrary to this, all contract law consequences of such a practice are to be 
decided by general courts, usually on the basis of general contract law. Since judges, 
according to the basic principles of rule of law which applies for all Member States as 
democratic countries, are allowed to judge only on the basis of the law, and not on the 
decision of any other state authority, they are constitutionally bound to found their 
judgements on the conclusions of an administrative authority. However, in practice 
the decisions of an administrative authority will have strong effects on the general 
court and they will follow it in a huge majority of cases.  
 
In that sense, the decision of the Court in Perenicova respected this tension between 
public and private law and constitutional constraints established by national legal 
systems. If there was a unified European regulation of enforcement and if there was 
more consistency and coherence among different pieces of European legislation on 
consumer protection, characterized by bifurcation, the Court could have adopted some 
other decision. However, as it stands now, the Court could have hardly adopted any 
other decision. In as much, the Court did not change much in national laws regarding 
the effects of the breach of the duty to trade fairly. Member States were left free to 
maintain their provisions of direct contractual law consequences of breach of the duty 
to trade fairly, if they had such rules. On the other hand, the decision clearly showed 
that a breach of the duty to trade fairly may, although indirectly, have effects on 





For example, in Hungary as a consequence of the lack of any kind of private redress, 
the provisions of unfair contract terms have to be used for annulment of contract terms 
that were found to represent a form of unfair commercial practices and to claim 
damages. The enforcement of the rules on unfair commercial practices is based on 
administrative law, whereas claim for damages is based on the provisions on unfair 
contract terms of the Hungarian Civil Code.874 
 
A second factor is of the factual nature and it is based on the fact that the judgment in 
Pereinicova is in accordance with reality. Namely, it is possible to imagine a case 
where a contract will be concluded as a consequence of unfair commercial practice, 
but that the contract itself is absolutely legally perfect, that its validity cannot be 
questioned on the basis of any legal ground. A hypothetical example could be if a 
consumer due to the false information in advertising comes to a travel agency where 
an employee explained to a consumer that the information on price was false, and 
provided consumer with  corrected information under which the consumer accepts in 
order to conclude the contract. Such a contract would be absolutely valid, hardly any 
consent defects could be raised as a grounds for voiding of contract. Opposite to this, 
advertising would be a form of unfair commercial practice since the provided 
information was misleading and it had the effect of the consumer to go to the travel 
agency and make a transactional decision.  
 
This example shows that a contract concluded as a consequence of commercial 
practice may be perfectly valid. Its autonomous invalidity on the basis of the breach of 
the duty to trade fairly would absolutely represent a negative phenomenon that would 
be contrary to the interest of the consumer. Contrary to this, it is not possible to 
imagine a case where an unfair contract term would not be found to represent a breach 
of the UCPD. Eventually, if the term cannot be subsumed under some of the thirty-
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one listed practices or the small general clauses, both of the conditions defined in the 
two limbs would be always fulfilled in case of an unfair contract term.  
 
Further to this, even in cases when a consumer contract has been concluded as the 
outcome of an unfair commercial practice, the annulment of such a contract may not 
always be in the interest of the consumer. If as an example is again taken a contract on 
consumer credit in which traders imposed an unreasonably high  annual percentage 
rate that is found to be illegal, it may just so happen that it is in the consumer interest 
to simply maintain a contractual relation just with modified annual percentage rates 
that would be decreased to a legally acceptable rate.  
 
This is because a consumer, for instance, might have already taken the money and 
spent it, or he really needs it urgently for a certain purpose, and now in case of 
contract annulment, according to the general rules of contract law, he or she would be 
obliged to give back the money. The amount of damages the consumer is entitled to 
would most probably not be near to the amount of the credit obtained, so it may be in 
his best interest to stay in that contractual relationship. Of course, from a financial 
perspective for a consumer the ideal situation would be to keep what he received after 
contract annulment without the obligation to give it back to the trader, as it is provided 
by some national legal systems, such as Belgian law. However, such a sanction may 
be, arguably, found to be disproportionate.  
 
Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights 
Right of withdrawal  
The duty of information and the right of withdrawal represent two most important 
instruments for consumer protection introduced by Directive 2011/83/EU. Herein, I 
address only the right of withdrawal since the duty of information is examined in 
detail in Chapter IV of this Thesis. From the perspective of the UCPD, the right of 
withdrawal, on the one hand, may represent an easy and efficient means to remedy the 




the rules on unfair commercial practices provide an additional level of protection to 
the consumer’s right of withdrawal.  
 
The right of withdrawal itself is a fundamental right of consumer that is granted to 
him by the European legislation in case of several types of consumer contracts. It 
represents a material exception to the general contract law principle pacta sunt 
servanda, allowing consumers to freely terminate an already concluded contract.  
 
Directive 2011/83/EU grants the right to consumers, in case of doorstep selling and 
distance selling contracts, hereby confirming the approaches that already existed in 
the old directives on doorstep and distance selling.875 Accordingly, in case of these 
contracts, the consumer is given a period of fourteen days to once more re-consider 
their economic decision and accordingly terminate a contract without the obligation to 
provide any kind of explanation or justification, with a simple expression of will. In 
case when a   trader has not informed the consumer about the existence of this right, 
the consumer has the right to terminate the contract fourteen days as of the date when 
traders provides him with that information. In any case, this additional period of time 
is limited to one year at maximum, in which case the Directive 2011/83/EU precluded 
the previously unlimited period of time in case of trader’s failure to inform consumer 
about this right as it was identified by the ECJ. 
 
Consequently, in case of these two types of contracts, a person who concluded a 
contract under the influence of the unfair commercial practice may use this right under 
the condition they find this out within fourteen days that they concluded the contract. 
This is a simple and easy way for a consumer to remedy an unfair commercial 
practice. Namely, the right to withdraw represents a powerful remedy for consumers 
in case of certain types of unfair commercial practices, such as for instance aggressive 
door-step selling.876 In these kinds of cases consumers have some time to reconsider 
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their decision and remedy the contract concluded as an outcome of unfair commercial 
practice.  
 
The consumer is given this additional period to once more re-consider their decision 
due to the particularities of these contracts. In case of doorstep selling, consumer is 
not psychologically ready to make an economic decision, there is this surprising 
moment, whereas in case of distance selling he or she  does not have a full picture of 
the product they are acquiring. The circumstances related to conclusions of these 
contracts show that these are such types of consumer contracts where unfair trading 
practices of a trader may particularly be present and dangerous and this is why the 
European legislation has regulated, to a certain extent, fairness of commercial 
practices in these two areas even before the adoption of the UCPD.  
 
Equally, in case of some other, particularly sensitive types of consumer contracts such 
as timeshare or consumer credit, consumers are also given this period of withdrawal, 
which eventually may represent a very adequate means that the consumer may use to 
terminate a contractual relation, rather than more complicated rules on consent 
defects, when used within the prescribed period of time.  
 
Failure to inform consumer as a form of UCP 
Traders’ failure to inform the consumer about the existence of his or her right of 
withdrawal will represent a form of commercial practice, as it is explicitly and directly 
pointed out by the UCPD. Unlike other cases of information requirements, such as 
omission of material information on product characteristics or provision of false 
information on after-sales services, which may directly influence consumer’s decision 
on a pre-contractual stage whether or not they will conclude a contract, the 
information on the right of withdrawals has not received such a power. It rather has 
influence on consumer once the contract has been concluded. If the consumer is not 




much less likely to withdraw from a contract.877  
 
If a consumer knows that he or she is allowed to withdraw from a contract without 
any particular formal requirement and without any negative consequences, he or she 
might decide to use their right to terminate the contractual relation. This is particularly 
present now with the introduction by Directive 2011/83/EU of mandatory maximum 
period of one year during which consumer may withdraw if a trader has not informed 
him about his right.878 This rule precluded the previously existing case law which did 
not put any time limits in such a case.879  
 
In addition to this, the imposition of any kind of illegal obstacles to the execution of 
the consumer’s right of withdrawal will also represent a form of unfair commercial 
practice. For instance, that would be the case when a trader, through threats to the 
consumer, prohibits him from withdrawing from a contract. Such a practice would 
certainly represent a form of aggressive commercial practice. Accordingly, through 
the provisions on unfair commercial practices, one of fundamental rights of 
consumers to withdraw from certain types of consumer contracts has been additionally 
secured.  
 
Inertia Selling  
As a consequence of the prohibition of inertia selling as one of thirty-one exhaustively 
enlisted in the Directive, European contract law through Directive 2011/83/EU on 
consumer rights developed a particular contract law remedy for a consumer who was a 
victim of inertia selling. In general, this is one of the few of contract law’s remedies 
developed on a European level, which represented a direct, contract law, answer to the 
introduction of pan-European prohibition of inertia selling through the UCPD. 
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Inertia selling represents another crossroad point on which the rules on unfair 
commercial practices and contract law intersect. EU Consumer Law is,  particularly, 
dedicated to the protection of consumers from common forms of aggressive practice 
by traders to a non-solicit supply with goods or provisions of service for which they 
subsequently demand payment under the justification that consumers have agreed to 
enter into a contract simply by remaining silent.  
 
Such traders’ practices are based on the fact that consumers are sometimes simply too 
passive and lazy to return the product, and therefore, it would be simply easier for 
them to pay for it. In addition, some consumers are misled to think they obtained a 
product for free, so they feel free to keep or use it, thinking that they will not have to 
provide any compensation. Initially, Member States had diverse approaches to the 
prohibition of inertia selling, i.e. inertia selling was not prohibited by all national 
legislations, particularly those of the “new” Member States. For instance, Poland, 
Czech Republic or Latvia had no particular rules that would prohibit inertia selling.880 
 
Today, inertia selling is prohibited in all Member States as one of the thirty-one 
exhaustively listed practices in Annex I of the UCPD which shall in all circumstances 
be considered as unfair.881 In that manner, the Directive prohibits traders from 
imposing contractual relations on the consumer.  However, the UCPD does not define 
what is a direct contract law consequence on inertia selling for a victim of such an 
unfair practice, but only sanctions the unfair behaviour of the trader. This is why the 
Commission considered that it is necessary to introduce through a new unified 
contractual remedy whose main purpose is to exempt consumer from any kind of 
obligation from unsolicited supply of goods or provision of service.882  
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Accordingly, Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, directly referring to the 
UCPD which inspired the European legislator to provide a contractual remedy to 
consumers in case of inertia selling, establishes that a consumer is liberated “from the 
obligation to provide any consideration in cases of unsolicited supply of goods, water, 
gas, electricity, district heating or digital content or unsolicited provision of 
services”.883 The fact that consumers do not provide traders with any response shall 
not mean that the consumer consented with such a supply or provision. In that 
manner, a unified European principle has been established that in case of an 
unsolicited supply of a good or provision of a services, in business-to-consumer 
relations, mere silence of the consumer is never to be considered as the acceptance.  
 
All in all, the fact that the consumer was supplied with goods or provided with 
services that they had never ordered or asked for will always represent a form of an 
unfair commercial practice and, consequently, traders will be sanctioned for his unfair 
behaviour. Directive 2011/83/EU is important since it provides a remedy for a 
consumer who was a victim of such an unfair commercial practice which significantly 
facilitates his position. In the case when a consumer had to rely on general contract 
law rules, which is a particular improvement in the countries which did not have 
contract law rules that would apply in case of inertia selling.  
 
Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sales and associated guarantees  
The rules on conformity of acquired goods 
Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sales and associated guarantees (“Sales Directive”) 
has established common European rules for consumer sales contracts. Its main 
consequence is the establishment of a European concept of legal guarantee, i.e. the 
obligation of the conformity of a consumer sales contract for the period of two years 
during which the trader is liable for any lack of conformity of the sold goods with the 
contract. Same as the UTD, this is a minimum harmonisation directive, so Member 
                                              




States are free to introduce any period longer than two years and to grant any higher 
level of protection than the one prescribed by the directive.  
 
The UCPD is relevant for the Sales Directive since it secures the consumer’s right to 
conformity by providing that one of the forms of misleading practices will be a 
provision of false information by trader to consumers about his  or her rights, referring 
in particular to the rights of repair and replacement as defined by the Sales Directive 
which are fundamental remedies available to consumers in case of lack of conformity 
of purchased goods.884 The other way around, according to the Sales Directive, one of 
the cases when the acquired goods will be considered as not being in conformity with 
the contract of sales is the case when the quality and performance of a good are not in 
accordance with seller’s, producer’s or producer’s representative public statements 
about the goods, in particular taking into consideration advertising as labeling.885  
 
Traders shall be liable to consumer for any lack of conformity that existed in the 
moment when goods were delivered.886 In case of the occurrence of lack of 
conformity, the consumer has first the right to replacement of defective goods or its 
repair, or in case when neither of the two is possible, the consumer can opt for 
contract termination or diminution of the paid price. The choice between the remedies 
is on the consumer. The Sales Directive is dedicated to protect contractual 
relationships between trader and consumer. This is why contract rescission is the only 
subsidiary option, when the  previous two are impossible.887   
 
As a consequence, the consumer does not have the option to rescind the contract if the 
lack of conformity is minor.888 A strong parallel between these provisions and the 
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provision on misleading actions of the UCPD is noticeable which explicitly mentions 
provision of false information about a product’s characteristic as one of the forms of 
misleading practices.889 
 
Therefore, in case of such a misleading action, the consumer will be able to use 
remedies provided in accordance with the Sales Directive which are, alternatively, the 
right to repair or to replace the product to be in accordance with any public statement 
the trader has made. In case of a misleading action, the option of repair seems to be of 
little practical usage since the case is that the trader typically has lied to the consumer, 
so that the consumer’s first option would be to replace the product with the one that 
would be in accordance with what trader had initially advertised or promised to 
consumer.  
 
In case when none of the options are possible, for example simply because the trader 
actually was never selling the product he advertised, the consumer may opt between 
diminishing of the price and contract rescission. In such a manner, at least when it 
concerns a consumer sales contract, the Sales Directive provides efficient contractual 
remedies to the consumer since he may, as his first choice, receive the goods he aimed 
to buy. Second, if that remedy is not possible, for some reason, the consumer may 
terminate the contract and in such a manner remedy negative consequences of unfair 
commercial practices. 
 
Accordingly, Wilhelmsson rightly points out to the remedies against non-conformity 
of goods as the most noticeable example of the contract law remedies against 
misleading advertising. Equally, in Scandinavian countries there is a long tradition for 
traders being liable for non-conformity of sold products if the product is not in 
conformity with the information a trader has provided before selling of the product in 
                                              




advertising or otherwise if it may be assumed that this information influenced the 
commercial decision of the consumer.890   
 
In case of consumer choice to terminate the contract, a trader is not allowed to 
demand any compensation from the consumer for the usage of goods which turned out 
not to be in conformity with the contract. This was clearly pointed out by the ECJ in 
its case law.891 Moreover, a trader is obliged to bear all cost of removing defective 
goods and installments of the ones with which they were replaced unless this 
represents a disproportionate cost for the trader.892Any behaviour of trader contrary to 
these rules will also be considered as unfair commercial practice, in particular an 
aggressive commercial practice since a trader would impose onerous obstacle to 
consumer to enforce his contractual rights. 
 
False description of product characteristics as a form of unfair commercial practice 
The Sales Directive defines what are the situations when it is considered that the 
acquired good is considered not to be in conformity with the contract. According to 
the Sales Directive, the lack of conformity will exist when acquired goods, first, do 
not comply with a description provided by a trader or as was shown in a sample or 
model; second, when they do not fit the specific purposes for which consumers 
purchased them and which the trader accepted; third, when the good is not fit for the 
purpose such products are normally used for; fourth, when the quality and 
performance of a good are not in accordance with seller’s, producer’s or producer’s 
representative public statements about the goods, in particular taking into 
consideration advertising and labeling.893  
 
The UCPD explicitly identifies the provision of false information about product 
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characteristics as one of the forms of misleading practices.894 In this kind of situation, 
it is possible to imagine two situations: first in which the consumer was advertising 
one product with the purpose of selling the other product, or, second, the situation in 
which a trader simply lied about the characteristics of the product. Both of these cases 
will represent a form of unfair commercial practice, but they may differ from contract 
law consequences. 
 
Traders may subsequently correct any statements made on labeling or through 
advertising which will prevent them from potential application of the rules on lack of 
conformity.895 However, despite made changes, traders may still remain liable for 
their unfair commercial practices since they provided false information that caused a 
consumer to make a transactional decision they would have not made otherwise. For 
instance, the correction of the advertised conditions in the finally issued guarantee to 
consumers will always represent a form of unfair commercial practice.896 
 
False provision of consumer rights 
The provisions of the UCPD explicitly provides that one of the forms of misleading 
action will be the provision of false information by a trader to consumers about their 
rights as consumers where the UCPD in particular refers to the right to repair and 
replacement as is defined by the Sales Directive.897 Provision of any false information 
in that aspect will represent a form of misleading action.898  
 
A particularly common example in practice is the case when a trader advertises the 
consumer’s statutory rights in case of a lack of conformity as a particular feature of a 
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product it offers.899 This is why such a behaviour is explicitly and always prohibited 
by the UCPD as one of thirty-one exhaustively listed practices, namely „[p]resenting 
rights given to consumers in law as a distinctive feature of the trader’s offer, which 
are always considered unfair“.900 Another example may be the simple refusal of a 
trader to remedy the lack of conformity while it is noticed by the consumer.  
 
After Sales Services 
Promising of the provisions of after-sales services represents a very powerful 
advertising tactics of some traders to attract consumers.901 Initially, the Sales 
Directive was supposed to include the rules on after-sales services, understood in a 
strict sense, as those not linked to the application of a guarantee and offered for an 
additional fee, in particular regarding the supply of spare parts.902 Eventually, due to 
the complexity of the question of after-sales service, in particular its time limitation 
and content, the final text of the Sales Directive contains no provision on after-sales 
services which was identified as one of the gaps.903  
 
This is where the rules of the UCPD may play an important role since according to 
Article 6(1)(b) UCPD provision of false information regarding after-sales services 
will constitute an unfair commercial practice.904 The mere fact that after-sales are not 
provided will not represent an unfair commercial practice, but it is necessary that „the 
trader’s conduct would lead the average consumer to have materially different 
expectations about the after-sale service available“.905 
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The question of after-sales services becomes particularly relevant in two cases of sales 
contracts: after the expiry of the period in which the consumer is granted remedies for 
lack of conformity and when a trader has promised the provision of post-sale services 
as an additional feature to the product. The first case would include as an unfair 
commercial practice, for instance, a trader’s failure to inform the consumer that the 
spare parts for the product they acquired would not be produced anymore which might 
mean as a consequence a shorter period of usage of the acquired good than the 
consumer would normally have expected.  
 
The second case would relate to the example of when a trader promises post-sale care 
to a consumer, but once the contract has been concluded, simply refuses to provide 
any care.906 In such a case, the trader will be sanctioned for their unfair behaviour on 
the ground of the provisions on unfair commercial practices, so that the UCPD secures 
that the consumer truly receives the post-sale services that they were promised.  
 
The case of post-sale services is also connected to another form of unfair commercial 
practice which points out that a form of misleading actions will be the provision of 
false information regarding „the need for service, part, replacement or repair“.907 
These provisions include cases when, for instance, a trader provides false information 
at the conclusion of the contract about the need for subsequent service or repair.908 
These provisions are also very relevant in case when the statutory period to remedy 
the lack of conformity has elapsed and trader lies to the consumer in stating that he 
needs an expensive repair, when in reality this is not the case.  
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This Chapter of the thesis analysed the interlink between the law of unfair commercial 
practices and contract law from the perspective of applicable remedies. Accordingly, 
it was possible to see that the Directive does not provide any remedies to individual 
consumers and that it is focused on collective dimensions of enforcement in the case 
of breach of its rules. Collective redress is currently developing in the European 
Union and it will certainly affect the process of enforcement of the UCPD is some 
near future.  
 
In lack of the rules provided by the Directive, an individual consumer who is a victim 
of unfair commercial consumer typically needs to use traditional contract law rules. 
However, in case of traditional contract laws of Member States, the lack of capacity of 
contract law rules, in particular those of consent defect, to provide adequate remedy to 
consumers who were victims of unfair commercial practices that resulted in the 
conclusion of a contract. This is why the adoption of the UCPD led to the 
modification of the existing and the development of new contract law remedies in 
some national legal systems of the Member States with the purpose of securing 
effective protection to an individual consumer.  
 
Furthermore, besides traditional contract law rules, in certain cases individual 
consumers may use the remedies which are provided by European legislation on 
consumer contracts. These remedies in certain cases enable consumers to remedy in 
an easy and rapid manner any contractual consequences of an unfair commercial 
practice. This is particularly the case with the rules on unfair contract terms, right of 
withdrawal, inertia selling and certain rules on consumer sales. In addition to this, the 
rules on unfair commercial practice provides an additional level of protection to these 

































CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main conclusive observations  
This thesis unpacked the complex, multi-layered and often ambiguous relationship between 
the law on unfair commercial practice and consumer contract law. The main purpose of the 
dissertation is to contribute to clarifying the inter-linkage between these two areas of law, 
particular as regards the mechanisms and manners through which the UCPD has affected and 
shaped consumer contract law.  
 
The principal conclusion drawn herein is that despite the existence of a strict formal 
separation between these two branches of law, as established by the UCPD, these two areas 
of law are in reality tightly coupled and interrelated. Therefore, EU Consumer law should be 
regarded as a unitary and not as a dualistic construction. Being artificial, the separation line 
introduced by Article 3(2) of the UCPD, does not manage to prevent the interaction between 
the two rules.  
 
In that context, this thesis has demonstrated the particularly strong impact that the Directive 
has had on consumer contract law. This impact is not a finite, but rather an ongoing process, 
whose nature is best described as intentionally aimed, yet spontaneous. The outcome of the 
process is an increasing Europeanisation of contract law throughout the European Union. In 
the process, an exceptionally prominent role is played by the ECJ, an institution that seems to 
be the engine of the process, powered by the fuel derived from the innovatively introduced 
European legal terminology. Accordingly, the Directive may be described as an extremely 
influential instrument for Europeanisation of contract law. 
 
In the thesis it was possible to see that the interaction between the law on unfair commercial 
practices and contract law is best observed at the four juncture points, which also encompass 
in themselves all the regulatory regime of the Directive. These four points concurrently 
represent the four chapters of the thesis and they include: the average consumer, the duty to 
trade fairly, the duty of information and remedies. Consequently, the interlink between the 
examined two areas of laws was separately examined in case of each of these four points in 






The average consumer is the main benchmark for assessment of fairness of a commercial 
practice. The average consumer is defined as a reasonably well-informed, reasonably 
observant and circumspect consumer, taking into account social, cultural and linguistic 
factors, as interpreted by the Court of Justice. Moreover, the average consumer is the main 
objective of protection established by a hierarchical, mandatory three-step mechanism aimed 
at sanctioning any kind of trader’s commercial practice which is unfair. As confirmed by the 
ECJ, while applying the rules on unfair commercial practices, national courts always have to 
bear in mind expected behaviour and reactions to a commercial practice of an average 
consumer. 
 
The average consumer represents a universal European standard of expected behaviour by 
consumer on the market. Initially developed through the case law of the ECJ, the average 
consumer was for the first time codified in EU consumer law through the UCPD. Besides a 
generally applicable standard of the average consumer, the Directive has also introduced a 
standard of the vulnerable consumer, as a member of a group of particularly vulnerable 
consumers due to some of their characteristics and in particular due to their mental or 
physical infirmity, age or credulity. The standard of the vulnerable consumer is used as a 
subsidiary standard in case a commercial practice is targeted to a particular group of 
vulnerable consumers. However, it was possible to see that the case law of the ECJ shows a 
rather restrictive and exceptional approach towards the use of the vulnerable consumer 
standard.  
 
In the Chapter II on the average consumer, I argued that there is a noticeable tendency of 
taking the standard of average consumer as defined by the UCPD to consumer contract law as 
the principal standard for assessment of the fulfillment of information and transparency 
requirements of traders. Namely, a related standard to the one of average consumer from the 
UCPD was missing in consumer contract law.  
 
Directives on consumer contract law are particularly focused on securing that the consumer 
receives all the necessary information he may need for the conclusion of a particular 




manner. However, what remained as an open question was the standard in comparison to 
which fulfillment of these obligations is to be performed. This is why I showed that a 
standard of expected consumer’s behaviour is increasingly needed in consumer contract law 
as a standard for the verification of correct fulfillment of transparency and information 
requirements determined by directives on consumer contract law.  
 
Consequently, in this Chapter of the thesis, I demonstrated that the codification of the 
standard of the average consumer by the UCPD has resulted in the ongoing tendency to also 
treat the average consumer as the main standard of consumer contract law. The examination 
of relevant legislation and case law has proven this. The adoption of the same standard of 
expected consumer behaviour in the law on unfair commercial practices and contract law is 
further supported by the arguments of coherency and legal certainty since transparency and 
information duties are evenly regulated by both of these two sets of rules of EU consumer 
law. Consequently, I argue that an adoption of different standards would result in an 
incoherent system of EU consumer law with ample legal uncertainty.  
 
Duty to trade fairly  
The duty to trade fairly has been established by the Directive, and entails a complex system 
for the protection of consumers from any kind of unfair commercial practice. It is for the first 
time that through the UCPD such a general obligation of trader was brought in EU consumer 
law. The duty to trade fairly is a standard of universally expected behaviour of the trader 
towards the consumer that applies to a widest possible number of situations. Considering the 
main objective, the duty to trade fairly represents a concept related to the universal duty of 
good faith that exists in the majority of national contract laws of the Member States. The aim 
of the duty to trade fairly is to secure a constant level of fairness in the relationship of traders 
towards consumers on the market. However, indirectly, it also secures a just and fair game 
between competitors on the market. 
 
The duty to trade fairly was defined in detail and substantively explained by the general 
fairness clause. The general fairness clause is designed in such a manner as to have the 
capacity to sanction any kind of unfair commercial practices of traders towards consumers. 
Its scope of application is very broad and thus it provides a very broad-spectrum character to 




this duty since it explains what is substantially meant by the concept of fair trade in business-
to-consumer relationships on the market. In accordance with its two limbs, any commercial 
practice of traders which is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and which 
materially distorts or is likely to materially distort economic behaviour of an average 
consumer is considered unfair.  
 
What I argued in this chapter of the thesis is that the duty to trade fairly as defined by the 
UCPD and developed by the ECJ has also become a generally applicable duty of consumer 
contract law. In European consumer contract law, as a consequence of its fragmentary 
character, there was no general duty as a universally accepted standard of behaviour of 
traders. However, after the adoption of the Directive, the duty to trade fairly also applies to 
and regulates all phases and aspects of a contractual relationship between traders and 
consumers.  
 
Equally, it is not a sector specific duty, but applies unexceptionally to all forms of consumer 
contracts. This is particularly the consequence of a very wide meaning of the notion of 
commercial practice, tightly connected to a contract, that covers trader’s behaviour towards 
consumers not only before a conclusion of a consumer contract, but also during and after the 
conclusion of a contract. Consequently, what I have demonstrated in Chapter III of the thesis 
is that the duty to trade fairly, as defined by the UCPD, has become the first universally 
applicable duty in EU consumer law that secures fair behaviour of traders towards consumers 
in their contractual relations.  
 
Duty of information  
The duty of information as a general obligation was first introduced by the UCPD. According 
to the provisions on misleading omissions, any failure of the trader to provide the consumer 
with material information that causes or is likely to cause consumers to take a transactional 
decision he would have not otherwise taken will always be a form of an unfair commercial 
practice.  
 
The entire EU consumer law is based on the information paradigm according to which only a 
well-informed consumer is capable of adopting rational economic decisions while acting at 




consumer is particularly noticeable when it comes to the possession of information. Hence, 
the consumer suffers from a chronic lack of information while negotiating for a consumer 
contract.  
 
This is why the European consumer policy maintained that such an existence of information 
asymmetry between the trader and the consumer can be only remedied through the imposition 
of a pre-contractual information obligation on traders, according to which the trader is 
obliged to disclose all relevant information to the consumer before conclusion of a contract. 
As a consequence of such an approach, the duty of information has become the main 
regulatory tool in all directives on consumer contract law since the very beginning of 
developments in the EU consumer law. 
 
However, I showed in Chapter IV of the thesis that prior to the adoption of the UCPD, the 
duty of information was regulated in an incoherent and fragmented manner through sector 
specific directives in the area of consumer contract law, dealing with different types of 
consumer contracts. There was no universal obligation of information, applicable to all types 
of consumer contracts. Eventually, a universal pre-contractual duty of information has been 
established for the first time through the provisions on misleading omissions of the UCPD 
that covers all contractual relations between traders and consumers. In other words, while 
stipulating a consumer contract, the trader is obliged to present to consumer all information 
he may need to take an informed transactional decision.  
 
Importantly, I demonstrated that in the UCPD, the duty of information is drafted in such a 
manner as to enable taking into consideration real consumer’s behaviour when deciding 
whether information has been duly fulfilled which is not the case with directives on consumer 
contract laws. Moreover, depending on the relevance of a particular situation for consumer’s 
decision making, the Directive makes a distinction regarding information requirements.  
 
In cases when the consumer is closer to making an economic decision, when a commercial 
communication is an invitation to purchase, the information imposed will be stricter since the 
consumer is closer to making his or her economic decision. This distinction is also important. 




law term, which has now received its own European meaning, affecting thus traditional 
contract law regimes of Member States.  
 
Remedies  
The chapter on remedies of this thesis analysed the link between the law of unfair 
commercial practices and contract law from the perspective of remedies. In Chapter V of the 
thesis, I argued that the UCPD is exclusively focused on collective protection of consumers, 
whereas the protection of an individual consumer, a victim of unfair commercial practice was 
left outside the scope of the Directive. This is why an individual consumer typically has to 
rely on traditional national contract law concepts or on remedies provided by fragmented 
rules of European consumer contract law with the purpose of remedying the consequences of 
unfair commercial practices that he or she was affected by.  
 
However, in the case of traditional contract laws of Member States, there has been a 
noticeable lack of capacity of contract law rules, in particular those on consent defect, to 
provide adequate remedy to the consumer which was a victim of unfair commercial practice. 
Accordingly, I demonstrated that the UCPD has brought about the development of new 
contract law remedies in some national legal systems of the Member States with the purpose 
of securing effective protection of individual consumers.  
 
Moreover, both the rules on the UCPD concerning misleading and aggressive practices and 
the rules on traditional contract law concepts of consent defects aim to secure free and 
informed consent of the consumer while stipulating a contract. However, when it comes to 
the content of these two sets of rules, certain differences are noticeable. I showed in this 
chapter that the rules on misleading and aggressive practices affect the interpretation of 
traditional contract law rules on fraud and duress at least when it concerns a consumer 
contract which was concluded as a result of a misleading or aggressive practice.  
 
Further to this, besides traditional contract law concepts, in certain cases individual consumer 
may use the remedies which are provided by European consumer contract law. I argued that 
some of them represent, in certain cases, the most convenient remedies to a consumer who 
was a victim of unfair commercial practice. This is particularly the case with the rules on 




the factors that national courts use while assessing fairness of a contract terms or the entire 
contract. Equally, this chapter demonstrated that certain rules on consumer sales, as well as 
those derived from Directive on 2011/83/EU, also provide effective protection to the 
consumer who is a victim of a commercial practice. Contrary to the usage of contract law 
concepts as applicable remedies in case of occurrence of unfair commercial practices, the 
rules on unfair commercial practice will provide an additional and complete guarantee to 




Europeanization of contract law through the UCPD 
 
Impact on contract law concepts  
Through the examination of the relationship between the law of unfair commercial practices 
and contract law, I also showed that the UCPD was used as an instrument to penetrate into 
national contract laws and contribute to their Europeanisation. In the introduction to the 
thesis, it was noticeable that the Member States were more keen to accept the harmonisation 
of the law of unfair commercial practices, than the harmonisation of contract law. This is not 
a consequence of legal argumentation, but rather of politics. As a result, the European 
legislation on unfair commercial practices provides a complete and developed set of 
substantive rules, whereas when it comes to contract law, we witness a noticeable lack of 
coherency and consistency, while the character of rules on contract law is highly 
fragmented.909  
 
Consequently, the UCPD was used as a tool to Europeanize, in a subtle manner, contract law. 
The standard of consumers in the directives on consumer contract law was missing not 
because it was a negligent omission, but since it was not possible to reach a consensus of 
what standard for the average consumer should be taken as a benchmark. The introduction of 
any general duty in contract law, resembling to the duty to trade fairly of the Directive, as a 
specific universally applicable duty to all consumer contracts and all phases of contract 
formation, conclusion and execution, also seemed impossible.  
 
                                              




The same applies for the duty of information which was, despite its recognition, regulated in 
an incoherent and fragmented manner. In the case of remedies, there was no direct imposition 
to adapt existing, or adopt new, contract law remedies, since Member States strongly opposed 
that. This process was eventually the result of the need to adequately reply to the new rules 
on unfair commercial practices.  
 
Consequently, the process of Europeanisation through the UCPD represents an intentionally 
expected spontaneous process by the European policy makers. Accordingly, Collins is right 
when he observes that the adoption of the UCPD may represent a basis, a form of foundation, 
for the future development of unified contract law throughout the European Union.910 
Through the rules of the UCPD, contract law has been harmonised through a non-contractual 
legal instrument. In such a manner, potential obstacles and Member States’ opposition were 
smartly avoided. In such a manner the UCPD was used as an efficient tool of EU law to 
reform and develop national contract law without entering into policy discussion on national 
levels. 911  
 
Any related concern of Member States was dismissed through the introduction of article 3(2) 
of the UCPD which was seen as making a formal separation between the rules on unfair 
commercial practices and contract law, thus officially leaving untouched national the contract 
law fortresses. In that aspect, article 3(2) of the UCPD acted as a ‘peacekeeper’ that enabled 
the passing of the Directive. However, after the transposition of the Directive into national 
legal systems, due to their tight connections, the boundaries between the law on unfair 
commercial practices and contract law have blurred.912 
 
 
The refined means of impact  
The subtleness of the used method to penetrate into national contract laws can also be seen in 
the manner in which some of the provisions are formulated throughout the UCPD. To start, 
the definition of the average consumer is provided not in the normative part of the Directive, 
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but in its Recitals, which strictly legally speaking do not have binding legal effects on 
Member States. The duty to trade fairly is also particularly wrapped into the innovative and 
mysterious concept of the general fairness clause. Equally, the duty of information is 
described nowhere in the UCPD as a universal pre-contractual positive duty of traders that is 
also always applied in case of any consumer contract formation, but it has been brought 
through the unclear rules on misleading omissions.  
 
Any potential ambiguousness of the meanings or applications of these concepts was 
subsequently clarified by the ECJ in its case law where their real meaning and functions were 
unveiled and confirmed. Accordingly, the universal character of the duty to trade fairly and 
the general duty of information were underlined whereas the average consumer was 
confirmed as the main benchmark for assessment of fairness of a commercial practice, being 
a notion of utmost importance.  
 
When it comes to remedies for individual consumers, Member States were not imposed with 
an obligation to reform their contract laws. A non-existence of such obligation was clearly 
underlined through article 3(2) of the UCPD. However, the modifications and development 
happened in a spontaneous and expected manner as a response to the necessity to remedy 
consequences of unfair commercial practice on an individual consumer. Such an impact was, 
to a large extent, already expected immediately after the adoption of the Directive.913  
 
Importantly, besides the fact that the UCPD is strictly limited to cover only business-to-
consumer relations, its provisions also affect contract law rules which are not limited 
exclusively to consumer contract law and thus in such a manner having a potentially broader 
impact. That is the case, for instance, with the notion of invitation to purchase. Moreover, a 
possible development of the European rules on unfair commercial practices in business-to-
business relations may further contribute to the effects of the law on unfair commercial 
practices, representing a model for shaping the national contract laws even further.914  
 
To that extent, the European Parliament in its resolution adopted already in January 2009 
called the Commission to either extend the scope of UCPD on business-to-business relations 
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or to adopt a black list in the Misleading Directive of the practices that will be unfair in all 
cases in order to clarify the situation.915 In 2013 the European Commission expressed, in its 
Green Paper, its intention to adopt European legislation that would also cover business-to-
business unfair commercial practices.916 Any further harmonization of the law on unfair 
commercial practices beyond the business-to-consumer commercial practices is very likely to 
broaden even more the scope of Europeanisation of contract law, now overpassing the limited 
boundaries of consumer contract law.  
] 
 
The significance of innovative legal terminology  
The examination of the Directive revealed usage of numerous innovative legal terms which 
have been introduced for the first time in European Private Law, but most of which 
substantially resemble those embedded in contract law despite their absolutely original 
naming. Some of the examples include the terms of professional diligence, invitation to 
purchase or honest market practices. Consequently, the innovative legal terminology plays an 
important role in the process of Europeanisation of contract law.  
The adoption of innovative legal terminology was initially identified as having introduced 
legal uncertainty due to unclear meaning of some of the terms.917 However, its legal 
linguistic originality also enabled impact of the rules of the UCPD on related contract law 
concepts. And it is exactly their initial unclear meaning that was used to avoid any obstacles 
in passing the Directive, in addition to building a new system of European private law. A 
simple examination of the meaning of these notions reveals how closely linked they are to the 
existing traditional contract law concepts.  
 
On the other hand, it is also true that the traditional concepts of national contract laws may, to 
some extent, also affect the concepts established in the law on unfair commercial practices, in 
particular in relation to the interpretation and application of the rules of the UCPD practiced 
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by the national courts.918 The European Union does not guarantee that there will be a 
common interpretation of these provisions.919 This results in a highly present risk that the 
national authorities will approach and interpret the transposed concepts from the Directive in 
accordance with pre-existing national legal, social and cultural perspectives.920  
 
This is where the ECJ plays a fundamentally important role by providing an autonomous 
meaning of these terms, as it already did in case of invitation to purchase, professional 
diligence or misleading omissions protecting in such a manner impact of national legal 
traditions on the notions brought by the Directive. Already at its early stage, the Court 
confirmed that all of the notions of the UCPD have their own European and autonomous 




Ex officio assessment of fairness of commercial practice 
The necessity of ex officio assessment of fairness? 
Eventually, this thesis puts forward the argument that, de lege ferenda, an obligation should 
be imposed on national courts to first verify ex officio whether a consumer contract has been 
concluded under the influence of an unfair commercial practice and, second, to apply 
appropriate contract law consequences on such a contract. Such an approach would be fully 
in line with the existing case law of the ECJ on the ground of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair 
contract terms (“UTD”). Only through an ex officio obligation of fairness of a commercial 
practice, an individual consumer, who is a victim of unfair commercial practice, will always 
be guaranteed a complete, easy and effective protection from an unfair commercial practice.  
 
The assessment should be performed with the purpose of verifying whether consumers can 
terminate such a contract or have any other kind of available remedies provided by the 
national legal system, which would protect the consumer from the consequences of the 
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trader’s unfair behaviour towards the consumer. Only the introduction of such a principle 
would secure the correct fulfillment of  “effective legal redress” requirement imposed by EU 
law, with the obligation that a consumer who concluded a contract under the impact of unfair 
commercial practices is awarded with the right to avoid any disadvantageous contractual 
consequences of an unfair commercial practice.922 
 
The Court already has a consistent law recognizing the obligation of the national courts to 
assess fairness of a contractual terms on the basis of the highest public interest, and the 
obligation of national courts to provide the consumer with effective legal redress has also 
spread from the area of unfair contract terms to other areas of consumer law, as it is the case 
with the rules on consumer sales923 or doorstep selling.924  
 
In the lack of detailed rules on enforcement, the Court had to develop certain procedural 
principles for enforcement of consumer law through interpretation of the rules, which are 
included in the directive containing rules of substantive character, such as the legislation on 
unfair contract terms. Namely, in the area of enforcement of EU consumer law, Member 
States are given procedural autonomy under the condition that their enforcement systems are 
in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.925 However, the case law 
of the ECJ shows that despite the existence of this procedural autonomy, the ECJ has 
interfered with the national procedure laws of Member States with the purpose of securing 
effet utile of consumer protection, which must be especially secured through individual 
enforcement.926   
 
Accordingly, what I argue here is that duty to trade fairly in business-to-consumer relations is 
also of highest public interest, so the same principles regarding the obligatory motion of the 
court should also apply in the case of unfair commercial practices. That would also secure 
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through more efficient and coherent normative coordination between the UTD and UCPD a 
higher general level of consumer protection. In its case law, the Court has constantly 
underlined the need for ex officio assessment of fairness of a contract term as the only manner 
to secure effective legal protection to the consumer as a weaker party in comparison to 
traders as a much stronger party.  
 
Now, equally, as in case of the UTD, the weak position of the consumer has also recently 
been confirmed in the Court’s case law on the UCPD. Therein, in his relationship towards the 
trader, the consumer was described as being in a weaker position, “in that the consumer must 
be considered to be economically weaker and less experienced in legal matters than the other 
party to the contract”.927 This approach of the Court in respect to the UCPD is equal to its 
position adopted in the case law on unfair contract terms.  
 
Ex officio obligation in Court’s case law on the UTD 
In Oceano, as the first case that substantially examined the provisions of the Directive, the 
Court approached the consumer as a weaker party in a contractual relationship with trader “as 
regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge”.928 Furthermore, the consumer 
was indicated as economically weak party with insufficient financial resources to initiate 
litigation before the court. While free legal aid programs may prove as a solution to this 
problem, what remains problematic is the fact that the consumer is not aware of his rights.929  
 
The lack of awareness surrounding his rights was the justification of the Court for the 
explanation of why the national courts do not need the motion of consumers in order to assess 
whether a contract term is unfair or not, but that they may assess it by his own motion. By 
this approach, the private law principle of Ignorantia legis non excusat (Ignorance of the law 
is no excuse) was precluded on the basis of justification that consumer is a much weaker 
party. 
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Such an approach was confirmed in Cofidis where the Court pointed out that national courts 
should assess without the motion of consumers whether a term is unfair because the 
consumer is “unaware of his rights or because he is deterred from enforcing them on account 
of the costs which judicial proceedings would involve”.930 In Cofidis, the Court reaffirmed 
the competence of the national courts to ascertain the illegality of an unfair terms even in 
cases when the consumers do not themselves raise the issue of fairness within the time limit 
defined by the national law. Furthermore, the Court pointed towards the effective protection 
as primary purpose of Directive 93/13/EEC.931 In Cofidis the risk was presented that the 
consumer might not use its right due to his ignorance or the costs of the procedure.   
 
In Mostazza Claro, the Court established the obligation of the national courts to assess 
whether a contractual term that is the subject of a dispute falls within the scope of Directive 
93/13/EEC. This was justified by the reasons of public interest that the regime set by this 
Directive is designed to protect.932 The ECJ emphasised in its decision that the purpose of 
Directive 93/13/EEC is to strengthen consumer protection “and, in particular, to raising the 
standard of living and the quality of life in its territory”.933  
 
Moreover, the Court imposed the obligation upon the national courts to raise the motion of 
unfairness even in cases when the consumer is represented by a professional lawyer before 
the court in a particular case, i.e. a qualified person who possesses a high level of legal 
knowledge.934 The special regime of protection by unfair contract terms imposes that “the 
national court being required to assess of its own motion whether a contractual term is unfair, 
compensating in this way for the imbalance which exists between the consumer and the seller 
or supplier”.935 
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The fact that assessment of fairness of a contract term represents a duty, and not the mere 
power of the national courts was confirmed in Pannon.936 Furthermore, in this judgment, the 
Court allowed the consumer to choose whether they wanted this option or not, as the 
Advocate General Trstenjak stressed out in her Opinion in VB: “[t]he advantage of that 
approach is that it refrains from imposing protection on the consumer, but is based rather on 
the idea of protecting consumers by providing them with information”.937  
 
In Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, the Court invoked the principle of public policy already 
present in national contract laws pointing out that the obligation imposed by the UTD that 
consumer must not be bound by an unfair contract term must has to be regarded “as a 
provision of equal standing to national rules which rank, within the domestic legal system, as 
rules of public policy”.938As a consequence, the national court is under the obligation to 
assess whether the contract is concluded contrary to the principle of public policy.939 
Moreover, national courts are obliged to ensure the establishment of all consequences under 
the national law, so that the consumer does not get bound by unfair contract terms.940 
 
The subsequent case law confirmed that public interest requirements impose the obligation 
on the national court to assess fairness of a contract term in circumstances of the case and to 
ensure that consumers are not bound by these clauses.941 In order to ensure that consumers 
are fully liberated from all of the consequences of the stipulated unfair contract terms, 
national courts have the right to declare the entire contract void.942 
 
This case law of the Court shows that for the reasons of protection of highest public interest, 
the EU law even has the right to penetrate into national civil procedure laws of Member 
States.943 An evolution from a simple right of national courts into their mandatory 
requirements has been noticeable. This evolution has achieved its current peak in the 
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judgment in Invitel.944  In this case, the Court pointed out that decision of the national court 
in which a contract term was found unfair has erga omnes effects on all consumer contracts 
that contain it, including the contracts of those consumers who did not initiate or join the 
process before the national courts on the assessment of fairness of a contract term.945 
  
Indirect effects of unfair commercial practices on a contract 
In accordance with such an approach of the Court, I argue that the UCPD is also designated 
to protect highest public interest. Namely, the main purpose of the Directive is to protect the 
economic interest of the consumer by prohibiting all kinds of commercial practices of traders 
that may impair it.946 To this end, this prohibition leads to the accomplishment of two 
extremely important goals of the European Union: the achievement of a high level of 
consumer protection and the strengthening of the internal market.947 The Directive 
accomplishes these two goals by providing the most complete legal mechanism for protection 
of consumer’s free and informed choice, which enables the consumer to make his 
transactional decision while being fully aware of all the necessary information, and without 
any illegal influence by the trader.  
 
In the case of unfair commercial practices, the actors are the same as in the case of unfair 
contract terms: trader as a stronger, and consumer as a weaker party. Moreover, as shown in 
Perenicova, there is a close link between unfair commercial practices and unfair contract 
terms: the stipulation of an unfair contract term is considered as a form of unfair commercial 
practice.948  
 
The obligation of the national court to assess ex officio the fairness of a commercial practice 
and apply all relevant contract law consequences on a contract concluded under its impact, 
would not be contrary to the judgment of the ECJ in Perenicova. In this case, the Court 
pointed out that the occurrence of unfair commercial practices does not have a direct effect 
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on fairness of a contract term, but that in any case it represents one of the factors national 
courts may take into consideration while assessing the fairness of a contract term.949  
 
Herein, I argue that the national courts should check whether the fact that there was an unfair 
commercial practice, in particular the facts that constituted that unfair commercial practice, 
has particular contract law consequences under the national contract law, and if the answer is 
affirmative, in line with its case law on the UTD, the national courts has to draw the 
appropriate conclusions under national law in order to ensure that the consumer is exempted 
from all negative contractual consequences of an unfair commercial practice.950 
 
Such an approach is in line with the decision of the ECJ in Perenicova since the mere fact 
that trader was engaged in an unfair commercial practice would not automatically lead to the 
annulment of a contract concluded as the outcome of such practice, direct nullity of its term 
or any other contract law consequences, but the national court would have to check where the 
facts connected to a particular unfair commercial practices have, under the rules national 
contract laws, any effect on the validity of concluded contract.  
 
All in all, I advocate that the protection of consumers’ economic interests as protected by the 
UCPD needs to be recognised as being of highest public interest, and thus ex officio doctrine 
should apply, as it is already the case with the unfair contract terms and some other areas of 
consumer law. Accordingly, in case where the presence of unfair commercial practice has 
been confirmed, the national courts should be obliged to apply all relevant contract law 
consequences defined by the national laws in order to provide an adequate and effective 
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In summation, this thesis examined the relationship between the law on unfair commercial 
practices and consumer contract law. The thesis developed the claim that that the UCPD has 
had a strong impact on consumer contract law, despite the formal separation between two 
branches of law established in Article 3(2) of the UCPD. In order to substantiate this claim, 
the thesis examined the implications for consumer contract law of the main components of 
the regulatory regime laid down by the UCPD, namely, the notion of the average consumer, 
the duty to trade fairly, the duty of information and the remedies.  
 
By looking both at the theoretical underpinnings and at the actual operation of this regulatory 
regime, the thesis casts light on the way in which the UCPD has shaped consumer contract 
law. The thesis further showed that this is an ongoing phenomenon whose ramifications may 
be far-reaching, for it implies that the UCPD is powerfully fueling the Europeanization of 
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